FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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JANUARY, 1928

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE TARIFF CONTROVERSY WITH FRANCE

By F. W. Taussig

THERE is a curious reversal in the attitudes taken by France and the United States in their controversy regarding tariff rates. France now takes a position which, though she once held it, was given up by her at a date comparatively recent. The United States on her part now holds to one which she has chosen within a very few years, abandoning that which she had maintained through the greater part of her history. The United States once held to reciprocity, and now stands by the policy of most-favored-nation treatment. France once held to the most-favored-nation policy, and now stands by reciprocity.

France, as need hardly be said, has proposed, in the now pending negotiations, to deal with the United States separately, — quite without regard to what she may do for other countries. What rates of duty she may impose on products from Germany or Italy have no necessary bearing on her commercial relations with the United States. Each and every country is to be dealt with on the merits or demerits of the individual case; it is a matter of *quid pro quo* with each. This is what has come to be called the policy of reciprocity; a somewhat narrow use of the term, but one convenient for understanding the existing international complications.

Reciprocity in this sense has not always been the French policy. For a generation after the Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1860 — the famous treaty negotiated by Cobden and Chevalier, the starting point in the history of commercial policy in modern Europe — France pursued the quite different policy of most-favored-nation treatment. The treaty of 1860 provided for reciprocal reductions of duties. England, already on a free trade basis in almost every respect, carried free trade to its final stage by admitting French silks free; and she lowered her revenue

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duties on French wines and spirits. France substituted for a highly protective régime, which had indeed been carried in many instances to the point of complete prohibition, one of moderate and simple rates. These moderate rates were subsequently applied, through the most-favored-nation clause, to imports from other countries. A succession of treaties, with Belgium, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Germany (i. e. the German Zollverein), provided for mutual treatment of this kind. Central Europe was gradually covered by an interlacing network of engagements, the general effect of which was to bring about equality of treatment on all hands, and — what of course is the thing of importance — a much moderated range of duties all around. This situation was chained down, so to speak, by the Treaty of Frankfurt (1871), which formally closed the war of 1870–71. Germany and France then guaranteed to each other most-favored-nation treatment; not indeed universally so by the express terms of the treaty, but so widely that the effect was to make the arrangement of far reaching importance. As regards the important countries, it may be said to have been of almost universal application, with the one striking exception of the United States. This country always stood quite outside the system; and France was quite free to deal with us independently, and steadily did so. But in Europe the system was not only of far reaching application, but of indefinite duration. The stipulations under the Treaty of Frankfurt were not limited as to time, and were not terminable except by something which would terminate the entire treaty; it needed the great crash of 1914 to put an end to their binding force, and so to sweep away the whole complex of engagements.

Even before 1914, however, some disintegration had begun. These commitments, apparently destined to permanence, became irksome, and were shaken or worn away at this point and at that. The system was in a fair way of disappearing even before the great cataclysm suddenly broke it up. It is of no great concern for the present discussion to consider how and why the protectionist spirit grew in all Europe and made the moderated duties unwelcome. It is easy to see that the binding effect of the Treaty of Frankfurt should have been irritating to both French and Germans, and should have led both to try to circumvent the liberal commercial article. Like most countries of the Continent, France turned more and more to protection, and more and more

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to arrangements with other countries which, so far as the engagement of 1871 with Germany made possible, gave her some special and privileged advantages, granting in return reciprocal treatment calculated to be just enough (no more) to purchase these advantages of her own. And finally, when the Treaty of Versailles set her free in 1919, she began to pursue openly and vigorously the policy of special bargaining, of dealing with each country on a *quid pro quo* basis. Of the degree of success she has had in the wider application of this policy, and of its meaning for world affairs, I shall say more presently. It led inevitably to her present attitude toward the United States. She proposes to deal with us quite independently of what she may be doing with other countries, and to offer us any favors extended to them, in whole or in part, only if satisfied with what we on our side may grant to her. So she had done, as regards the United States, even in prewar days; so she proposes still to do.

The United States, as I have intimated, has changed her ways in just the opposite direction. She long held to a policy of separate reciprocal arrangements. She did so as regards the formal interpretation of the most-favored-nation clause in treaties; she did so too as regards some important arrangements with other countries.

The formal interpretation of the most-favored-nation clause by the United States is significant not so much for the concrete effects which it had on our treaties and our trade as for the general attitude it showed. The United States long maintained that when such a phrase as "most favored nation" appeared in a treaty signed by her, it should mean, not that she undertook to give the other signatory country identically the same treatment as the best (most favorable) given anywhere else, but merely as good treatment as was warranted by the treatment reciprocally given then and there. It was to be understood merely to promise what was fairly equivalent to what the other country did. A shrewd Yankee to whom I once tried to explain this way of interpreting the most-favored-nation clause remarked, "Ah! thus understood, the clause means not that you engage to give the other fellow exactly as good terms as you give the rest, but only that you give him *as good a trade*." Precisely; the United States long planted herself on the Yankee position of giving as good a trade, and this only. It was not an unnatural ground for a young and comparatively weak country, dealing with the

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experienced negotiators of older countries and somewhat suspicious of their maneuvers and intents.

The substantive effects of this general attitude, — trade for trade, concession for concession, — appeared not so much in the formal interpretation of the most-favored-nation clause as in some negotiations on specific tariff arrangements. Treaties on the reciprocity basis in this sense were concluded or proposed especially with some South American countries. These date back to the 90'ties, to the days of Secretary Blaine and to the earlier and domineering stage of our attempts at closer affiliation with our South American neighbors. In the end the reciprocity arrangements of that time, like the interpretation of the most-favored-nation clause, had in few cases any outcome of much economic or political consequence. Those with Hawaii and Cuba did indeed lead to important results, as is familiar enough; and a somewhat ambiguous arrangement with Brazil persisted, and was not without some importance.

In the main, however, the United States, while rejecting overtly the most-favored-nation principle and even seeming to insist on the opposite policy with some self-righteousness, in fact was dealing with almost every country on precisely that basis. As matters turned out, we treated all alike, barring our relations with dependencies and semi-dependencies. It was therefore not difficult to make a change. A complete *volte face* was made in 1923, when Mr. Hughes was Secretary of State. The immediate occasion for the change seems to have been the termination by the United States of that ambiguous arrangement with Brazil, to which I have just alluded; an arrangement curious in form as well as in substance, by which the United States really gave nothing yet got something. It was a good riddance. And yet is not easy to understand just what considerations led the State Department to make a complete sweep, or why it was made at this precise date. It was not in accord with the previous policy of the Republican Party; rather, it was such as might have been expected from the Democrats, especially when they were under President Wilson's leadership. But made it was. We turned suddenly to the policy of complete most-favored-nation treatment. And apparently this new basis is established for good. There has been no whisper of any modification. We now offer to all countries identically the same treatment, and expect from each of them complete equality of treatment. No longer trade for trade, no

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complicated negotiations. Whereas France, to repeat, wants trade for trade. She wants reciprocal and special engagements such as seem to her (and she hopes would seem to us also) mutually reasonable, regardless of what either country may arrange with third parties.

It is to be observed that Congress has passed no legislation embodying in set terms this new American policy. Inferentially, to be sure, Congress has sanctioned it. The Tariff Act of 1922, that now in force, has a provision (Section 317) which authorizes the President to impose retaliatory duties on the products of countries which fail to extend to producers of the United States the same treatment as they get elsewhere, — countries which impose on American products "any unreasonable charge, exaction . . . not equally enforced upon the like articles of every foreign country." While thus setting up a means of compelling equal treatment to ourselves, there is no authorization for any inequality of treatment for others, — no discretionary power granted to the President or any one else to lower a single duty imposed by Congress. There can be no bargaining under the statute, and no discrimination except when called for as a combative measure, a means of enforcing equality of treatment to ourselves.

So much as to the position now taken by the two countries. What is to be said on the merits?

My own sympathies are with the principle adopted by the United States, not with that to which this country so long had professed adherence, and which France now maintains. The most-favored-nation basis is simple, reasonable, commendable. It leaves every country free to settle its tariff policy according to its own good or bad judgment; to determine for itself what it believes to be for its advantage, and to regulate its industrial development as it may think fit. No one would question that this is a matter upon which, amid the clash of differing opinions, every country must decide for itself. Having settled its policy, each country then deals with others on that footing and on no other. It asks no special favors and grants no special favors. Nor is it inconsistent with the simplicity of this procedure that there should be countervailing or supposedly punitive duties on imports from countries that fail to give equal treatment. Retaliation of this kind is to be regarded as an unwelcome but inevitable adjunct to the effectiveness of the general plan. No doubt the

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practice of retaliation often fails to bring about the desired result of equal treatment. It may lead to substantial and permanent modifications in the tariff rates of the maneuvering countries, and so to excesses not expected and presumably unwelcome. On the whole, however, it is to be admitted that consequences of this kind, while not impossible in connection with most-favored-nation treatment, bring no serious danger of modifying its single-minded character; nor can it be said that they are inconsistent with a sincere desire to maintain that character.

As regards the general tone of foreign relations, their friendly acceptance, their continuing smoothness, the most-favored-nation basis is more promising than that of reciprocity. Reciprocal dealings, conducted more or less at arms length, lead almost of necessity to bickering and friction. So it was with that interpretation of the most-favored-nation clause to which the United States formerly adhered, namely that of giving, not equal terms but as good a trade. What are reciprocally equal terms, and what is as good a trade? On these questions the opinions of the negotiating parties commonly are far apart. Each party scans suspiciously the offers of the other, and schemes to get as much as it can for as little as possible. The diplomats and experts who conduct the negotiations take a certain sporting pleasure in the game, exaggerate the importance of minor moves and nominal concessions, and lead their constituents also to regard the whole performance as one of fence and parry.

No better illustration of this inherent difficulty can be found than in the experience of France both before the Great War and since. Before the war, France — so far as its treaty commitments allowed of a departure from the policy of equal treatment, — entered into negotiations and was involved in controversies with several countries, conspicuously with Switzerland and Italy. The outcome was depressing. Tariff wars resulted, punitive duties were imposed on both sides, trade which had been advantageous to both was disrupted, and finally compromises were accepted which at the best left matters as they had stood before. Since 1919, again, France has negotiated on the same plan; and while the consequences have not been as regrettable as in former days, nevertheless they have been far from satisfactory.[1] France has endeavored to arrange for favors to herself

[1] For an excellent account, see the article by H. van V. Fay, on "Commercial Policy in Post-war Europe," in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May, 1927.

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from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Belgium, Austria. She has not stipulated that they shall be confined to her; but they have been such as to inure most to the advantage of her trade. In return she has given concessions in the way of moderated duties on her own part, — concessions not greater than the course of the negotiations seemed to render necessary. The dominant political and military position of France with regard to some of these countries has enabled her to conclude treaties which from her point of view were advantageous, yet not without a strain on friendly relations. In other cases she has quite failed to attain the desired object. She has certainly left in the wake of all some feeling of irritation, of suspicion, of unwilling acceptance of unwelcome terms. And finally she is compelled to reconsider her entire position because of her negotiations with Germany. It will be remembered that the Treaty of Versailles compelled Germany to give most-favored-nation treatment to all the Allies, but did not compel the Allies to give Germany similar treatment. That provision in the treaty endured for five years only, and lapsed in 1925. Since then Germany has frankly pursued the policy of most-favored-nation treatment all around, and has offered to deal with France on that basis and on that basis only. France has finally acceded, in substance though not in so many words or in every detail. There can be no question that as between the two old enemies this basis for their commercial and industrial relations will conduce to mutual good feeling and to the permanency of peace.

And yet something more is to be said. The position taken by France is not entirely stubborn, is not entirely without explanation, and is not entirely without justification. This is to be admitted as regards the relations between France and almost all the countries she has been dealing with; and it is so particularly as regards the United States.

France is in an exceptional position. To a considerable extent her exports consist of articles of luxury, such as silk goods, gloves, laces, fine grades of woolens, wines, perfumes, the so-called *articles de Paris*. On such things other countries, sorely in need of revenue, are likely to levy high duties. And these high duties, while levied ostensibly for revenue, often have behind them something more: a lurking desire, perhaps an overt purpose, to protect and strengthen the domestic industries producing the

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same or competing articles. Of this combination of motives and pretexts there is no more striking illustration than the duties which the United States long has imposed upon silk goods. They have been for many years among the highest of our duties. They were originally made high because of revenue needs. They still are often defended on the ground that luxuries should be highly taxed. But they are also defended, and undoubtedly have their main strength, because they protect the domestic silk manufacture. Something of the same sort is true of our duties, no less extreme, on the fine grades of woolen cloths for men and dress goods for women. Most irritating of all, from the French point of view, is our way of treating her wines: high duties in old days, prohibition now. Before prohibition, the French had a suspicion, by no means unfounded, that our duties on their wines were not merely revenue duties, but were imposed partly because they gave protection to the wine producers of California and other regions. And nowadays they find us quite incomprehensible. To a Frenchman it is incredible that the glass of wine consumed habitually and soberly by every class in his country should be regarded as more damaging or immoral than the American's cup of coffee. He is not to be blamed if he has a suspicion that there is something more than high moral fervor behind our prohibition régime. Are not our vineyards in California prosperous? And may not the French suffer from an intolerant and hypocritical obstruction of their commerce?

It is, I suspect, the peculiar character of the goods so largely exported by France which goes far to explain the policy she has pursued since 1919. No doubt other elements enter. The French have a bad taste in the mouth as regards the most-favored-nation clause. Imbedded as it had been in the Treaty of Frankfurt, it recalls a period of bitter humiliation. And further, the French themselves, it must be freely admitted, are no less resolutely and uncompromisingly protectionist than the United States. In France, as in this country and in every country, each interested group and each constituency clamors for protection, and tariff legislation and tariff policy are enormously influenced by the necessity of bringing all within the scope of the system. It is thus true that France grants concessions sparingly and unwillingly, as would the United States if she granted any at all. None the less she has more solid grounds for granting concessions only in exchange for concessions to her own commodities, than

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is the case with most countries and certainly than is the case with the United States.

There is a more general consideration; one that bears not only on the French attitude and ours, but on all commercial relations. The word "favor" in the discussion of most-favored-nation treatment would seem to mean something. It implies some degree of friendliness, some real concession, something more than bare equality of treatment. The United States, it is true, offers the same terms to all countries; but in substance there are favors to not one. The countries with whom we deal may well say to themselves, even though they cannot well say it in the formal communications of their foreign representatives, that while we offer everybody the same treatment, we merely offer the same bad treatment all around. Our rates are so high, our policy of protection is so intolerant, so all-embracing, so inclined to extension to every blessed article on the demands of each interested group of producers, that our most-favored-nation policy amounts to universal severity and universal ill treatment. Under such circumstances can we expect any warmth of feeling, any cordial response to our newly taken basis of negotiation?

This reflection has a wider bearing. It is applicable to the situation in which Europe finds herself to-day. Something in the nature of a contest has been going on ever since the war between the two opposing principles, that of reciprocity and that of most-favored-nation treatment. There is nothing sacrosanct about either; they must be judged by their fruits. It is pretty well agreed on all hands that a satisfactory economic development for Europe, and especially for the continent of Europe, is dependent on the resumption of a ready flow of trade throughout its area and on a lowering of the cumbersome and artificial barriers which have multiplied so much in consequence of the redistribution of European territory. I will not stop to debate whether complete free trade might be desirable for the whole region. It may be granted unhesitatingly that there are unanswerable political reasons, and some cogent economic reasons, that work against a universal application of free trade. At all events a United States of Europe having the same freedom of intercourse throughout its length and breadth as that enjoyed by the United States of America is quite outside the realm of things practicable. But some lowering of the barriers which now impede an obviously beneficial course of trade, some mitigation of intolerant protec-

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tion, seem to me quite possible and eminently desirable. Removal of duties on foodstuffs and on fundamental raw materials, moderation in the duties on manufactured goods, the restriction of revenue duties to commodities to which they are really applicable and in such manner that they shall be in fact revenue duties, and finally reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment all around, — these seem to be the lines upon which real progress is feasible. And these are the lines along which, on the whole, the League of Nations has proceeded, or at least thrown its influence. They are not, upon the whole, the lines upon which France has proceeded. Nor are they in substance, though they may be in form, those on which the United States is now proceeding. France may set no good example, but we set none better.

A suggestion has been made for a way out. Apparently it came from France; and apparently it has not been rejected once for all by the United States. It looks to the utilization of the so-called flexible provisions of the Tariff Act of 1922 as a means for securing a reduction of our duties upon some French products.

These provisions, in the well-known section 315 of the Tariff Act of 1922, rest on the principle that duties should be in accord with the differences, as between the United States and foreign countries, in cost of production of the several commodities. Under them the United States Tariff Commission is authorized, and indeed called upon, to make investigations of costs of production in this country and in "the principal competing foreign country," and to report to the President what differences in cost it finds. The President then "shall" lower duties or raise them, to such an extent as to equalize competition between the domestic producers and the foreign; with the limitation that no changes may be made, up or down, of more than fifty percent or the duties fixed by the act of 1922.

The proposal to use this machinery as a makeweight in commercial negotiations, or indeed for any bargaining or political purpose, makes one pause. No such use was remotely anticipated when it was set up. Its purpose was supposedly scientific, and at all events quite without any preconceived object. Much was said at the time about the scientific fixing of rates of duty, the creation of something better than the haphazard procedure of Congressional committees and of Congress itself. A rigorous system, based upon a principle and not subject to whim or in-

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fluence or political pressure, was to be substituted for the loose methods of former days. The Tariff Commission in its investigations, and the President in thereupon settling a duty, were supposed to be indifferent to the outcome. It might be to raise a duty, and it might be to lower one. To use this device as a means of securing some end had in view from the beginning would seem quite contrary to the intent and spirit of the entire plan.

We all know, however, that political devices sometimes have unexpected consequences, and are used in ways and for purposes not thought of when they are created. Just what the effect of these flexible provisions shall be depends not a little upon the manner in which they are administered. It is quite conceivable, nay, it might seem fairly probable, that a Commission with leanings against protection should happen to take up first and chiefly commodities upon which the duties were high, should find them greater than was warranted by the differences in cost, and in effect should use the provisions for bringing about reductions. And on the other hand a Commission made up of good protectionists might easily happen to give chief attention to articles on which duties were low and bring about increases. As a matter of fact the Commission, during the years in which the arrangement has been in effect, has given attention chiefly to commodities upon which duties were alleged to be unduly low, and the practical effect of its operations has been to screw them up somewhat. Only in a couple of quite insignificant cases has a change in the other direction been made. But these may be only the throes of youth and growth. It is the wish and hope of all observers and critics — except some hide-bound protectionists — that the Commission shall settle down to a strictly judicial attitude, and shall determine the field of its inquiries as well as the substantive conclusions without design of reaching a result aimed at from the start.

In the statute itself there is no intimation who shall take the initiative in this procedure. Heretofore the initiative has been taken in practice by interested parties — either domestic producers who hope to secure an advance of rates, or importers or consumers who hope for a decrease. It would seem that almost any one can start the machinery; the President himself, or the Department of State, or the Commission, or an interested party. Somehow the Commission can easily be brought to making an investigation on any desired article. It might be led to turn, for

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example, to silk fabrics, articles of large economic importance, in which the French are particularly interested. There is no doubt in my mind, or in the mind of anyone having even superficial information on the subject, what would prove to be the general outcome of an investigation in this field. The duties on most silk goods are higher than suffices to equalize cost of production between the United States and France. How much higher, remains to be seen; and the range of difference would not be the same on all grades of goods. It is rather the medium and cheaper qualities than the finer which would be found to be now mulcted by duties higher than was warranted by the test of differences in cost. The general outcome, I feel sure, would be in the direction of lowered rates. The same sort of outcome, it might be added, would be reached if investigation were made upon the duties of cotton goods or woolen goods, indeed almost all textiles.

Is it desirable to deal in this way with the problem of our commercial relations with France? And is the procedure likely to be followed? I confess to doubts whether it is desirable; no less doubts whether it is likely to be followed. It is not desirable, because it endangers an interesting and in some ways unique experiment in tariff legislation. The Tariff Commission, to repeat, is supposed to be a judicial body and to undertake judicial tasks. One may or may not like the principle upon which it is supposed to act, that of equalizing differences in cost. For myself, I have no high opinion of its validity on strictly economic grounds. But such as it is, it should be adhered to without indirection. To plan the inquiries and calculations of the Tariff Commission with the expectation that the result should lend itself to a commercial policy indicated in advance seems hardly less than stultification. It is difficult enough at best to maintain the principle on which the establishment of the Commission rested, that of taking the tariff question out of politics. This proposed use of its powers and resources would serve not so much to take the tariff out of politics as to bring the Commission in.

Whether any such use of the flexible provisions will in fact be made, remains to be seen. The procedure would of course meet with stiff opposition. The American silk manufacturers are among the most uncompromising advocates of sustained high duties, and would contest the move with every ounce of their influence. They would have the support of the general body of

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fervent protectionists. There would be rumblings and upheavals in Congress, and in the staunch Republican press. The Administration itself, even though disposed to friendly relations with France, is quite as much disposed to friendly relations with its followers and supporters. When it is considered what it all might lead to, the feasibility of this way out becomes dubious.

A *modus vivendi* has been reached. The French have agreed to restore virtually the situation which existed before the present controversy began. This does not mean that the United States gets the full benefit of France's minimum tariff. We did not have that sort of most-favored treatment before, and indeed never had it during the whole period (since 1892) of the French maximum and minimum system. But it means that the move recently made by the French is taken back for the time being. The United States offers no change, standing pat on its newborn most-favored-nation policy. The agreement is avowedly temporary. The French are content, it would seem, to wait for a while and see whether the United States on further consideration will conclude to make some concessions.

What, then, will the United States finally do? The people of this country are recurrently called on to consider just how far they propose to carry their protectionist policy, and just how intolerant they propose to be in the way of keeping out every scrap of imported goods that might interfere with any clamorous domestic producer. Should we not consider these larger aspects of the tariff question in connection with the pending negotiations? We have proclaimed singlemindedness in tariff policy; and therein, as I have said, we are proceeding not unwisely. But does this necessarily mean complete disregard of other people? Even those who say most about holding aloof from European complications, say much also about the maintenance of friendly relations with all and the promotion of mutual good feeling. Now that we turn to a systematic policy of most-favored-nation treatment, why not put into it some element of real favor and of genuine friendliness? It needs no acumen to discern that France does not stand alone in her feelings about our tariff rates. Other countries may make no moves such as she has made, but none the less they shrug their shoulders at the contrast between our courteous gestures and our stern realities. We are eager to export, and above all to export manufactured goods. Our Department of Commerce bends its energy

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to the utmost toward promoting their sales. But when others wish to send goods to us, we bend our energies to erecting barriers as high as we can devise. It would be no bad outcome of the pending negotiations and debates if we were led to do something toward promoting beneficial trade and good relations not with France only, but with all the world?

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ITALY, JUGOSLAVIA AND LILLIPUTIA

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

EVERYWHERE in the Balkans today is felt the hand, half hidden, half disclosed, of Rome. Every international event is traced, rightly or wrongly, to the supposed will of Premier Mussolini or his servants. If Rome has been seeking prestige she has won it — the prestige of fear. A Serbian general is assassinated by Bulgarian *comitadjis* outside his headquarters in Macedonia; at once people whisper, do not the Bulgarian revolutionaries visit Rome regularly to receive their orders and the funds to execute them?[1] The Albanian Minister to Belgrade and Prague, the too powerful and popular Černa Bey, who though the brother-in-law of Italy's manikin, President Ahmed Zogu, is known to rate the friendship of Jugoslavia above that of Italy, is shot down as he leaves his hotel; had not the assassin been educated in Italy and had he not come to Prague from Rome only four days before he committed the crime? Gen. Averescu attempts to break up the Little Entente and prepares a military coup in Rumania; was it not Italy that by suddenly recognizing Rumania's annexation of Bessarabia furnished him with the prestige that he thought would enable him to seize absolute power and add one more dictatorship to the European list? Wherever Balkan politics are jumpy and worried — in Albania, in Saloniki, in Macedonia, in Bessarabia, on the borders of Hungary — there is Italy, in reality or in shadow, to aggravate the worries and augment the fears. Today all Balkan roads lead from Rome.

The main rope in the Balkan tug-of-war stretches across the Adriatic from Rome to Tirana, and thence to Belgrade. Albania is the unfortunate middle marker, first hauled in this direction and then that, and always feeling herself threatened with extinction. For the moment Italy is having her way. Her plans, matured through three stages, move forward with precision.

The first stage, which might be called *the stage of legal preparation*, dates from the declaration of the Conference of Ambassadors on November 9, 1921. On that occasion the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan took the strange course

[1] Nor does the jubilation of the Italian press give the lie to such a theory. A Bulgarian statesman said to the writer the other day in Sofia: "I am grateful to Italy for her support, but the enthusiasm of the Italian papers every time a Serbian is killed seems to me too obvious to be good taste."

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of declaring in advance what the representatives of their governments on the Council of the League of Nations would do in case trouble arose in Albania — namely, they agreed that their delegates at Geneva should receive "instructions" to entrust the maintenance of Albania's territorial integrity to Italy. Incidentally this agreement was a blow to the League, as it abolished in this particular instance the freedom of the members of the Council to decide what course to pursue in a given situation — a fundamental part of their right and duty — and gave one member state a privileged position in the affairs of another.

The stage of direct negotiation first produced the Treaty of Tirana, signed by the governments of Premier Mussolini and President Ahmed Zogu on November 27, 1926. This treaty stated that the maintenence of the *status quo* in Albania — "political, juridical and territorial" — was to be the especial charge of the Italian Government. The Powers in 1921 had assigned to Italy the right of acting on their behalf to maintain the territorial integrity of Albania. Ahmed Zogu now extended Italy's right to include the maintenence of his own personal régime. Belgrade was furious, as Foreign Minister Nintchitch had made friendship with Italy the corner-stone of his policy and had entered into a gentleman's agreement with Sig. Mussolini that neither should act in questions of mutual interest without giving advance warning to the other. London and Paris were also disturbed, but restricted their activity to counselling patience at Belgrade and to securing Sig. Mussolini's promise that he would at once enter into direct conversations with Jugoslavia in order to remove her suspicions that the treaty was primarily directed against her.[2]

If a further seal on Italian control over Ahmed Zogu's fortunes were needed, it was set by the second Treaty of Tirana, news of which reached the world on November 25, 1927. Actually, it introduced no important new element into the relationship agreed upon by the two governments a year earlier, but it committed Sig. Mussolini more defiantly than ever to his policy of tutelage and made it more difficult for him to back down in case of dispute.

The stage of active exploitation is meanwhile in full swing. Italy's chief instruments are the Albanian National Bank, established as a *succursale* of a group of Italian banks, with headquarters in

[2] The new Jugoslav Minister, M. Rakitch, sent to Rome eight months ago for the purpose of beginning these negotiations, has not been received by Sig. Mussolini, Minister for Foreign Affairs, since his formal call to present his letters of credence last April.

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Rome, and the Society for the Economic Development of Albania, headed by Sig. Mario Alberti of the Credito Italiano. Forty-nine percent of the stock of this bank — which acts as treasurer for the Albanian State, has the power to issue money, asks for all bids for public works, and makes all contracts — was supposed to go to Albania; but none has reached there yet. The euphoniously named Society has given the Albanian Government a loan to finance public works. In return, all revenues from monopolies and customs are pledged as security. The loan was nominally for 50,000,000 gold francs, and to this day it is doubtful whether there are two dozen people in Albania, outside the foreign colony, who understand that the terms were so arranged that the indebtedness of Albania (including bankers' fees, advertising, Italian taxes, etc.) really amounts to 70,500,000 gold francs. The Albanian Minister of Finance last March budgeted 5,636,850 gold francs as interest due on this loan, and President Ahmed Zogu informed the writer on October 1, 1927, that to date Albania had received "about 6,000,000 gold francs" — not a very advantageous transaction on its face, the more so as no gold has ever actually come into the country, all advances from the loan being in the form of paper bank-notes issued by the aforementioned National Bank.

But of course none of the 5,636,850 francs thus budgeted were ever actually paid over to Italy, nor was there ever the remotest possibility that they could be. The most successful collector of taxes in Albanian history, Fan Noli, managed to obtain about 17,000,000 francs in his best year. Last year's budget allowed for expenditures of 23,500,000 francs; there was a serious deficit, though just how great is not known as the pay of officials and officers is far in arrears. At any rate it is safe to assume that Ahmed Zogu today does not dispose of revenues in excess of 20,000,000 francs, and the sum is probably much less, particularly as exports have fallen off heavily.[3] Nevertheless the present budget envisages expenditures of 29,000,000 francs, of which some 12,000,000 are for army and gendarmerie expenses.

Faced with bankruptcy, the only possible course was for Ahmed Zogu to beg off the interest payments due to the Society for the Economic Development of Albania. Happily he found the

[3] In 1925 Albanian exports were valued at $3,112,503 and imports at $4,208,380, an unfavorable balance of roughly a million dollars. In 1926 exports were $2,309,649 and imports $4,800,121, an unfavorable balance of nearly two and a half million dollars. The decrease in exports was due to the bad olive crop. The crop has again been a failure this year.

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THE BALKAN PENINSULA TODAY

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Italian Government ready to help. By "Decree-Law" No. 521, signed March 3, 1927, the Italian Government authorized the Italian Minister of Finance to advance to the Society for the Economic Development of Albania the sum due from Ahmed Zogu's government to meet the service on the loan (which in this instance is spoken of by its real total, namely 70,500,000 francs, instead of the 50,000,000 francs always referred to in Tirana).[4] The burden for the first expenditures in Albania was thus shifted to the shoulders of the Italian tax-payer.

According to President Ahmed Zogu, the same course will be followed next spring, but he is confident that by the following year returns on the investment will begin to materialize in the form of larger state revenues and that thenceforward everything will be plain sailing. However, as most of the expenditures are not of a sort to become directly productive, and some, as for instance the small railway being constructed from Durazzo to Tirana, will always remain a heavy liability, it is easy to draw a different picture. In this picture Italy (the Italian Government itself, not merely the Society for the Economic Development of Albania) holds a mortgage on Albania which Albania can never hope to pay off and on which she can never pay a cent of interest. Italy thus is in possession of a new right, beyond that acquired by virtue of the Declaration of the Ambassadors and the Treaty of Tirana, namely the right of foreclosing her mortgage and taking control of Albania in order to protect her financial interests there.

That Italy would not be able to do this without risking a war with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which has repeatedly stated that it will never tolerate the establishment of an Italian "mandate" in the Balkan peninsula, may account for another phase of Italian activity in Albania, the military.

As soon as the loan had been arranged, Gen. Maglietta, Chief of the Engineering Section of the General Staff of the Italian Army, arrived in Albania and laid out a general scheme of roads, which he then entrusted for execution to Capt. Gorbino of the Italian Army. Subsequently Capt. Gorbino was named head of the Engineering Corps of the Albanian Army, and since July his road-making duties have devolved on another Italian officer. The roads already constructed or in course of construction are

[4] For text of "Decree-Law" 521 see *Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi e dei Decreti del Regno d'Italia*, Vol. I, 6–12 Marzo, 1927, pp. 930–931.

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in the main directed toward the Jugoslav frontier. In many cases this is natural enough, but it is not natural that some of the most important of them lead from tiny harbors which do not exist in a commercial sense, but which might serve as convenient points for the debarkation of troops.[5] As one Italian officer remarked, "Our object is to connect Durazzo with Kossovo, and Valona with the heart of Macedonia" — both regions within the Jugoslav frontiers. The undertaking is now being supplemented by the work of fifteen officers of the topographical section of the Italian Army, headed by Col. Feraro, under a contract to map the country during the next seven years at a cost of 200,000 francs per year.

At the beginning of Ahmed Zogu's régime an Albanian army commission inspected the military supplies on hand and found 37,000 rifles and 12 mountain guns in good condition. About half these rifles, all of which were of Austrian make, had never been used. Eight Italian mountain guns were added. All this equipment has now been discarded, even the eight new guns, presumably because they are not of the pattern now used in the Italian Army and so could not readily be coördinated with the artillery of an Italian expeditionary force. Forty new mountain guns (65 millimeters) have now arrived, also 20,000 rifles, also 120 Fiat machine guns. Every uniform that an Albanian soldier now wears is also of Italian origin.

The figures are less important in themselves than as evidence that the Albanian military machine is now armed as if it were a branch of the Italian Army. More important still is the question where the money is coming from to pay for all this new equipment, and for the hundreds of motor camions, the tents and the other supplies that clutter the harbor of Durazzo. We have seen that Albania is hardly in a position to undertake the wholesale re-equipment of its army. The answer seems to be that these vast supplies are being charged to the account of the Italian Government with the Albanian National Bank, but no definite information on the matter can be obtained in Tirana and it is never mentioned in the dummy Albanian Parliament nor in any statement of the Minister of Finance or the Minister of War.

Meanwhile the Albanian Army has come largely under the direction of Italian officers, who wear the Albanian uniform but continue to receive their pay from Rome. The writer has a list

[5] For example, Patok, Pali, Divjak, Porto Semeni, Porto Palermo.

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

This map shows the progress made with the extensive system of roads being constructed in Albania under the supervision of the General Staff of the Italian Army.

In central Albania the road from Durazzo to Elbasan has been improved with good bridges, etc., and extended to the Jugoslav frontier at Lake Okhrida. It is passable even in midwinter, and one can motor from Durazzo as far as Koritsa in a single day. A supplementary road now under construction from Tirana to Elbasan will link up with the purely strategic road that is being built parallel to the Jugoslav frontier northward from Librasht to Pishkopi and Kukius.

In the north, the road from Scutari to Puka is being prolonged through the mountains toward the Prizren region. The heavy bridges seem meant for a sort of traffic for which there obviously are no economic needs. The northern frontier will also be fed from the small ports of S. Giovanni di Medua and Patok by the new road up the valley of the River Mat.

In the extreme south the road from Santi Quaranta to Koritsa is being shortened and improved. But the most important new link in the south is that being built from Berat to Koritsa. When this is finished, Koritsa will be the principal military concentration point in the south, connected with the sea at Porto Semeni, Valona, Porto Palermo and Santi Quaranta.

A related fact of some importance is that the island of Sasseno, off Valona, is Italian territory; it has been elaborately fortified and equipped as an Italian naval base.

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of 56 such officers, as of October 1, 1927, but it was incomplete even then and is still more so today. The work that most of them are doing cannot by any stretch of the imagination be labeled "instruction," the term recently used by a Tirana correspondent of the London *Times*. Some of their posts, for example, are commanders of the general army dépôts at Durazzo and Tirana, commanders of the three army groups (Lieut. Cols. of the Italian General Staff Combara, Secui and Nebbia), the commanders of the service of supply, of the artillery, of the engineering corps, commanders of various infantry battalions and companies, even the commander of the President's personal guard!

Connect these military preparations with the privilege which Italy claims to have obtained to act as the guardian of the government of Ahmed Zogu against any threat, external or internal, and the excuse which the non-payment of interest gives her to intervene for the protection of her interests even should Ahmed Zogu or some successor *not* want it, and you have the answer to the question why Jugoslavia, believing that her safety and the future peace of the peninsula depend on preventing any outside Power from starting again the traditional chess game of Austria-Hungary and Russia, is crying out against the policy of Rome and against the British statesmen who condone and seem to encourage it. The retort that Jugoslavia really has an attack of "sour grapes" and is merely annoyed because she would like to be doing in Albania precisely what Italy is doing has some weight. The answer can only be that after all she is not doing it, that her whole interest is obviously to obtain a period of peace for internal consolidation,[6] and that in any case she realizes what disadvantages attach to any project involving the termination of Albanian independence.[7]

Belgrade cannot hide the fact that Italian preëminence in Albania is the more worrying because of the situation in Macedonia, where revolutionary outrages of Bulgarian origin occur every few days and keep the Jugoslav and Bulgarian Governments from arriving at any really cordial understanding. Were

[6] In this connection it is instructive to compare Jugoslav and Italian military expenditures. The Jugoslav budget for 1927–28 carries military items to the amount of 2,349,000,000 dinars, about 114,000,000 dinars less than last year. The Italian budget for military purposes is 4,625,000,000 lire, which when it was adopted was the equivalent of over 12,500,000,000 dinars — i.e. more than five times the Jugoslav expenditure.

[7] It will be recalled that M. Trumbitch refused Scutari as a sop for not getting Fiume at the Peace Conference, and that M. Nintchitch in 1924 refused an Italian offer of Northern Albania in compensation for a proposed Italian annexation of Valona.

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they on good terms, the Albanian question would lose much of its importance. Jugoslavia has no great opinion of Italian military prowess, fascist or otherwise, and feels that she could survive the ordeal of a war in which Italy was her sole opponent. She knows the superiority of Italian equipment, and admits that Italy could land in Albania, bombard or capture the Dalmatian coast towns, sink the little Jugoslav gunboats at Kotor, and even start an invasion of Slovenia by way of Longatico and Tarvis. But the Albanian people as distinct from the government do not love the Italians any better than they do the Jugoslavs, and are fond of recalling what they did to Italy's forces of occupation in 1920; indeed, it seems probable that in case of war the Italians would quickly find themselves fighting the Albanians as well as the Jugoslavs. As for Italian exploits on the coast, they would seriously harm but would not endanger the Jugoslav state. Moreover, the Jugoslavs know that their army is esteemed by neutral military experts and that it would have the advantage of fighting a defensive campaign on familiar terrain.

But what the Jugoslavs obviously fear is that Bulgaria might take occasion in such a conflict to square accounts for her last two disastrous wars. A war with Italy on one front and with Bulgaria on another would be very unpleasant. Bulgaria is conscious of this Jugoslav fear, and though the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, M. Bouroff, says plainly that he wants a *rapprochement* with Jugoslavia, he seems to be trying to prolong the present situation in order to get better terms. On the other hand, Belgrade is a bit doubtful about taking Bulgarian protestations of friendship at their face value, not only because of the heritage of the past and because of what it calls the Bulgarian Government's weakness in coping with the Macedonian organizations that operate openly in Sofia itself, but because at this particular moment M. Moloff, the Bulgarian Finance Minister, is trying to get the blessing of Geneva for an international loan and is therefore presumably anxious for his government to appear as pacific as possible. And so we have the old vicious circle of mutual distrust, which can merely suit third parties whose interest it is to keep the Balkan states divided and weak. The only counsel one might give the two governments concerned is to make up their minds firmly whether in principle they desire a *rapprochement* and whether they would look upon it as a corner-stone of their foreign policy over a period of years. If so, they must on the one

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hand ignore temptations to reap minor advantages and on the other feel strong enough to be generous. One cannot always sell at the top of the market.

Lacking this settlement with Bulgaria, which would constitute the surest possible guaranty of Balkan peace, Jugoslavia imagines herself faced with the sort of calculated maneuvers that Serbian statesmen remember from before the war, though then they originated north of the Danube instead of across the Adriatic. Her tendency naturally is to magnify the menace. To an outsider it seems hardly possible that Mussolini is deliberately planning a war with Jugoslavia, using Albania as the *point de depart*. Even supposing that he dared risk mobilizing the country, he cannot be absurd enough to count on English support in the event of an armed conflict where the blame was either mainly his or more or less divided. England may be glad to utilize him as a bogey-man against the Turks and the Bolsheviks, as a counter-weight to France on the Continent, and as a check on the growth of Slav supremacy in the Near East; but only so far, and no further. And without English support even Sig. Mussolini must feel the inadequacy of his position, the more so as France and Jugoslavia are now entering into a five-year treaty of mutual defense similar to the Little Entente treaties.

This treaty was prepared and initialed in March, 1926, after Italy had refused M. Nintchitch's suggestion to enter into a three-cornered agreement with France and Jugoslavia, giving as the reason that her freedom of action in the Adriatic could not be circumscribed. After due notice in Rome, the treaty has now been signed at Paris (Nov. 11, 1927) by M. Briand and M. Marinkovitch, and is to be registered promptly at Geneva. Sig. Mussolini will again be urged to join. But he is not likely to relinquish his point of view so easily, and we shall probably see the present community of interests between France and Jugoslavia intensified. Though the wording of the treaty is most pacific, it is less likely to result in M. Briand's becoming a mediator between Italy and Jugoslavia (a rôle which Sir Austen Chamberlain has not found grateful and which has not added to his prestige) than in a widening of the Franco-Italian rift. News of the forthcoming signature of the treaty with Jugoslavia was favorably received by the French public, which is heartily tired of what it considers a futile but nevertheless aggravating anti-French slant in Italian foreign policy. The

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Italian press cannot spout bombast about Tunis, Morocco and Corsica on the one hand and Albania and Dalmatia on the other without bringing home to the French and Jugoslav publics their community of interests in the face of a common danger.

The new "unalterable" pact between Italy and Albania, announced two weeks after the signature of the Franco-Jugoslav treaty, does not really change the situation existing between the two countries. Perhaps it was partly what the *Journal des Débats* termed it, "a gesture of bad humor." But it was much more a device to confuse foreign opinion about the sequence of events in Albania, in other words, to make it appear that the bonds uniting Rome and Tirana resulted from the announcement of a Franco-Jugoslav alliance rather than — what is the fact — that the Franco-Jugoslav alliance followed a year after the Italo-Albanian treaty of November, 1926, and that the present pact between Tirana and Rome merely underlines the previously existing situation in the sort of picturesque terms that appeal to fascist sentiment. It is also to be noted that whereas the Franco-Jugoslav treaty makes much of the League of Nations and elaborates the methods of arbitration to be resorted to in case of trouble, the Italo-Albanian pact does not make mention of the League (beyond providing for registration at Geneva) nor of arbitration. Furthermore, it was only when negotiations to bring Italy into a general three-cornered pact were seen definitely to have failed that the French Ambassador in Rome gave notice of his government's intention to sign a separate treaty with Jugoslavia; but the "bad humor" of Rome led it to conceal the imminence of the second Treaty of Tirana just as it had concealed the first, and Paris and Belgrade heard of the matter only when the press communiqué was handed out at the Palazzo Chigi.

Despite these events it still seems likely that Sig. Mussolini's view extends much less far than both those who most admire him and those who most fear him are prone to imagine, that he pursues little successes here and there rather than *une politique de grande envergure*, that he aims chiefly at maintaining a "nuisance value" so that sometime the people who want peace will beg that he be given something somewhere to keep him quiet. In fine, he probably is playing for prestige, keeping the Balkan pot and every other possible pot boiling in Mr. Micawber's hope that something will turn up. If this thesis is correct, then the chief danger is that, as in the case of the Kaiser, either men or

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events may be too strong for him. A chance attempt on his life by a Jugoslav "Miss Gibson" or the assassination of the Italian Military Attaché in Albania near the Jugoslav frontier might force the Fascist Government to execute some of the threats with which it has kept flaming what Sig. Nitti calls "the Mediterranean fever" of its disciples. Nor on the other hand is the recent quiet attitude of Belgrade proof that a popular furor would not force it to some desperate step in case, let us say, a bomb were put under the royal palace by an Albanian who, like the assailant of Černa Bey, was popularly suspected of having traveled the road from Rome.

The problem, then, seems to be to devise a way of introducing some League of Nations cold water into the Albanian kettle before the lid suddenly blows off. Looking back, one wonders why what the League thought necessary for Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece was not thought necessary for the weakest, least experienced and most menaced of the Balkan states, and why instead of arranging for the international supervision of Albanian finances the League allowed the country's destiny to be placed in the hands of the Credito Italiano and the Banca Commerciale Italiana. True, the League could not have forced financial control on the country against its will, but there was more than one difficult period when London and Paris might easily have persuaded Tirana to ask Geneva's help, the more so as a League financial adviser had already been on the spot. The Jugoslav Government also made a mistake in not insisting on referring the whole Albanian matter to Geneva, under Article 11, at the time last spring when Italy made her famous complaint to London, Paris and Berlin about alleged Jugoslav encouragement of frontier incidents. Sir Austen Chamberlain and M. Briand urged them not to, for reasons still obscure, but they probably were wrong to acquiesce, especially as the evidence of British gendarmerie officers and other neutrals on the spot is that nothing out of the ordinary was on foot to justify the Italian complaint.

Today the best hope seems to be that Great Britain and France will be able to maintain such a situation in Europe generally that Sig. Mussolini will not be tempted and cannot be forced into adventures, and that meanwhile some way will be found of introducing the League of Nations into the bankruptcy proceedings toward which Albania is now headed.

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NEW CHINA'S POLITICAL BIBLE

By Hiram Bingham

STUDENTS of contemporary Chinese history and politics are well aware that the late Dr. Sun Yat Sen is held in greater esteem in China today than any living statesman or any political philosopher of the past century. Adhesion to his theories has been proclaimed, not only by the Cantonese or "Nationalist" government, but also by the Northern war lords. In many localities, including the Capital at Nanking, every Monday morning services are held in his honor. Obeisance is made thrice to his picture. His parting message is read aloud.

This message or "will," as it is sometimes called, is frequently found painted in large characters on walls or billboards in Southern and Central China. It is not long. It stresses the "imperative" necessity for all his disciples to "do their utmost" to realize "The Three Principles for the People." This is a book by Dr. Sun containing a series of sixteen lectures. It has become a political bible for "Nationalist" China. It is a compulsory text book for every school controlled by the Nationalists. There is no question that its influence has been and is going to be enormous. It is said that quotations and paraphrases of its text occur in almost every political harangue delivered by members of the great Kuo Min Tang, the political society of "Nationalist" China. A recent slogan reads, "'The Three Principles for the People' are the principles for National salvation." Another reads, "To be against 'The Three Principles for the People' is to be a counter revolutionary."

Briefly, the "Three Principles" taught in this book are Nationalism, Democracy and Socialism. With the method of treating the two last we need not concern ourselves. But the first is of supreme importance to all who would understand China of today and gauge the trend of China of tomorrow.

Some of the lectures throw a flood of light on some of the causes for the intense anti-foreignism which prevails in China today. They also contain certain references to America which ought not to pass unnoticed. Above all they indicate what we may expect of New China.

In the first lecture Dr. Sun calls attention to the fact that the Chinese have not been accustomed to thinking in terms of a Chinese

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nation, but only in terms of the family and the clan. He says:[1] "This cohesion with reference to the Family and to Ancestors is very powerful, and they have always been ready to sacrifice even life itself in order to preserve the ancestral unity; as may be seen in the feuds between any two clans in Kuangtung. No matter how much of property or life is given up, they are never willing to cease fighting. This is because of their inordinate attachment to the Ancestral idea. This having entered deeply into their life, they have been able to uphold it to the point of sacrifice. With reference, however, to the nation, there has never been one instance of such sacrifice."

This appears to be an accurate analysis of the chief reason why it is so difficult to organize anywhere in China a government patterned on Western political ideals. It seems doubtful whether a people who have been for so many centuries unwilling to sacrifice anything for the public welfare and willing to sacrifice everything for the family welfare can be expected to change their racial psychology with sufficient rapidity to satisfy the demands of the modern world. In other words there appears to be little hope of a unified China such as our government is desirous of being able to recognize.

Lest the Chinese might feel equally pessimistic, Dr. Sun calls their attention in the middle of his first lecture to the rise of Japan. He says Japanese have never been conquered and that they have developed into the strongest nation in Asia because they have emphasized the principles of nationalism. "In order to make China strong we must take Japan as a model . . . whatever the white race can do, the Japanese can do also. . . . We see that now Japan has risen and as a united people enjoys the honor and prestige of a first-class power, the other peoples of Asia may also be lifted into the position of highly-exalted international relationships. Formerly we thought we could not accomplish the things that Europeans do, but now that Japan has been able to copy Europeans, we are also able to copy Japan. Now that we know we can become like Japan, we also know that we can become like Europe."

All this sounds reasonable and must have a strong appeal for the Chinese. It is not likely that they will take into account the

[1] The quotations appearing in this article are taken from the *North China Herald*, which has recently been printing an English translation of the more important parts of Dr. Sun's book. The first installment appeared in the issue of September 24, 1927.

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intensely nationalistic character of Japanese racial history for several centuries past.

Again, in Lecture six the possibility of copying Japan is dwelt upon. "If we wake up like Japan and get back our national position, in ten years' time we can be free from the political, economic and numerical pressure of foreign countries, and from all sorts of evils. Japan has only needed a few tens of years to become one of the Great Powers, but our population is ten times as great, our territory thirty times as large, and our sources of wealth much greater. . . . If China can only copy Japan, it only needs our one country to become equal to ten powerful nations, and when that time comes we shall have recovered our original premier position."

In the third Lecture Dr. Sun says, "In my opinion, it is very evident that the idea of Chinese nationalism has vanished, not just recently, but has been lost now for several hundreds of years."

It is significant that the loss of this "valuable asset by which a country seeks to flourish and by which its people are preserved" is not attributed to racial characteristics. The chief reason for the loss "is because of conquest by a foreign people" and again "the chief reason for the extinction of nationalism amongst us is because we have been subdued by a foreign people." In this case it is the Manchus who are blamed. Although as a matter of fact the leading Manchu Emperors not only deified the Chinese heroes, but they also contributed in great measure to the conservation and study of Chinese culture, literature and art. Judea and India are also held up as countries where the principle of nationalism was lost because they were conquered by foreigners, and yet although the Jews have been without a country for two thousand years, their racial nationalist spirit still remains.

Of Russia, the faithful followers of Dr. Sun are taught as follows: "The Russians . . . have altered the character of their government, abandoning their old policy of military aggression, and adopting one of peaceableness. This new policy not only discards the barbaric method of encroachment on other lands, but it is pledged to the resistance of force in aid of the weak and the execution of justice, so that all nations have come to fear Russia. . . . Even now the nations are much more afraid of her than they were, because this policy of peaceableness has not only destroyed Imperialism in Russia, but will destroy it in every part of the world. More than this, it will destroy Capitalism."

It is significant that there is no reference to the doctrine of

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"world revolution" nor to the Soviet occupation of large parts of Mongolia. On the contrary Dr. Sun's disciples are told that, "The result of the revolution in Russia has been that the Slavs have determined to restrain the strong and aid the weak, to repress the wealthy and succor the poor, their sole aim being the upholding of justice and the destruction of inequality. This object having been made known all over Europe, the small and weak nations have welcomed it gladly, none more so than Turkey."

It will be news to many that "it is entirely owing to the help given by Russia" that Turkey "although not reckoned as one of the Great Powers is considered as a second or third class power in Europe." Furthermore it was Russia "who came forward in defense of inequality" and "helped Turkey to expel the Greeks and brought about a revision of all the unequal treaties." No wonder Madame Sun Yat Sen recently issued a manifesto reproving the Chinese Nationalists for dismissing the Russians and herself went to Moscow with Eugene Chen and other earnest Chinese communists.

It is significant that again in the fourth Lecture Russia is held up as the savior of mankind and the one hundred and fifty million Russians are quoted as intending to join with the weaker countries of Asia to resist the more powerful nations. Lenin is praised and the reason why the world powers opposed Lenin is stated to be their desire "to destroy the prophets and seers of mankind."

After holding up Russia as the friend of all weak nations Dr. Sun goes on to threaten China with an America of overwhelming magnitude. "When I compare the rate of increase of each nation with the numbers in China I am horror-stricken. Take for instance America which a century ago had only a population of nine million and now has one hundred million. In another hundred years, according to the present rate there will be a billion. . . . Many scholars consider that even if the Japanese or the white races conquered China, they would in the same way all be absorbed into the Chinese nation. This might be matter for consolation were it not for the fact that in a hundred years' time the American people will have increased to one billion, and they will be two and a half times more numerous than the Chinese."

Such a prophecy we know to be quite fantastic and consequently we smile at the thought that America would become so crowded that the American people, outnumbering the Chinese two and a half to one, would move into China as a conquering

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horde and obliterate the Chinese people and their culture. Yet that is precisely the doctrine taught in the first chapter of this new Chinese bible, and the more Dr. Sun Yat Sen is worshipped the more his words are likely to be accepted as gospel truth.

The conclusion of the first Lecture is that the "reason why other nations do not now take our territory is because they are fewer in number than we. But in a hundred years' time if our numbers do not increase . . . it will be a case of the larger number conquering the smaller and they will certainly appropriate China. When that occurs, China will not only have lost her sovereignty, but the Chinese will be absorbed by the other peoples, and will also have lost their nationality. Formerly the Mongols and Manchus conquered China, the small number subduing the larger, with the intention of causing the larger number of Chinese to be their slaves. If in the future the Great Powers conquer China, it will be a case of the larger number subduing the smaller but they will not make us slaves, because when that time arrives, we Chinese will not be in a position even to be slaves."

Here is indeed a dreadful picture, painted by the man now most revered of all by the Chinese. Thousands of those Chinese who cannot read this book for themselves have its precepts dinned into their ears by trained agitators and lecturers whose business it is to spread Kuo Min Tang doctrines and to inflame the populace against foreigners and foreign nations.

In the second Lecture Dr. Sun considers the suffering which has come to China from foreign domination and economic pressure which he fears will soon be disastrous to the Chinese race. He sets forth the astounding proposition that if the Chinese people continue to suffer from foreign domination and economic pressure "they may not even last ten years, therefore, these ten years will be a critical time for China." He even goes so far as to prophesy that if some method cannot be found of warding off this foreign domination and economic pressure China will not be able to survive, but will be destroyed.

This is a startling prophecy but "ordinary people are not easily made aware of economic pressure. For instance, China has already suffered from this at the hands of the Great Powers for several tens of years, but up to the present most people are not conscious that every part of China has become virtually a dependency or colony of the Great Powers. . . . The truth is that the economic pressure of the Great Powers has made China, not only a semi-

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dependency, but one that is in a much worse plight than if she were a real colony. Supposing we are the slaves of one nation only, if there happens any calamity such as flood, drought or fire, the ruling power will provide funds in order to relieve the distress. This will be done from a sense of obligation; as part of its duty. The people who are the slaves will also think it is the duty of the ruling power to succor them. But a few years ago, when there was a famine in North China, not one country considered it an obligation to do its best to provide funds for relief."

This is grossly misleading. No reference is made to the enormous sums which were raised in America and England for famine relief. Obviously those under whose influence Dr. Sun was writing during the latter part of his life did not propose to have any sparks of gratitude kept alive in the Chinese people.

As an example of economic pressure Dr. Sun goes on to call attention to the operation of foreign banks in China. He contrasts the lack of trust in the native banks with the faith put by the Chinese in foreign banks. He makes no reference to the fact that the native banks outside of foreign concessions are frequent victims of forced loans and financial extortion. He makes no reference to their lack of cash reserves and to the foreign banking laws which oblige foreign banks to maintain a system which assures for them the confidence of the depositors. Such statements would only tend to defeat the very object of the Lecture which is to arouse the Chinese against the foreigner by every possible means. He says that when the Chinese banks were first established in Kuangtung, "they issued paper money which was accepted everywhere; today that paper money is useless . . . Chinese notes in former times were not as valuable as foreign ones, but today, even Chinese silver is not as good as the paper money of the foreign banks. . . . Just now the number of foreign bank notes circulating in Kuangtung represents several millions of dollars, and the public generally are more willing to keep these than to keep Chinese silver. This applies also to the ports of Shanghai, Tientsin and Hankow. The reason for this is that we are suffering from economic pressure."

It is of course hardly necessary to point out that the notes of the foreign banks have adequate specie reserves back of them, while the notes of the Chinese banks do not; and furthermore the modern Chinese silver coins do not always contain the legal amount of silver, and, therefore, are as "small money" at a discount as

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compared with the foreign notes which are payable in full weight silver dollars, or "big money."

Dr. Sun goes on with an argument so astonishing as to lead to grave doubts as to its authorship. He says, "We all have the idea that foreigners have plenty of money, not realizing that they are giving us paper for our goods. They really have not much wealth, and a great deal of it has been given to them, as it were, by us. The money that foreigners use is simply a few millions of printed notes which we accept, and so they possess a few millions of dollars. For every dollar note printed by the foreign banks as currency they expend only a few copper cash; but these notes are given the value of one dollar, ten dollars or one hundred dollars. Thus the foreigners expend only a trifling amount to print notes that represent several millions of dollars, and they give us those in exchange for goods valued at several millions of silver dollars. Think, gentlemen, is not this a grievous loss? How is it that they can print so much paper money, whilst we cannot do the same? It is because we are suffering from the economical disabilities caused by foreign nations, and rely on them rather than on ourselves, therefore our own paper money is not accepted as currency." Was there ever a more specious argument? If it were not for the fact of this paragraph being in the compulsory text book of the Chinese Nationalist Party, required to be used in all the schools, the very basis of the Nationalist movement, it would scarcely deserve a moment's attention. But it forms part of the Chinese political bible.

I should like to call attention to some of the "statistics" whereby Dr. Sun endeavors to prove to his readers the enormous loss China is sustaining, thanks to her dealings with foreign banks and foreign traders. He says, "An examination of the Customs Returns shows that in 1921, the imports exceeded the exports by $500,000,000, an increase in the ten years of 150 percent. Calculating on this basis we shall find that ten years hence there will be a proportionate increase. Then the duty on imports will exceed the duty on exports by $1,250,000,000."

Dr. Sun sums up China's enormous losses as follows: "1. The invasion of foreign goods, despoiling us yearly to the extent of $500,000,000. 2. Foreign paper money coming into our markets; loss on exchange and circulation of funds, all of which rob us of about $100,000,000. 3. Additional freight rates which rob us of several tens of millions even up to $100,000,000. 4. Taxes, Ground-rents

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and Land Prices in Concessions and in ceded territory which deprive us of between $40,000 and $50,000 (sic). 5. Monopolies, $100,000,000. 6. Speculations and all other kinds of fleecing, which must be several tens of millions. These six methods of economic pressure cause us losses which cannot be less than $1,200,000,000. Unless there is a way of saving this waste, it will show a yearly increase. Unfortunately there is no principle by which it will lessen; therefore, China has already arrived at a state of impoverishment. If she is not saved, this economic pressure will result in the loss of the country and the extinction of the race. . . . Supposing we had not to render this great tribute, and each year had this fund of $1,200,000,000, what a lot of things we could do, what wonderful progress as a people we should make!"

It is certainly depressing to realize the importance given in China to a book containing such amazing mis-statements and false conclusions. No wonder the Chinese are endeavoring to drive out the foreigner. No wonder the essence of their teaching seems to be hatred and destruction. No wonder most of their political slogans which are printed by the hundred thousand and posted up on countless walls and billboards begin with the words "Down with."

Again in Lecture five these astonishing "statistics" are brought to bear to prove to the faithful member of the Kuo Min Tang and his followers, that if they do not drive out the foreigner their country will be destroyed and their descendants exterminated. Dr. Sun "proves" that the average adult male who has not reached decrepit old age is obliged to pay every year to the foreigners "a poll tax of $45" and furthermore, "this sort of tax will go on increasing indefinitely. Therefore, in my opinion if the Chinese don't wake up, but continue the same, even if foreign politicians sleep all the day, in less than ten years China will be destroyed because even now the people are impoverished and wealth is exhausted. You may easily imagine what the poverty of the people will be in another ten years, when the contribution will have to be two and a half times as great. Don't you think China will be destroyed then?"

The argument by which this extraordinary conclusion is reached will amaze the intelligent reader and would not be worth repeating were it not for its place in this important treatise. Dr. Sun says: "China is robbed each year by foreigners of some 1,200,000,000 gold dollars, and the amount seized increases daily. If this

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discrepancy between imports and exports ten years ago was $200,000,000, today it is $500,000,000 which means that every ten years it is two and a half times as great. Reckoning according to this proportion, in ten years time we shall be robbed by foreigners each year of $3,000,000,000 gold dollars. If these $3,000,000,000 were divided amongst our 400,000,000 people each year each person would receive $7.50. Each year each one of us contributes to foreigners the sum of $7.50; in other words each year each one of us pays a poll-tax of $7.50 to foreigners. Moreover, of our 400,000,000 people, 200,000,000 are females, and judging by their present circumstances and ability it is very clear that females are not able to pay such a tax. This being so, the males have to take a double share, and every year each man must contribute $15. Males are divided into three classes, one of which comprises the old and weak and another the very young. Although both these classes are males, yet they are only consumers and not producers, so of course are not capable of contributing such an amount. Now coming back to each male having to pay a poll-tax of $15 two-thirds of them are not able to do so, and so the whole burden rests upon the middle aged producers who are males. These middle aged male workers must be responsible for the $15 that the old and young ought to pay, therefore each one of these workers must pay every year a poll-tax of $45. Just think of it, each one of our middle aged workers having to pay a poll-tax of $45 to foreign countries, isn't it dreadful!"

It would seem to be quite obvious that if you can make several million men of military age believe that by some hocus-pocus they are being heavily taxed by a foreign power you are likely to arouse their fighting spirit to fever heat. The claim that China is about to be robbed by foreigners each year of three billion gold dollars is so fantastic that if it should appear in any ordinary book, magazine or newspaper it could be laughed off. On the other hand, to find it calmly set forth in Dr. Sun's great "Three Principles" makes it worthy of most serious consideration, especially when the resulting figure of 45 gold dollars a year "poll-tax" which "each one of the workers must pay" is sufficient to buy his food for the entire year. In other words Dr. Sun proves to the worker that the foreigner is taxing him an amount which would provide him with all he needs to eat.

Again Dr. Sun sounds the alarm as follows: "But our nation today is in a very difficult position, and will certainly be de-

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stroyed in the future, on account of the simultaneous action of the three factors, increase of the populations of foreign nations, political domination and economic pressure. We already fully apprehend the disabilities owing to foreign domination and economic stress, but our own population being large, it is not easy to realize the evils we suffer because of the increase of foreign populations. We shall know very well in a hundred years' time. What a pity that a nation so large as ours has lost its idea of nationality. Because of this, foreign power and economic pressure will break us. As we have already suffered from foreign aggression and economic pressure, and will afterwards be weeded out by the process of natural selection, there is nothing for us but loss of country and the extinction of our race."

So long as a people believe that they are threatened not only with loss of country, but with virtual extinction it is not likely that they will submit tamely to the presence of foreign business men who, as their most revered leader tells them, are going to cause disaster. When one remembers that the chief spiritual idea of the Chinese people is the worship of ancestors, when one remembers that the chief aspiration of every Chinese is to have male descendants who will worship him and provide for his ghostly needs after he is gone, one can comprehend how calamitous, how terrible is the threat of racial extinction. Nothing could possibly arouse the Chinese more than to be told on good authority that in the course of the next few years, or at most in the course of the succeeding century, their progeny would cease to exist, and that there would be no grandchildren and great grandchildren to make them comfortable in the next world. Therefore, the linking together of foreign economic pressure and Chinese family extinction is the most clever device imaginable for arousing Chinese sentiment against the presence of foreign traders and the growth of foreign commerce.

In the fifth lecture the threat of racial extinction, unless nationalism is obtained, is again set forth. "If we do not really know that we need to regain our nationalism, then we are forever without hope, and before long the Chinese race will be exterminated." The critical situation of China is described and the attitude of the Great Powers is painted in dismal colors. "Any strong country in the world can destroy China. How is it then that China has been able to survive up to the present? The reason for China's survival up to today, is not because she has strength to resist

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but because the Great Powers in their desire to conquer China try to over-reach each other and none is willing to give way. . . . The Great Powers still wish to conquer China, but they consider that if they try to do it merely by military force, it may mean the beginning of a war like the Great European War of a few years ago, which will result in defeat and loss on all sides and no benefit to anyone."

Dr. Sun says that the object of the Washington Conference (where so much was actually done for China, of which no recognition whatever is made here), while ostensibly the limitation of armaments, was really to make an arrangement about "how to divide up China's rights and privileges without coming into collision with each other." He continues: "When the Washington Conference was held, China appointed delegates and the subjects discussed relating to China were manifestly for the benefit of China. But not long after the Conference, the newspapers of all countries reported a 'united control'; and this talk of united control become daily more common. The unanimous decision of all countries was to devise a satisfactory method of destroying China." It is evident that Dr. Sun did not propose to leave one stone unturned in his effort to destroy any lingering regard for America.

"Today the two strongest countries in the world are Britain and America, but they are not the only ones; there are several. These are called the Great Powers. Unfortunately the character and ideas of these Great Powers up to the present have not changed. It may be that in the future Britain or America will be able to destroy the other nations, and become an independent power. When that times comes, China may be conquered by Britain and the Chinese will become British subjects."

It is natural that under the influence of Bolsheviks Dr. Sun should have taken pains to draw a vivid picture of the Anglo-Saxon bogey. "Today the people that occupy most of the territory on the world's surface are the Saxons. This race originated in very early times in Europe, but they only occupy in Europe itself the three islands called Great Britain, namely, England, Scotland and Ireland." (It will be news to some readers to learn that Scotland is a separate island.) "The territories to which these Saxons have spread are North America in the west, Australia and New Zealand in the east, and Africa in the south, so we may say that those who occupy most of the world's territory

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are the Saxons. These Saxons are also the wealthiest and strongest people in the world."

"Before the European war, the nations of Europe suffered from the evils of Imperialism. Now what is Imperialism? It is the principle by which political power encroaches on other countries; what in China is called being ready to seize to any extent. This kind of policy of grab is called Imperialism, and every nation in Europe is infected with this idea to such an extent that there are constant wars."

"Amongst the 1,500,000,000 of the world's population, the strongest are the 400,000,000 white people of Europe and America. The white races consider these as basic material by which to absorb all the colored races. For instance, the red aborigines of America are already extinct, the black people of Africa will be destroyed very soon, and the brown races of India are just now in process of extermination." Now no educated person believes that the brown races of India, which number upwards of three hundred million are being "exterminated" by the British. One must remember, however, that there are probably four hundred million illiterate people in China who are likely to believe whatever is told them by persons whom they respect and for whom they have a high regard. They are being taught to revere Dr. Sun's "Three Principles" and when they hear the enthusiastic lecturers and agitators quote from it that "the yellow races of Asia are suffering from the oppression of the whites, and probably will soon disappear," it is certain to cause them to shudder, and eventually to seek for ways of avoiding this racial extermination.

Further reference to the danger of the Chinese being exterminated by the increasing populations of white races is made in Lecture five, where Dr. Sun says "according to our own history, the Chinese being numerous, the aborigines of China . . . were being exterminated by the increasing population of other peoples. This is easy to see; therefore China, suffering from the political oppression of the Great Powers, cannot be guaranteed even for one day. Economic pressure in ten years' time will also destroy us. Speaking of this question of population, China will very soon be in a very precarious condition so we see that the three great calamities of foreign domination, economic pressure, and encroachments of foreign populations are already upon us. Knowing this we must proclaim it in all quarters and

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tell everyone that we Chinese are already in such a position that we cannot escape the destruction of our own nation. When everybody has learnt this what ought we to do? The proverb says, 'When the beast is cornered it will fight.' When we are pressed to the point where there is no escape, we must rouse up and risk our lives to fight the enemy. When we arrive at that juncture, shall we be able to fight? Yes, certainly. But it will be only if we realize that our end is near, and death is certain. Therefore to advocate nationalism, our 400,000,000 must know that their end is near, and not only be cornered like the beast but fight as well. We who are about to die, shall we fight or not?"

The answer is obvious. The sad part of it all is that the teaching of this book is compulsory in all the schools in the Nationalist territory, not excepting mission schools. Under the present policy of the Nationalist Government all schools must be registered and must agree to have Kuo Min Tang doctrines taught in the school. It is necessary for us to bear in mind that the new generation in Southern and Central China is going to be saturated with this doctrine which is so sacred that to set oneself up in opposition to it is to be a "counter revolutionary" and subject to loss of life and property.

Besides advising the Chinese to fight, Dr. Sun urges strikes and the boycott and actually the complete severance of economic relations with foreigners. He says, "There are some things we cannot do, but what we can do is to refuse to work for foreigners and be their slaves, to refuse foreign goods and use native. We can decline to use the paper money of foreign banks and only use the money of the Chinese government; in a word, break off economic relations." The result of this doctrine has been very keenly felt in Canton where Dr. Sun had his headquarters for several years. Furthermore it is being felt all up and down the Yangtze Valley. It is true that many of the leading Chinese merchants and bankers do not subscribe to this doctrine at all, but with the constant spread of the Kuo Min Tang and the increasing use of "The Three Principles" the effect is bound to be felt more and more unless it could be successfully combated. It is the duty of the Kuo Min Tang to spread the gospel preached in this book. "The reason why up to the present we have suffered from foreign oppression is that most of us are ignorant of it, in fact drunk and dreaming. . . . There are two ways of resisting foreign countries, one is the Positive or Actual, by which the

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spirit of the people is roused to demand their rights and secure their social well-being in order to compete with foreign countries. The other is the Negative method which is passive resistance, by which the imperialism of foreign countries is lessened and the continuance of the nation assured." Needless to say both methods are taught by Dr. Sun.

Internal evidence points to the fact that the lectures in their present form were published in 1924, the year of Dr. Sun's death. One cannot help wondering whether the text of the "Three Principles" was not doctored by those Russians who were directing the councils of the Kuo Min Tang from 1924 to 1926. Be that as it may, the chief point at interest is not the character of Dr. Sun himself, or the nature of his knowledge, or the logic of his position, or the possibility of Russian authorship, but rather the fact that in this book we have the actual gospel that is being preached in China today. If the rising generation of Chinese become saturated with "The Three Principles" it will be many years before China can hope to be a useful member of the family of nations. The situation calls for far-sighted statesmanship and a campaign of enlightenment.

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THE COMING FRENCH ELECTIONS

By André Géraud
("Pertinax")

M. CLEMENCEAU, having spent nearly all his life in the ranks of the radical opposition, took the French Premiership at the hour of the gravest national danger, created the political conditions which made possible the victory of 1918, and brought about the conservative consolidation of 1919. Next to his, the career of M. Poincaré bids fair to become one of the most romantic in the whole history of France. The word "romantic" coupled with the name of this very positive and matter-of-fact man may seem odd. But it nevertheless describes perfectly his political fortune; and the people who know him well, who from time to time have perceived behind his impassive face the ebb and flow of sentiment, will not dismiss it as out of harmony with his real character.

I

In 1922, as President of the Council of Ministers, M. Poincaré carried out the Ruhr undertaking and endeavored to build up a Franco-German policy on the foundation of a Rhineland organized so as to secure the payment of reparations — by its own resources and by supplying a sort of mortgage, half physical, half moral, on the whole body of the German Reich. That he achieved a considerable measure of success is shown by the "Micum" report issued in July, 1924, and by the establishment of the Dawes system, now in successful operation for three full years, which Germany would not have accepted but for the pressure that had been put upon her. But, late in 1923 and at the beginning of 1924, when the occupation of the Ruhr was in full swing and when Herr Hugo Stinnes and the other coal and steel magnates were sending unofficial delegates to Paris, a larger solution of the various Franco-German problems than the Dawes system provides might well have been attempted. The vision of what could be done was dimmed in Paris by the absurd "separatist" risings and by the expectation (which the history of the German people in the last century flatly contradicts) that, somehow, the introduction of the particularist factor into the German problem would pave the way towards a solution. The opportu-

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nity was allowed to pass. M. Poincaré faced the general elections of May, 1924, with a record of foreign policy which was challenged on several grounds, and the financial and economic difficulties resulting from inflation and from the huge borrowing for reconstruction purposes provided the Radical-Socialists and Socialists with a powerful arm of attack. The Poincaré government fell and they came to power.

Let us pass over two years. The government of the "*Cartel des Gauches*" (June, 1924–July, 1925) had by this time utterly degraded the French currency. To enlist the confidence of the propertied classes, whose capital was being quickly exchanged into foreign currencies at an ever declining rate, and to get rid of socialistic watch-words, had become questions of life and death to the Republican régime. Of all the statesmen still available M. Poincaré was regarded on all sides as the only one who could try his hand at the task with even the remotest chance of success. But even those who were clamoring most loudly for the return of Cincinnatus were only partially sincere, and the prospect of an undiluted Socialist cabinet, headed by M. Léon Blum, loomed large on the skyline. Was not M. Poincaré a mere child as far as concerned financial matters, a school friend of old M. Robineau, the Governor of the Bank of France, who was held responsible for most of the technical mistakes that, in addition to adverse political developments, had nearly destroyed the financial and economic structure? Being by birth, education and environment prone to entertain the narrow-minded ideas of the small investors' class about the "revalorization" of the currency and opposed to the schemes of the so-called "international financiers," was he not doomed to failure? But the men of the "*Cartel*" felt some satisfaction over the experiment of entrusting the power to M. Poincaré — once he had failed dismally, they would be in a position to proceed more vigorously than ever with the enforcement of their ideologic formulas.

However, as the weeks went by the critics were one by one silenced. M. Poincaré, working in his own methodical and stern manner, secured the realization of a very few principles that nobody could possibly object to — the balancing of the budget by dint of new taxation, with a large surplus earmarked for the sinking fund of the floating debt, the transformation of the floating debt itself into a short-term debt, etc. Working by his side was M. Joseph Moreau, the new Governor of the Bank of

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France, M. Caillaux's excellent gift to his successor. He was seen to supply the expert knowledge and technical capacity in manipulating the money market, national and international, that most prophets had confidently said the new Prime Minister was not able even remotely to apprehend. Contrary to all anticipations, the economic structure withstood *de facto* stabilization of the currency at the relatively high level of 25 francs to the dollar.

II

It is not my purpose to examine whether M. Poincaré ought not before this to have set himself to the task of a *de jure* stabilization, whether, indeed, he has not allowed the most favorable moment to pass. Whatever may be his failings on that point (and we have to wait before we can safely pass judgment upon the course he chose to follow), such temporizing does not discredit him in the eyes of the electors, since the public will always believe in the possibility of an indefinite appreciation of the franc.

Today, then, we are confronted with the paradoxical fact of the Radical-Socialist and Socialist parties going to the general elections of May, 1928, under the leadership of the man they threw out of office four years ago, privately and even publicly showering all sorts of praise upon his wonderful performance, and yet asking practically for the same mandate that they received before. Will Cincinnatus be sent back to his plough? Will the dramatic romance of M. Poincaré terminate in dismissal and failure? Utilizing the financial foundations which he has laid down in the course of the last fifteen months, will the parties of the Left endeavor to build up a régime of a very different nature from his, both in home and foreign politics? Shall we have to sing once again that monotonous anthem of politics, "*sic vos, non vobis* . . . "? While avoiding rash forecasts, let us try to make some sort of answer to that query.

The first point to be noticed is that just as in 1924 M. Poincaré is not in a position to go to the country and ask its judgment regarding an achievement that stands by itself and is complete. Even making allowances for the fact that hardly anything final is attainable in politics, there still is something obviously incomplete and undetermined about the present status of his financial reform, just as there was something unfinished and undetermined in the Ruhr undertaking when the electorate was called upon to vote in 1924. I have already mentioned that M.

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Poincaré has so far deliberately refused to clinch the financial rehabilitation of France by stabilizing the currency for good, that is, by making the banknote convertible into gold at a fixed rate and by allowing capital to move freely in and out of the country. As long as these measures have not been taken M. Poincaré's opponents can always deny that his system has fully vindicated itself. When he was noticed to hesitate and waver regarding what kind of use he would make of the occupation of the Ruhr, a foreign ambassador in Paris is quoted as having said that the Premier was always sure to take the right train but that he couldn't be relied upon to get off at the right station. I do not wish to make that epigram my own, but it certainly summarizes the argument which people who for their own purposes wish to find fault with M. Poincaré are sure to level at him. From what someone has left undone, it is a very easy and current practice in politics to draw disparaging inferences against what someone has done.

A second point to be emphasized is that personally M. Poincaré does not appeal to the country in the way a first-rate political leader would do in the United States or in England, and that he does not even go into the campaign at the head of a well-organized party — to a lesser extent, indeed, than he did in 1924. Then, at any rate, he was master in his own cabinet, which he had formed himself and reformed; and in both houses of Parliament he had a majority of senators and deputies owing him political and even personal allegiance. Even in those favorable circumstances he overlooked entirely all considerations of home politics and gave a practically free hand to the prefects in the provinces. What he was not willing to do then he will certainly refrain from attempting this year, sitting in a cabinet where many of his colleagues belong to an opposite school and regarding himself as having been specially commissioned to deal with the finances of the nation and to abstain from exhibiting any personal bias in the control of public affairs generally.

Now this course would be quite intelligible if all the participants in the Cabinet of National Union acted in the same spirit, and if it were generally agreed (to take a concrete case) that at the Ministry of the Interior no particular pressure was to be put on the prefects and on the host of officials who, as is well known, play a decisive part in French elections. Such abstention from political pressure would seem the more natural as the present

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Minister of the Interior, M. Albert Sarraut (though belonging to the Radical-Socialist Party, of which his brother, Maurice Sarraut, was the supreme leader till a few days ago), is neither a partisan nor a fanatic.

But whenever a national union of some sort has been established in France, in 1914 and since, it seems always to have been tacitly understood that the Radical-Socialist officialdom, which has enjoyed a hold on the country for over twenty-five years, should not be disturbed in its possessions. When the war broke out the prefects were Radical-Socialists to a man. Even in the high days of the *Bloc National* (1919–1924), no Premier, no Minister of the Interior, ever dared infringe upon their tenure and privileges. MM. Millerand, Briand and Poincaré, though supported by conservative majorities (1920–24), were careful to entrust the Ministry of the Interior, which sets in motion and regulates the whole electoral machinery, to authentic Radicals or Radical-Socialists — M. Steeg, M. Marraud, M. Maunoury, who were supposed to secure for them the patience and the goodwill of the men of the Left. Under the national union of 1926 such a state of affairs could only be confirmed and even further accentuated, because the Radical-Socialist Party was now the predominant partner. The electoral law of last July which suppressed the imperfect system of proportional representation and revived the old single-member constituencies of pre-war days, was obviously framed against the conservatives, notwithstanding the fact that these conservatives have their official spokesman, M. Louis Marin, in the cabinet and that M. Poincaré himself is a lifelong advocate of proportional representation. Recently when M. Millerand was put forward by the conservatives as a candidate in the senatorial election in the Department of the Orne, the enterprising Radical-Socialist prefect there could be seen at the fairs and markets accompanying the candidate of the Radicals, M. Labbé, and utilizing his right of bestowing administrative favors in order to drum up electoral support. Similarly, it is alleged that at the War Ministry, now in the hands of M. Painlevé, a foremost leader of the "*Cartel*," all the promotions are controlled by a young major high in the hierarchy of freemasons. This strong Radical-Socialist influence can be detected everywhere in the administration.

It is clear, then, that M. Poincaré at the head of his present ministry can under no circumstances appeal to the country against

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the Radical-Socialist machine and what it stands for. Were he to set his face against it he would have to resign at once. He might be compared to one of those generals of the old Tsarist army who were compelled to lead Trotzky's red troops, and, when they had done their day's work, were cautiously confined in a well-guarded cell and supplied there with a good dinner.

III

But, supposing the Prime Minister were a free agent and could move freely on the political field, would he be ready to unfurl a flag of his own, to have a clear-cut program posted up all over the country and to ask for a mandate? Even if unfettered as a Prime Minister, would M. Poincaré, as a man, be prepared to engage unreservedly in the struggle? Where does he stand in the ebb and flow of groups, teams and factions? Answering that question, we reach the heart of French political ethics.

Behind the medley of factions, there are in actual or virtual existence today five big parties. Passing from the Right to the Left, their characteristics are somewhat as follows:

1. *Religious, national and social conservatism.* M. Marin (now in the cabinet) and, outside Parliament, General de Castelnau, the head of the Catholic Federation, can be called the most representative men of this section. Since his recent victory in the senatorial election in the Department of the Orne, M. Millerand, the socialist of a quarter-century ago, is obviously joining hands with them. No account need be taken of the royalist forces, which though very active intellectually fail to rally any mass of people.

2. *National and social conservatism*, modified by "laïcism" (i.e. the separation of church and state), the defense of the secular schools, the refusal to grant a legal status to religious orders, etc. MM. Poincaré, Barthou and Tardieu may be mentioned as the leaders of this party — the lineal successors of Gambetta, Ferry, Waldeck-Rousseau, the men who built up and managed the Third Republic.

3. *National conservatism*, modified by devotion to the furtherance of League of Nations ideals and to "laïcism," and favoring gradual social changes in the direction of greater social equality though without changing the basis of private ownership. These are the tenets of the Radicals and Radical-Socialists, the latter laying particular emphasis on social evolution (a favorite expression of theirs) and promotion of the Geneva Covenant. MM.

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Loucheur, Albert Sarraut, Doumer (President of the Senate) are typical Radicals, while MM. Herriot, Malvy and Bienvenu Martin might be put down as typical Radical-Socialists. M. Caillaux and his friends are Radical-Socialists but with a pretense of intellectual detachment and a technical equipment that make them unpopular with the rank and file. Hardly distinguishable from the Radical-Socialists proper are the "French Socialists" — Painlevé, Briand, Jean Laval, de Monzie. They have found it convenient not to cast their lot in with the Radical-Socialists unreservedly because of a desire for more freedom of movement either left or right. For example, in the May, 1914, elections M. Briand fought for the conservative cause. "Thomas, *mon ami*," once said M. Briand to the director of the International Labor Bureau, whom he was urging to give up international socialism, "Thomas, my friend, you will not be worth anything till you have joined the great party of all the renegades!" On the other hand, M. Painlevé is always to be found in the same boat as M. Herriot.

4. *Internationalism*, "laïcism," reconstruction of society in accordance with Marxist theories but short of violent methods. MM. Blum, Paul-Boncour, Renaudel, Ferdinand Bouisson (President of the Chamber of Deputies), are the chiefs of the "French Section of International Socialism," though as a matter of fact M. Paul-Boncour, who comes of a well-to-do family and has acquired a great position at the bar, usually behaves as a Radical-Socialist behind the screen of Geneva.

5. *Communism*, with all the Russian implications of the word.

After this rough characterization of the parties, it would seem fairly simple to forecast what part a French politician will play in Parliament once it is known under what label he has been elected. M. Poincaré belongs in party No. 2: whence the doubt as to the real color of his flag?

The explanation of the obscurity and uncertainty which is such a curious feature of French political life is that no one of the French parties can expect to win single-handed. It must always be ready to make some pact with the parties either on its right or on its left. The electoral system opens the way to coalitions of that kind, since nobody can be elected at the first poll unless he gets an absolute majority of votes (half plus one), and whenever such a majority is lacking a second vote must take place a fortnight later. Under these circumstances, the main question anyone who wants to become a deputy or a senator must face is not so

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much "What is your distinctive program and label?" as, "With whom are you going to be connected — with the people on your right or with the people on your left?" And the senator or deputy, after he has been returned, will not always solve the problem in Parliament in the same way as in his constituency.

The question arises for General de Castelnau: Are you willing to support a Radical against a Radical-Socialist or a Socialist at the price of throwing overboard your religious claims, the reform of the school laws, etc.? — and it is a question that may break conservative unity, the more so as the zealots of the *Action Française*, infuriated by pontifical thunderbolts, do not wish to make things easy for anyone in France and are causing further dissensions on minor issues of their own.

The question arises for M. Poincaré: In order to defeat a Socialist or even a Radical-Socialist of socialistic leanings, have you made up your mind to stand by a Catholic who would make short work of the secular schools? What comes first in your thoughts, the maintenance of social order, the organization of an efficient army, or the prohibition of religious orders?

The question arises for M. Herriot: Do you prefer the Marxist social transformation offered by M. Blum or the national conservatism of the Radicals?

The question arises for M. Blum: What is your second best? The Russian terrorism of MM. Marty and Vaillant-Couturier on your left or the timid socialistic empiricism of M. Painlevé on your right?

Through the whole range of parties the same query repeats itself in various forms, but giving rise to the same sort of controversies and divisions. And, as party organizations are very weak in France (even that of the Radical-Socialists and Socialists, better equipped though they are than their rivals) there is a general lack of discipline, everyone doing in the long run as he likes and adapting himself to local conditions.[1]

M. Poincaré, then, if he means to enter into the fight, ought to declare whether M. Marin is more to his liking as an ally, or MM. Herriot and Malvy with all their ramifications extending to the heart of socialism. He will never venture to make such an open declaration because, having been brought up in the ideas of 1885, he still breathes deeply the spirit of "laïcism" and would regard

[1] Now and then, of course, party discipline of a sort is asserted. For instance, M. Franklin Bouillon has just been expelled from his party because he recommended the setting up of an anti-socialist union.

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a concession to the Catholic element as a betrayal of the Republican régime. He is quite ready to govern with the assistance of the Right, but that assistance must be given to him unconditionally, without any open pact, without any promise of repayment. Rather than run the risk of parting company for good with the Left, he behaves as a sort of arbitrator, as a super-parliamentarian, willing and able in times of need to set up a persuasive dictatorship, superior to groups and parties, but equally ready to resume his writing of books and articles as soon as both houses of parliament grow tired of him and party spirit turns restless and begins to claim its due.

I remember very vividly a conversation I had with him in the last days of May, 1924, after the election returns had been published and before the new Chamber had assembled. He was not yet sure that the advent of the Radical-Socialist majority meant his downfall. "I have so many friends among them," he said quietly. In that phrase, quite unconsciously, M. Poincaré faintly anticipated the development which was to occur two years later, when, without any change of majority or any real modification of the relative strength of parties, an overwhelming demand for him arose everywhere. The function he has been discharging since July, 1926, can be compared more or less roughly to the function of the dictator "*rei gerundæ causa*" in the early centuries of the Roman Republic. The Dictator of that primitive period was not the self-centred, self-seeking force that later on was to appear on the scene under the name of Marius, Sylla or Julius Caesar. He had no relation to the Mussolini of today. He was nothing more than a power temporarily created by the consuls or by the senate to meet extraordinary emergencies or fulfill a well-defined task: he voluntarily withdrew once his work was done, and did not try for success in the forum. *Mutatis mutandis*, M. Poincaré answers to the description. This much was recognized by the communist deputy who once shouted to M. Poincaré in the Chamber: "You always turn up on fateful days!" A greater recognition of his services could hardly be given.

Supposing M. Poincaré is not overthrown before the elections, what will become of him once the new Chamber has been chosen? Should the "*Cartel des Gauches*" win, that is, should a majority of Radical-Socialists and Socialists still control Parliament, the services of the present Prime Minister are likely to be retained only in case there is really deep anxiety regarding the fate of his

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financial and monetary reform, and provided the Left leaders have received the impression in the course of the campaign that, while ready to grant them a new lease of power, the country would not passively stand any tampering with the currency and the budget.

On the other hand, if the conservative forces give a better account of themselves than in 1924, M. Poincaré will probably survive. A Poincaré government probably represents the maximum of advantages that the conservative element can hope to get in France under present conditions, just as it is regarded by the Radical-Socialists and Socialists as a barely tolerable minimum. But two facts must be borne in mind. Close relations have developed between MM. Poincaré, Herriot and Painlevé, chiefly at the expense of M. Briand, and these may weigh in the scale, adversely for M. Poincaré as well as favorably. For example there is a feeling among the conservatives that by rescuing the Radical-Socialists and Socialists from their embarrassment and helping their government with sound management, M. Poincaré is, in fact, working against the conservative cause. Indeed, the withdrawal of M. Marin from the cabinet has been contemplated on several occasions. But no action has been taken, as it was feared lest the constitution of a purely Left cabinet on the eve of the elections would pave the way for an even greater interference on the part of the prefects and a reckless spending of public funds for partisan purposes.

IV

In order to give some sort of completeness to the picture, I must now try to describe briefly the tendencies which can be perceived in the various parties on the eve of the electoral contest. I shall not risk a forecast of the actual results.

At first sight, socialism would appear to be the principal issue. But owing to the shifting program of the Radical-Socialists and "French Socialists," imbued as they are with the tenets of socialism and at the same time inclined to resist putting them into practice, the problem cannot be stated so plainly. Rather, the battle will be fought between the uncompromising opponents of socialism and the people who half-way disapprove of it. Which coalition will prove the more compact and determined, the coalition of the anti-socialists or the coalition of those who might go by the name of "socialistic"?

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Two factors distinctly favor a general coalition of the Left. A majority of the officials forming the backbone of the Left parties are not favorable to socialism, if socialism be conceived as involving the suppression of private ownership. But they are ready to absorb a good deal of socialist teaching if socialism means merely that private ownership must not be allowed to develop too glaring social inequalities. Teachers of the elementary schools (always the darlings of the Third Republic), sons of peasants sticking to scientific credos as only rough neophytes can do, postmen and so forth, these are the soul of that army. Tennessee would shudder at the sight of them. In a village of some three thousand inhabitants I observed last year no less than sixteen teachers at work, a very valuable asset indeed for the "*Cartel*." As to the postmen, it is sufficient, in order to convey an idea of their influence, to state that the Secretary-General of their union over-rules the Postmaster General every day.

Then it must not be overlooked that in France social jealousy exists to a degree that cannot be imagined in, for example, the United States. The provincial towns and the villages are honeycombed with it. At the top are the remnants of the old aristocracy and the new aristocrats who have wealth or some other substitute for traditions, keeping to themselves, snubbing the local manufacturer, the doctor, the notary, the university professor, the multitude of various officials. It is in the second stratum that the skeleton of the Radical-Socialist parties is to be found. The members of this business and professional class all have it in mind that the best revenge for the snubs they receive is to retain in their hands the political supremacy which was transferred to them on the 16th of May, 1877, the decisive day when the Third Republic asserted its authority. Up to a few years ago, it could be said that the parish priest took sides with the "castle," and, for that reason, the laws of "laïcism" were the parting line between the republican and the non-republican groups. But that situation hardly exists any longer. Nowadays, the parish priest as often as not styles himself democrat and pacifist, and labors on a path of his own. Moreover, things are made more complicated by the fact that of late the doctor and the notary are sometimes shy of the teacher, of the city postman, and of the farm laborer, quite a number of whom have become adepts in Marxism. But so far the socialist creed has not met and conquered the coalition of the Left established on social rivalry.

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Socialism, as introduced in the rural districts, does not usually go beyond the denunciation of capitalism and of large land proprietorship. It is content with the proposal that private ownership should not be allowed to rise above a level that most farmers and rural workers can hardly hope to attain. As to communism, it does not play a rôle outside some of the very big towns and their suburbs. It cannot be said yet that it seriously strikes at the root of the "*Cartel*."

In the aggregate, the coalition of the Left, originating in petty feelings and passions, in the narrowest outlook of life, public and private, rather than in the adhesion to any common program, is indeed formidable. Only the realization that a socialist-communist danger exists can divide and defeat it.

V

On every occasion the conservative forces have proved themselves to be far less cohesive. From one angle, the history of the Third Republic is the history of their internecine quarrels and divisions. The Royalists of the *Action Française* are apt to think that, after all, a victory of the most extreme socialists would serve their own purposes by pushing the republican institutions to the brink of the abyss; and they sometimes act accordingly. Thirteen years ago the exponent of rural socialism in the south, M. Compère Morel, was elected by the royalist vote. Members of the Catholic Federation may be found who will withdraw their support from a Radical if he does not pledge himself to the repeal of the laws of "laïcism," a step that would alienate from him the large body of his followers and involve his defeat.

Is it possible to speak of a French industrial party aiming at the protection of large economic interests in anything like the way that Germans or Englishmen or Americans speak of a "big business" party? Hardly. Since the war something has been done to give more power to large economic interests in Parliament and in the press. But these efforts have been spasmodic and ineffectual. At the time of the Ruhr expedition it was commonly said abroad that M. Poincaré was the regular servant of the iron founders, coal owners and steelmakers. In fact, when M. Poincaré practised at the bar he always made it a rule never to accept the briefs of any big corporation and as a result had to specialize in lawsuits arising out of divorces, wills, etc. But the theory is even more absurd in so far as it assigns big industry

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a paramount influence in politics. Associations of industrialists may occasionally interfere in a constituency — for instance at Belfort, where M. André Tardieu was elected by their efforts. But, speaking generally, they have not as yet succeeded in banding together the various conservative factions. Just now an organization called "Le Redressement Français," headed by M. Mercier, an electrical magnate, has been formed and well endowed to propagate this motto: Let all conservatives get together on as large a common basis as possible, namely the fight against radicalism; at any rate let them concentrate against the reds and if necessary help the Radical-Socialist to defeat the Socialist. It remains to be seen whether such propaganda will be effective.

The weakness of the conservative camp lies in the fact that it is permeated by no common feeling strong enough to offset the mutual antipathy of one group for another, and no permanent framework into which all groups can fit themselves and proceed to work out a plan of battle. Self-appointed staffs of self-appointed very second-rate leaders appear in the towns a few weeks before polling day, recruiting a rank and file by making speeches and posting up programs. A friend of mine, Henri de Kerillis, having failed by a narrow margin of votes to be returned to Parliament last year, is now educating the conservative committees in the use of the electoral methods of the British conservatives — such obvious things as posting up placards telling a succinct story by a picture and a phrase, and the checking of the electoral lists that are in the keeping (safe or unsafe) of the municipal corporations and that, so far, nobody has ever thought of perusing. His success has been immediate. Thousands of towns and villages are now regular subscribers to his placards, which he sells at cost price. All his blows are directed against the communists, the socialists, and anyone who keeps company with them. But it is still too early to say whether the popularization of these electoral instruments will succeed in forging a common bond.

VI

The American who happens to read this article will probably exclaim to himself: How is it that French policy, having been so continuously in the hands of Radicals and Radical-Socialists, should nevertheless wear so conservative an appearance? The answer is that while the men who label themselves conservatives generally get the worst of the fighting, conservative ideas sooner

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or later permeate and control the Radicals, Radical-Socialists and even the Socialists. The greatest national and conservative leaders of contemporaneous France, Millerand, Théophile Delcassé, Clemenceau, were once elected against conservatives — I mean conservative in a very large sense, sound republicans of the Poincaré type. And once again the "*Cartel des Gauches*" of 1924 is now under the harness of M. Poincaré.

But the result is not entirely satisfactory. It means that out of the four-year life of a legislature, two years, if not more, are spent in wild scheming and experiment, with consequent waste of time and national strength. The country as it enters upon a new phase of this recurring cycle can be compared to a man who, having won a high university degree, suddenly finds himself deprived of all his learning and set again to learn to read and write in the elementary school. Confronted in Europe with highly efficient governments and nations, France can hardly afford to develop in such a haphazard manner. Even an occasional dictator "*rei gerundæ causa*" like M. Poincaré cannot always make good the waste.

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CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES

By O.

CUBA'S propinquity and its highly strategic position in the Caribbean have inevitably produced an unusually intimate connection with the United States. It is the nature of this connection, subsequently confirmed by formal arrangements and strengthened by economic penetration from the north, which the Cubans now find irksome and which they would alter so as to obtain greater freedom of movement. In addition to the fortuitous circumstance of geographical proximity — the brief ninety miles that separate the two countries — three outstanding factors affect the relations between Cuba and the United States. These are the Platt Amendment, the Reciprocity Treaty of 1903, and the large American investments in the Island.

The Platt Amendment, which was originally passed as a "rider" to an army appropriation bill in the American Congress, was incorporated into the Cuban Constitution against the bitter opposition of most of the higher political class in Cuba. The circumstance that the Island was still under the military government of the United States made its acceptance obligatory in the Cuban Constitutional Convention. Four of the provisions of the Amendment seemed to the Cubans to limit the national sovereignty of their nascent republic. The first forbade the making of treaties with third powers which might compromise the independence of the nation. The second limited the debt contracting powers of the government to obligations within the scope of the ordinary revenues. The third provided for intervention by the United States to maintain orderly government and all its accessories. The fourth required the cession to the United States of sites for coaling or naval stations.

The treaty of commercial reciprocity between Cuba and the United States was signed December 11, 1902, and has governed the trade relations between the two countries ever since. The special concessions embodied in the treaty were specifically confirmed by the United States Tariff Act of 1917, at which time the reciprocity arrangement with Brazil was discontinued in accordance with the new tariff policy of this country. The reciprocity treaty admitted Cuban goods into the United States at a reduction of 20 percent from the regular tariff rates. Thus Cuban

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sugar of 96 degrees polarization, the standard in the crude sugar market, pays a duty of 1.7648 cents per pound, as against 2.206 for sugar of other countries. On the other hand, American goods imported into Cuba, with the exception of tobacco products, were granted reductions of from 20 to 40 percent from the Cuban schedules, the preferential rate being graduated according to the four classes into which American products are grouped for the purpose. The treaty also provided that "no sugar, the product of any other foreign country, shall be admitted by treaty or convention into the United States, while this convention is in force, at a lower rate of duty than that provided by the Tariff Act of the United States approved July 24, 1897."

Investments of American capital in Cuba have reached an aggregate of some $1,500,000,000, our largest holdings in any foreign country except Canada. The largest single item is, of course, sugar, which accounts for over half the total. Approximately two-thirds of the entire output of sugar is produced by American-owned mills. American interests include the great Cuba Cane Sugar Company, the Cuban American, the Punta Alegre, the Cuban Dominican, and the Cuba Company. The Cuba Cane places the value of its properties at over $86,000,000. The National City Bank, through a holding company, known as the General Sugar Company, operates a number of important centrals. The American Sugar Refining Company owns the two fine mills, Cunagua and Jaronú. The United Fruit Company operates two huge centrals on the North Coast of Oriente Province, which it feeds with cane from the vast hinterland of its own territory. The Hershey Chocolate interests own three centrals in Matanzas Province. Besides these there are a number of lesser companies in the field. The Americans have an overwhelming control of the industry in the two eastern provinces of Camaguey and Oriente, where in the crop year 1926–27 American-owned centrals accounted for 15,049,087 bags as against 3,470,270 bags for the Cuban-owned mills. American companies also control the situation in Matanzas Province. Only in the important Province of Santa Clara and in the western provinces of Habana and Pinar del Rio, where the industry is on the decline, do the Cubans hold the balance. Each of the larger American companies owns or controls by long-time leases, from 100,000 to 660,000 acres of lands. The aggregate of such holdings is well over 5,000,000 acres. Thousands of miles of private

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broad-gauge railway lines also serve the American sugar properties.

Other investments comprise government securities, railways, public utilities, banks, hotels, mineral deposits, manufacturing industries and general agricultural lands. The foreign debt of Cuba, amounting to a total of about $89,000,000, is all held in the United States. The railway system of the eastern provinces, unified under the Cuba Company and operated as the Consolidated Railways, is American-controlled. In the field of public utilities, the American Foreign Power Company owns the light and power business in nearly all the important towns of the Island, including the Havana Electric Company. The Cuba Telephone Company, with its wires all over the republic, is a subsidiary of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company. The Havana Dock Company is another American-owned utility. Among banks, the National City Bank of New York is a powerful factor in the financial life of the Island, and has over twenty branches scattered throughout the Republic. The First National Bank of Boston and the Chase National Bank of New York also operate directly in Cuba. A number of the largest hotels in Havana are owned in the United States, and the Bowman interests of New York are now investing more millions in a large amusement development as a further stimulus to the growing tourist trade between the United States and Cuba. The Bethlehem Steel Corporation and other interests hold large iron and manganese ore deposits in the Province of Oriente. The American Portland Cement Company controls the cement manufacturing plant at Mariel, and a number of industrial establishments in and near Havana, including substantial investments in the tobacco manufacturing industry, are American-owned. American interests are also a prominent factor in the tobacco growing industry of Pinar del Rio, and many American farmers are engaged in the production of fruits and vegetables for export, especially in the Isle of Pines, and in the country closely tributary to the city of Havana. In fact, most of the vegetables shipped to American markets are grown by Americans.

It will be seen from this summary how completely American capital and enterprise dominate the whole economic life of the country. The only important exceptions are the growing of sugar cane in which Cubans still predominate, and the general mercantile business of the island, which is largely in the hands of Span-

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iards. The economic structure of few other independent countries is controlled to such an extent by a foreign people.

It is in order at this point to review briefly the developments in Cuban-American relations as affected by the two fundamental acts which govern these relations. Under the operation of the Platt Amendment, there has been but one instance of formal intervention in Cuban affairs. In 1906 intervention was precipitated by the inability of the Estrada Palma administration to put down a serious revolt against the government. At the invitation of the Cuban President, Secretary of War Taft was sent to Cuba by President Roosevelt, where he took over the direction of Cuban affairs, supplanting the constituted authorities of the Republic. After a short period as Provisional Governor, Taft was succeeded by Charles Edward Magoon, who was in charge of the intervention until its termination in 1909. The mission of General Crowder, who was sent to Cuba in 1921 as special representative of President Harding, partook of much of the character of a forced intervention, but did not involve the suspension of the native government. The sending of General Crowder was prompted by the necessity of exercising a certain measure of control over the acts of the shifty Zayas government. As such it was a mission of considerable delicacy, since General Crowder was dependent on the support which his actions would receive from the Government at Washington, and not upon the high powers conferred under a régime of intervention. However, he was able to exercise strong pressure on the Zayas government for the acceptance of his recommendations for improving the administration of public affairs, so that his position as obligatory mentor to a particularly exasperating government had some very substantial results. It is well to remember that both under the formal intervention of 1906–9 and under the Crowder mission, as well as during the life of the American military government (1898–1902), every solicitude was shown by those in charge of American affairs in the Island for the rights and feelings of the native Cubans. In spite of the possibilities of the situation, a minimum of friction was engendered. On the other hand, incalculable benefits of a very positive nature were conferred on a young and yet undisciplined nation, which was gravely in need of disinterested guidance. It is safe to say that, except for the efforts of the noble Estrada Palma to start his people on the right road, none of Cuba's own national leaders before President Machado deserves

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so much gratitude from the nation as did General Wood and General Crowder. Wood occupies a very high place in Cuban popular esteem, probably as much for his participation in the war of 1898 as for his constructive accomplishments as Military Governor of the Island. The very solid work of Crowder, who only retired during this year as Ambassador to Cuba, has yet to receive the recognition which it deserves. Beyond the regulation official farewells, his departure from Havana attracted much less attention than the sailing of any Cuban cabinet officer for a vacation in Europe.

The United States has had no occasion to exercise the right conferred on it by the Platt Amendment to prevent the curtailment of Cuban independence by a third power, and any voluntary relinquishment of national sovereignty by treaty, provided against in the Amendment is, of course, highly unlikely; neither has control of governmental expenditures in the interests of national solvency been the object of intervention, though much of the work of General Crowder lay in that field.

In accordance with the authority derived from the Amendment, the United States Government selected Guantánamo Bay on the coast of Oriente Province as the site for a naval base. This location was admirably chosen, not only because of its commanding strategic position long ago emphasized by Captain Mahan, but also because its isolated location minimizes the possibility of friction with the native element in the country. The Isle of Pines had previously been rejected for this purpose. Moreover, the American claims to this large island, the determination of whose ownership was left by the Platt Amendment to future negotiations, has been definitely abandoned, to the great satisfaction of Cuban nationalists.

Under the Reciprocity Treaty, trade between Cuba and the United States has reached such proportions that Cuba now ranks among the major factors in the foreign commerce of the United States. In both exports and imports she is ahead of every other Latin American country. In 1926 the United States exported to Cuba goods to the value of $160,500,000 and imported from Cuba sugar and other products valued at $250,600,000. In 1925 the respective figures for exports and imports were $198,700,000 and $261,700,000. In the former year, Cuba ranked seventh among American export markets and fifth as a source of American imports. Cuba is our first market for many important lines,

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including boots and shoes, and is our second market for flour and cotton cloth. In the first 21½ years in which the Reciprocity Treaty was in effect, Cuba exported to the United States merchandise to the value of $4,666,167,044, or virtually 80 percent of her total exports. During the same period she imported from the United States goods to the value of $2,902,359,002, or slightly over 67 percent of all her imports. The Reciprocity Treaty has had little effect on the course of Cuban export trade, the percentage destined for the United States in the fiscal year 1902–3 being 80.6, or substantially the same as for the whole period in question. However, the proportion of Cuban sugar exported to the United States has decreased considerably since 1911, up to which time we took practically the entire Cuban output. The increase of Cuban sugar production beyond the needs of the United States, and the development of large domestic sources of supply by the United States have been responsible for this decline in the relative proportions of Cuban sugars taken by this country. On the other hand, the tariff advantages granted to American goods have resulted in raising the percentage of Cuban imports from the United States from 41.1 percent of the total (1902–3) to 61.4 percent in 1926, which is, however, 14 percent less than in 1919, the peak year of American trade with Cuba. It is noteworthy that the latter is the lowest figure since pre-war days, and as such represents the strong tendency of the trade to return to its earlier channels. This is largely explainable by the predominance of the Spanish mercantile element in the business of the Island.

Reduced to the simplest terms, Cuba's foreign policy must be a matter of finding markets for her sugar, and, very secondarily, for her tobacco. Everything else is but the frills and fireworks of diplomacy — the assertion of her national *amour propre* as a sovereign state. She believes that the first and substantial object is no longer properly served by the Reciprocity Treaty. The second and sentimental phase of her international policy she declares grievously prejudiced by the Platt Amendment. Therefore she would modify the one and abrogate the other.

Agitation against the Platt Amendment is perennial in Cuba. Though much of this outcry against the act which limits the country's sovereignty is only for political effect at home, discontent with the Amendment is undeniably very real. It is difficult to say how much of this opposition is, in turn, the result of persist-

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ent agitation and how much spontaneous popular feeling. A fervid organization, known as the "League Against the Platt Amendment," does not allow public concern over the problem to flag, and the press keeps alive the issue in its columns. President Machado is a declared opponent of the Amendment, and his declaration at Barocoa in September to the effect that "Cuba will make whatever treaties she pleases" is indicative of this attitude.

The present political régime in Cuba is essentially nationalistic. It resents the economic dependence on the United States into which Cuba has fallen through one circumstance or another. It refuses to recognize the fact that the advanced American economic penetration of the Republic is only the natural result of the attraction of a field that promised good returns on the investment of capital. That Cubans were unable or unwilling to supply the capital and enterprise necessary for this development of their country does not affect this essential fact. They only see their sugar industry dominated by Americans, their banking system controlled from the United States and vast areas of the national territory held in "latifundias" by the foreigners. They believe that the advantages of the Reciprocity Treaty are no longer reciprocal, and that the original convention should be altered to meet the changed condition of the present, so that the balance of favors contemplated by the Treaty may be restored. Even Luis Marino Perez, probably the clearest economic mind in Cuba, is convinced of the antiquated nature of the Reciprocity arrangement. Cubans contend that the present American duty on sugar is inordinately high, approximately 80 percent when reduced to an ad valorem basis, and that it bears no relation to relative costs of producing sugar in Cuba and the United States. The reduction of this duty is the great desideratum of Cuban foreign policy. It is regarded as the only certain guarantee for the future prosperity of their too exuberant sugar industry. They recognize the political power of the beet sugar industry in the United States as the principal obstacle to the attainment of their wishes, and view with alarm the increasing sugar production of our overseas possessions. But for the latter, Cuba could market her entire output in the United States. In 1926 the United States consumed 5,671,000 tons of sugar. Of this, Cuba supplied 3,291,000 tons, or 58.03 percent of the total. Our domestic beet sugar industry supplied 873,000 tons, or 15.39 percent and the cane industry of Louisiana only 70,000 tons. We con-

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sumed 618,000 tons of Hawaiian sugar, 460,000 tons of Porto Rican, and 313,000 tons of Philippine sugar, or a total of 1,391,000 tons.

Cuba resents particularly the free admission of Philippine sugar into the United States, which she contends is in violation of the clause of the Reciprocity Treaty quoted above. However, the legal basis of her claim, whereby she protests that the Philippines are foreign territory, is a weak one, since the United States Supreme Court has declared the international status of the Philippines to be that of American soil. The Cubans assert with considerable justice that, in view of the far greater magnitude of American investments in the Cuban sugar industry, that industry is deserving of relatively more consideration in the American Tariff than is the case at present.

In default of an early prospect of improving the status of her sugar under the Reciprocity Treaty, the Cuban government has embarked on a policy of artificial regulation of her sugar business, in the hope of raising the price level of her great staple to a satisfactory position. During the past three years many bills have been introduced into the Cuban Congress with the object of promoting the interests of the national sugar industry, but very little legislation to that effect has actually been enacted. Finally, to avert the danger of overproduction, a law was signed by President Machado on May 3, 1926, empowering the President to regulate the next two sugar crops and to fix the time for the commencement of the grinding season. In accordance with this authorization, the President on September 21st decreed that the 1926–7 crop should start as of January 1, 1927. On December 10th, he signed a decree limiting the crop to 4,500,000 tons. A special commission was appointed to apportion this total among the six provinces, and, when representatives of the sugar interests in each province found it impossible to fix a satisfactory quota for each mill, the National Commission was forced to make the necessary apportionment. Vast quantities of cane were left in the fields at the end of the crop, occasioning considerable dissatisfaction among planters, especially in Camaguey and Oriente. Nor did the restriction have the anticipated effect on the price of sugar. For a time, the c. f. price of raws rose above 3 cents a pound — according to Cuban opinion the borderline between profit and loss — but fell again, depressing business throughout the Island.

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Discussion of the sugar problem continued active throughout last summer. The famous Cortina plan for the protection of the sugar industry was finally shelved in Congress, and interest transferred to a new project originated by Col. J. M. Tarafa, one of the most prominent capitalists in the Island. This scheme had the support of the President, and as an administration measure was forced through the Congress. The law received the signature of President Machado on October 4. It provides for the creation of a commission of five members with vast powers over the national sugar industry. The Commission, which is headed by Col. Tarafa, is to study the world market, with the object of securing a more scientific regulation of production and distribution in Cuba. On the basis of these findings the President shall determine the limit to be placed on the next crop and its distribution among the leading markets of the world. A certain quota of the crop will first be assigned to the United States, and the sale of the surplus above this amount will be left to a special entity created by the law, to be known as the "Cuban Sugar Export Corporation." This body is capitalized at $250,000 by means of an obligatory subscription of the producers, apportioned according to the production of their mills.

It is unlikely that this radical departure of the Cuban Government will result in a higher price level for sugar. It is also highly improbable that the plan for an international agreement between Cuba and other prominent sugar producing countries, like Java and Czechoslovakia, for a concerted restriction of production will succeed. It appears that Cuba will have to wage a lone fight in the sugar world. She is definitely embarked on a policy of artificial restriction, and must face the probability of increased production in other nations that may offset the advantages of her program. Conflicting opinions have greeted the new sugar law in the United States. The refiners, of course, are outspoken in their denunciation of it. On the other hand, the Cubans are counting on the support of their arch-enemies, the American beet sugar interests, in the belief that the latter group will welcome any measure calculated to raise the price of sugar, whatever its origin.

The Cuban Government is making a determined effort to increase the international prestige of the country and to create a position in the society of nations independent of her peculiar status with relation to the United States. The atmosphere of the

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Cuban Foreign Office is pro-European. Martinez Ortiz, the Secretary of State, though impregnated with the current nationalism of the administration, is a continental gentleman, by preference at home in the suave society of European capitals or negotiating at close range and in the stately fashion of ages with the chancelleries of the Old World. He would strengthen Cuba's position by a series of commercial treaties that would open wider markets to her products. The bargaining provisions in the new tariff were calculated to aid in this movement, as declared by President Machado himself in an address delivered on December 4, 1926.

Cuba's recent election to a place in the Council of the League of Nations by a vote of forty out of fifty-nine delegations occasioned an outburst of national enthusiasm on the Island. Her President called it "the foremost triumph in Cuban diplomatic history."

One of the most interesting phases of present developments in Cuban foreign policy is the growing *rapprochement* with Spain, which was lately confirmed by a commercial treaty between the two countries. Though the terms of the pact represent some very skilful negotiating on the part of the Cubans, the treaty was celebrated with much more enthusiasm in Cuba than was justified by its potential advantages to the smaller nation. Much of this closer binding of ties between Cuba and Spain is sentimental. The old bitterness against Spain engendered in the Wars for Independence have disappeared with surprising rapidity and completeness. Spaniards now join Cubans in paying the annual tribute to the memory of Marti and Maceo. Cuba has been brought within the scope of the Spanish *reconquista* movement — the attempt by Spain at a spiritual and intellectual recovery of her lost colonies. Some of the republics, like Mexico, have been obdurate to the call of the mother country; others have been very receptive to the allurements of kinship and a common language. Also, the Spanish community in Cuba is large and influential. Conservative, solid and industrious, the peninsular element dominates the internal trade of a country whose people, true to the habits of their Latin American cousins, are disposed to leave the business of buying and selling to foreigners. The dignified *Diario de la Marina*, the best newspaper in Cuba, is its special press organ. One of its wealthiest and most prominent leaders, Falla Gutierrez, is a power to be reckoned with in the country.

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Cuba has also increasingly affiliated herself with the cause of Hispano-Americanism, the racial phase of the more comprehensive Pan-Americanism. There are possibilities for her embarrassment in the fact that the objects of the two movements may not always be consistent, particularly where the Latin American policy of the United States becomes an issue. The outspoken "Yankeephobes" in the other Latin American republics are trying to win over Cuban public opinion to their campaign against the "imperialism" of the great bugaboo of the north. The intransigent element in Nicaragua, the Panamanians who resent their country's "dependence" on the United States, the irreconcilable nationalists of Santo Domingo and Haiti, irked by our intervention in their countries' affairs, have all appealed for the sympathy of the Cubans. An attempt was recently made to organize a society in Cuba to promote the cause of Porto Rican independence. Mexico, in her assiduous and skilled efforts to build up a solid bloc of Latin American support in the event of an open break with the United States, has not neglected Cuba. In this connection, it is significant that the diplomatic representations of each country in the other have been raised to the rank of embassies, with much attendant talk of consanguinity and its obligations. Yet one of the most clear-headed of Cubans once remarked to me, "Though we should not rejoice at the difficulties of others, the troubles of Mexico have been to the great advantage of Cuba." For a Mexico peaceful and orderly, and unharassed by radicalism, would be a very formidable competitor of Cuba, if her cheap and plentiful labor were given full rein to develop her great possibilities as a producer of the staples of the tropics.

The Pan American Congress to be held in Havana in January offers an unequalled opportunity for Cuba to assert her international personality. How far she will go in proclaiming the fullness of her sovereignty, now restricted by the Platt Amendment, will depend on the moderation and wisdom of her own delegates and the support which they might count on in public opinion. Her delegation, headed by the able Sanchez de Bustamente, contains some of the outstanding figures in Cuban national affairs, and, in spite of the temptation to give the fullest expression to national aspirations, before a sympathetic audience, it is doubtful if the unpopular American control will be openly challenged. However, the Cubans might well be placed in an awkward position if delegates of the other republics should air their

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opinions of the United States too unceremoniously. The incident with Uruguay which led to a short-lived suspension of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and which was precipitated by the Uruguayan representative at Geneva casting doubts on the complete independence of Cuba, still rankles in the national pride. After all, the call of the blood is very strong among all these republics of Hispanic ancestry, and those who have full liberty of action to do as they please are the envy of those who may not. There are many in Cuba who resent the fact that the dream of her revolutionary patriots has not reached complete fruition and that Cuba is not as *libre* as she might be.

What are the alternative solutions for Cuba's international problem? In the first place, any *rapprochement* with the general body of other nations, as with the rest of Latin America, in particular, can give her little more than an unsubstantial and sentimental satisfaction. Furthermore, additional commercial arrangements with other countries can profit her little. Practically all these countries have sugar industries of their own to foster, and due to the conditions of the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States, Cuba's ability to barter tariff favors with other nations is limited.

The time for the radical remedy of annexation to the United States has passed. Such a course might have been practicable during the period of military government, or even at the time of the intervention of 1906–09. More responsible Cubans then favored joining the United States than gave open utterance to their wishes. Today, no Cuban would dare suggest annexation. Annexation is now out of the question, unless a long succession of lean years for the island would weaken the nationalistic spirit of the country to the point where it would be willing to pay the hard price for free sugar and economic salvation. Even then the strongest opposition to annexation would probably come from the north.

Many developments of the last twenty-five years would militate against such a drastic solution. This is aside from the growth of a strong national consciousness among the Cubans and the creation of an official class which would lose by the abolition of national independence. In the first place, the potential menace of free Cuban sugar to the large beet sugar industry of the west and the cane sugar industry of Louisiana, not to mention the cane sugar industries of Hawaii, Porto Rico and the Philippines, would

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insure the opposition of powerful political interests in Congress. Much less important, but nevertheless to be considered, would be the fruit and vegetable growers of Florida and other sections, whose business would be seriously threatened if Cuban products were allowed free entry.

If annexed to the United States, Cuba could well expect early statehood. She could scarcely be treated so cavalierly in this respect as Porto Rico has been. She would almost certainly be a democratic state, out of sympathy with democratic low tariff policies and from mere propinquity with the "solid south." In view of this prospect the Republican Party would probably not welcome Cuba into the Union.

Finally, the effect of annexation on the rest of Latin America would have to be considered, even if it was a voluntary surrender of national sovereignty. The passing of Cuba as an independent power would only seem to confirm the warnings of the most violent Demosthenes of those countries against the menace from the north. Clearly, in view of all these circumstances, annexation is not within the realm of practical politics.

The second alternative is the removal of the present limitations on complete sovereignty by the annulment of the Platt Amendment through the necessary agreement with the United States. The Cuban Government is openly committed to the attainment of this end. Its leaders affirm that the Cuban people have attained their political majority and are no longer in need of the tutelage and control implied in the offensive Amendment. Moreover, they contend that substantially the same objects could be assured through different arrangements of such a nature as not to offend the national sensibilities of the Cubans. Though very considerable progress towards political stability has been made under the Machado régime, no assurance exists that those higher standards will be perpetuated beyond the life of the present administration. The disgraceful Zayas era is still too close for us to be certain that the evils of those years can never recur to threaten order and stability within the country as well as the integrity of the whole political order. It is against this possibility that the Platt Amendment still holds the warning of intervention. Many Cubans are willing in their frank moments to acknowledge that this guarantee of public order is to the benefit of their own country as well as to that of the heavy American investments in the Island. These same Cubans recognize the

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salutary value of the financial control implied in the clause of the Amendment which limits the power of the Government to contract debts.

The Cuban contention that the Reciprocity Treaty no longer serves its original purpose and should be modified to restore the balance of tariff favors contemplated in the pact of 1903 has much to commend it. For Cuba, this would involve a substantial reduction in the American import duty on sugar, which is the crux of the whole question. However, this would result in a corresponding reduction in the revenues of the United States Government and would meet the powerful opposition of the beet sugar states in Congress. On her side, Cuba has proposed no definite and satisfactory formula for the difficult purpose of bargaining to this end. The further concession which she would be required to make to American products in her import schedules would, of course, curtail her customs revenues and create additional financial problems for her Government.

Cuban officialdom should recognize that, after all, her foremost interest is in strengthening her commercial relations with the United States. Those who talk lightly of denouncing the Reciprocity Treaty and of turning their country adrift in a world of free competition can have little sense of the realities of the situation. The nation can do much by balancing its internal economy, now dangerously threatened by its unique dependence on sugar. Beyond that, its path lies in cultivating its great natural market to the north. Europe and the rest of the world can do little for her. As for the Platt Amendment, time and the political maturity of the Republic will automatically dispose of its limitations on the national sovereignty.

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IMPERIAL POLICIES OF GREAT BRITAIN

By M. H. Long

IN 1897 there was held in London the Diamond Jubilee in celebration of the sixtieth year of the reign of Queen Victoria. The galaxy of foreign monarchs, of Indian princes, and of colonial statesmen who attended, the assemblage of an unrivalled sea power, the marshalling of contingents of varying race and color from the four corners of the earth, made of the occasion an imperial pageant the like of which the world had never seen. Through it breathed a not unjustifiable pride in the achievement overseas of the inhabitants of the little home islands. It was instinct with a sense of power, a buoyant confidence in the imperial destiny of Britain. Better, perhaps, than any other single occurrence it marks the culmination of the great age of nineteenth century British imperialism. At its close Kipling in his "Recessional" struck a more chastened note, and now after the lapse of thirty years, we are not quite so sure as we were in 1897. With the new epoch new forces and new circumstances have come into being and the effects of old ones have been altered or more significantly revealed. The Commonwealth, it is true, has been able to weather an unprecedented storm, but the tempest has left its mark upon it, and things are not as they were even in 1914. It may be worth while, then, to attempt a simple statement of the main factors which had given to the British Empire its unrivalled position in the world toward the end of the Victorian age, and of the changed conditions which have evoked in many who love the Commonwealth a feeling of uncertainty and apprehension for its future.

The factors that contributed to Britain's success in empire building are many and varied, but three which were absolutely essential were sea power, commerce and industry. Had Britain remained largely an agricultural country as she was in the Middle Ages, the resulting limitation in wealth and population would have made her too feeble to become the heart of such a great and scattered empire. That Britain did not remain mainly agricultural but experienced the requisite growth of sea power, commerce and industry, was in large measure, though not wholly, due to lucky accidents of her geography and geology.

Britain is an island, and it is a truism that this fact has in-

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fluenced her development in a great variety of ways. It lay most certainly at the basis of her development of sea power. The fact that no part of the country is more than forty or fifty miles from salt water helped to give her people a sense of the sea. Numerous harbors and rich neighboring fishing banks early nourished a hardy race of fishermen like that which formed the basis of Dutch sea power. Proximity to the Continent and danger of attack therefrom also made a fleet the obvious and indispensable first line of defense for an island state.

Britain, however, was not only an island. She was an island with a strategic situation. Up to 1492, indeed, she occupied a remote and rather disadvantageous position in the known world, but the age of geographical discoveries shifted her from her marginal situation to a central position on the trade routes of a new and larger world.

For Britain this had enormous consequences. In the first place it made her as an oceanic island lying athwart the new oceanic routes the natural leader in the evolution of a new type of oceanic sea power. The old routes had been through the narrow seas, and there since the dawn of historic times the galley had been the appropriate type of sea power. But the galley was unsuitable for the long voyages and heavy seas of the new oceanic trade routes, and its cargo space was small. Accordingly the lighter sailing ships of earlier times had to be developed into larger and more seaworthy craft. These in turn to trade safely and protect distant colonies had to be evolved into a new type of warship carrying broadsides of cannon, fighting under sail, and subject to very different tactics from those of galley fighting. Now the Mediterranean was the stronghold of the old traditional galley warfare, and Spain and France, England's chief rivals, being both Mediterranean powers it was therefore difficult for them to free themselves from the old galley tradition. England, on the other hand, because of her geographical position on an oceanic island remote from the Mediterranean, and dependent wholly on sea power for defense, from the time of Henry VIII quite naturally took the leadership in this naval revolution. It was because of this leadership that in 1588 she won her classic victory over the obsolescent equipment and methods of the Armada, and thus broke the power of Spain. The same advantage of an island situation and the same necessity of defense by a fleet rather than by an army has caused Britain, with one or two dangerous lapses,

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to maintain from that day to this the leadership in the evolution of sea power which she assumed in the sixteenth century.

But sea power was not only the *sine qua non* of national independence at home. It was the key to empire abroad — for the sea is a highway that leads to all parts of the world. When it came to rivalry with Continental powers for control of that highway Britain's geographical position proved to be an asset of great strategic value. They were land powers, whose first line of defense was necessarily an army. They therefore could put only their secondary efforts into building up sea power. While France and Spain and the Empire wasted each other's strength in the land struggle for European hegemony, and while Holland was exhausted by her desperate fight for existence against Louis XIV, England because of her island position was relatively free to pursue sea power, colonies and commerce. On critical occasions, it is true, she participated in Continental struggles to prevent any strong power gaining a dangerous ascendancy or acquiring control of the Low Countries, either of which eventualities was an obvious peril to England. But on such occasions England's insular detachment usually placed her in the advantageous position of being able to choose which of two fairly evenly balanced groups of Continental powers she would join. She was thus able to "ride the balance of power" to her own security and advantage.

Moreover, when it came to a contest on the high seas themselves, Britain lay across the trade routes of her distracted Continental rivals. She cut the communications between Spain and the rebellious Netherlands, between France and her ally Sweden in the north. She enclosed within the North Sea her rival Holland in the seventeenth century and in our own day her mightier rival Germany, and was thus able to strangle them into submission by the instrument of the blockade. And if Britain did not similarly lie across the communications of France and Spain and Portugal with the outer world she at least had the advantage of taking them on the flank.

Thus it was that England, largely owing to her happy geographical position, was able to preserve and augment the sea supremacy which in 1588 she had asserted against Spain. It was that sea power which decided the fate of North America and of India in the eighteenth century, for by it Britain was able largely to cut off her enemy's forces from the arena of operations overseas and

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throw in her own. It was that sea power which in spite of Napoleon's mastery of the Continent left the colonies of France and her allies in Britain's hands. In a word, it was by sea power alone that Britain was able to win her empire and by it alone was she able to retain it. The feeling of power and confidence which prevailed in 1897 was largely due to the fact that since Trafalgar British supremacy on the seas had been unassailed and still seemed unassailable.

But the mood of 1897 was not based solely on a consciousness of sea power. It was compounded also of the consciousness that for a hundred years Britain had led the world in commerce, in industry and in finance. Behind the sea supremacy were the material resources to sustain it. The vast accumulation of wealth, and of power to produce wealth, which had become concentrated in Britain was again in no small degree due to the good fortune of her geographical position. In continental countries, exposed to military invasion and depending on military power as the first arm of defense, it was easy for princes to base an autocratic power on standing armies. In Britain, an island state, shielded by sea power, such a course was never possible except for one brief interval under Cromwell. Accordingly, government in England early became relatively free and relatively stable — a condition favorable to the growth of trade and industry. The practical freedom from the ravages of invading armies and the releasing of a greater proportion of the population for the pursuits of peace likewise stimulated the growth of wealth.

With the discovery of the New World, and of a new way to the Far East also, Britain found herself occupying as strategic a position for trade as for war. A glance at a map will show that she lies very near the centre of the land hemisphere of the earth, and on or near the routes joining a great part of Europe with the outer world. Accordingly it was easy for her to bring together products of many countries for resale to other lands and thus become an *entrepôt* for world trade. Similarly when the industrial age came Britain was strategically situated for assembling raw materials from, and despatching manufactured goods to, all parts of the world by sea carriage, the cheapest sort of transportation. With these advantages, and the "freedom of the seas" which her sea power established, the commerce of Britain steadily grew, and one of the most formidable consequences of its growth was the accumulation of a great body of ready capital in the

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country. This development was signalized by the appearance of organizations like the Royal Exchange and the Bank of England for dealing with large scale finance.

With capital available in large quantities and seeking profitable investment, and with overseas markets of seemingly inexhaustible capacity for absorbing manufactured goods of suitable character, Britain was now in a position for an industrial expansion such as no country had ever before experienced in the history of the world. All she needed was the natural resources requisite for large scale industries, and the human ingenuity to take advantage of them. Again a kindly nature had endowered her with geological formations containing large quantities of high grade coal and iron, coal for power, and iron for machinery. The genius of her people was equal to the task of effecting the needed synthesis, with the result that Britain became the "workshop of the world." The growth of industry in its turn gave a new impetus to commerce, and both operated to pile up an ever-growing fund of capital. For the investment and reinvestment of this capital in enterprises in all parts of the world, and for the exchange of credit between country and country, peculiarly flexible financial machinery and a highly skilled technique were developed. Because of the unrivalled services which "the City" could give, it attracted foreign capital as well as domestic, and London became the financial capital of the world.

In this fashion a grouping of geographical and geological and human factors had brought about in the nineteenth century in Britain a combination of imperial sway and of commercial, industrial, financial and naval strength without parallel in history. Nor was this edifice wholly a materialistic one. The liberties which she had painfully evolved through the centuries at home Britain had extended step by step to those of her colonies which were ready for self-government, and the Dominions, mistresses of their own domestic affairs, were thereby bound all the more strongly by the ties of sentiment to the old Mother Land. Moreover, to the more backward peoples of the Empire, as yet unfit to rule themselves, Britain brought the boon of peace and law and justice between men, and the hope that in due time political liberty would ripen for them as elsewhere in the Empire. Everywhere, too, there was toleration and legal equality between race and race and creed and creed. In a word her attitude has been one, not of exploitation and enslavement, but of trusteeship.

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Seemingly impregnable in its strength and on the whole beneficent in spirit, it was the thought of many of the subjects of the great Queen that their Empire must indefinitely keep its preëminence, and become "the greatest force for good" in the future history of the world. And indeed it is not impossible that this hope may still be realized, but if so it must be along lines that few or none clearly perceived in 1897. What are the chief ways in which the situation has changed, and what modifications in ideals and policies do these changes involve?

In the first place, a fact fundamental to nearly every aspect of Britain's situation is that she is not a self-sufficient country in the matter of food supply. This of course was true in 1897. Early in the nineteenth century Britain passed the point when she could sustain her rapidly growing industrial population from the products of her own agriculture. Since then with the growth of population and the decline of agriculture her dependence has steadily increased until it has been estimated that at the present time there is usually only seven weeks' reserve supply of food in the country. In 1897 with Britain's overwhelming naval superiority this dependence on overseas lands for food did not seem a very real danger. But the Great War showed that it was a deadly peril. Indeed, through changed circumstances the insular position of Britain, which had been such a safeguard in earlier times, had now become in this respect just as clearly a disadvantage. A continental country with a surplus population cannot be starved into surrender except by a combination of powers which can completely blockade its entire land and sea frontier, and such a combination is unlikely. An island power with a surplus population, on the other hand, can be starved into surrender by any single opponent possessing superior sea power. Indeed, the Great War indicated the possibility of this being achieved by a country which was inferior on the seas resorting to submarine warfare.

In other ways, too, the passage of time has made Britain's island position, formerly so strategic, much less so. While she possesses the disadvantage of an island in the matter of vulnerability to blockade and submarine warfare, she no longer enjoys its advantages with respect to some other modes of warfare. Cannon can now fire across the Channel, and the progress of aeronautics has been such that in the event of another war no part of the British Isles would be immune from the disorganiza-

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tion and devastation of aerial warfare. In these respects, indeed, Britain has ceased really to be an island. The Channel is no longer a natural frontier and Britain is compelled, as the Locarno Pact shows, to look beyond the Belgian coast and to other devices than sea power for her defense.

The development of new methods of war above and under the sea, then, has made Britain's position far less secure than it was in 1897. Nor is it quite as secure on the seas themselves. Since then we have witnessed Britain's traditional type of sea power reduced from an indefinite superiority to a three, to a two and now to a one power standard. Nor is this one power standard at all assured. Agreement with respect to its definition failed to be reached at the recent naval disarmament conference, and who can doubt that if a race of armaments should begin between Britain and the United States, the former with its more limited resources, strained as they have been by the Great War and the ensuing economic depression, would be unable to sustain the contest with the unstrained and unrivalled resources of the latter? Even if the one power standard should be maintained it spells for Britain a certain measure of inferiority, because her naval commitments are scattered all over the world while those of the United States are largely concentrated on her Atlantic and Pacific coasts linked by the Panama Canal. This fact, on an equal basis of naval construction, would tend to give to the United States a greater facility for concentration and therefore a superior striking power. Moreover, while Britain, an island with an insufficient food supply, is susceptible to a vital blow from sea power, the United States can largely live of itself and is unvulnerable to sea power alone. As against the United States, and Japan, also, Britain possesses no such strategic advantage as she did against Germany. She does not lie across their sea access to the outer world. On the contrary, while Britain has near at hand in France a power which can use the aeroplane and submarine against her with deadly effect, neither the United States nor Japan is at present so menaced. A race of armaments would thus mean for Britain not only building against the United States and Japan on the seas, but building against France above and under the seas, for the increase of Britain's strength as against the United States or Japan would inevitably be regarded by France as a peril to herself.

No one, of course, would consciously and deliberately wish

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to plunge Britain into such a competition. The only danger is that unconsciously and step by step we may drift into it. Solicitude for our own security may lead us to insist on certain minima of armament. This in turn will be regarded by the other states in question as a threat to their security, which will cause them further to arm themselves. This again will raise our conception of the minimum necessary for our defense, and thus we are caught in the fatal circle. Forty or fifty years ago, perhaps Britain could have sustained such a competition. Today she would be foolhardy to enter upon it, not only because of the adversely altered strategic situation noted above, but also because her economic situation has likewise changed in such a fashion as to make her in peace as well as in war more dependent on and vulnerable to forces in the outside world.

What are the main facts in this altered economic situation? As before we must take our departure from the commonplace but fundamental consideration that Britain has a much larger population than her agriculture can support. To provide her people with the food and other things from abroad which are requisite to the maintenance of the existing standard of living, the country must make corresponding payments to foreign lands. These payments, as everyone knows, are made in such forms as the export of manufactured goods like textiles, or of raw materials such as coal; the re-export, with a profit, of raw materials or manufactured goods imported from abroad; the services of the merchant marine; the interest on investments abroad, and the banking and exchange services performed for foreigners by "the City" functioning as the financial capital of the world. Not only must Britain pay for her food in these ways, but she must purchase in these ways also many of the raw materials without which she cannot manufacture the articles to pay for the food. All this makes Britain trebly dependent. First, she is dependent on the outside world for a growing proportion of her food and raw material. Secondly, she is dependent on the willingness and ability of the outside world to give her a market for her manufactured goods and re-exports and to avail itself of her mercantile and financial services. Thirdly, she is dependent on the maintenance of the "freedom of the seas" to enable these exchanges, which are like the vital flow of blood in the body, to be safely and normally made.

Even in the heyday of the Victorian age it is true that England

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was dependent, as now, in all these respects, but her dependence did not then seem to be a matter worthy of grave concern. The trident appeared to be irremovably within her grasp and therefore for her under all circumstances the freedom of the seas was assured. For the rest, raw materials seemed inexhaustible and markets for British goods and services seemed capable of indefinite expansion. There did not appear to most British subjects to be any reason why population and wealth and power should not grow without limit in the British Isles, and this economic supremacy and imperial preëminence be indefinitely maintained.

To this complacency time has brought many challenges and a somewhat changed perspective. The altered situation with respect to sea power has just been treated and need be labored no further. But the economic situation back of sea power has changed also and in a variety of ways. First, in the matter of industry. The nineteenth century was preëminently the age of coal and of this commodity Britain possessed a superabundance of the finest quality. This she was able to use not only to manufacture goods at home, but she was able to export large quantities in payment for food and raw materials from abroad. Moreover, coal greatly helped to make Britain a centre of commerce constituting as it did a ready return cargo to many parts of the world and thus making for cheap marine rates. It has been claimed that British economic preëminence in the nineteenth century was built up fundamentally on coal.

In this vital matter Britain now finds herself at a disadvantage in two ways. In the first place, other fuels such as oil and electricity which possess some obvious advantages over coal are competing more and more successfully with coal for various uses, and in various regions. With these new sources of power Britain is not so well supplied, at least in the homeland, as many other countries. In the second place, in the world market for coal Britain has found a competition far more keen than any she experienced in the nineteenth century. In the years before the war German competition made itself increasingly felt, particularly on the Continent. During the war Britain, and of course Germany, had to curtail their exports, with the result that other countries entered the export field. Australia developed a Pacific market. South Africa commenced to export. Most formidable of all, the United States with her enormous productive capacity for the first time became a great exporter, replacing British coal

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in wide regions. Since the war Britain has recovered a good deal of this ground, but the fundamental fact remains that coal is not quite so important industrially as it was in the past, and may become still less so, and that in the export field Britain will have to meet from a reviving Germany, an expanding United States, and from other quarters a keener competition than she has ever experienced. In other words, Britain will find it more difficult to use her coal to purchase the food and raw materials which she must obtain abroad in order to sustain her existing population at home. In this respect the fabric of her industrial life and of her national strength would seem to be less secure.

In other ways, too, the future would seem to be more precarious than the past. Iron is another essential of modern industrialism. Once Britain was self-sufficient in this respect as in coal, but now she depends on the foreigner for about half of the iron ore consumed in her blast furnaces. In the fiscal year 1921–22 the native wool crop supplied only 12 percent of her industrial needs. Most of her wool and all of her cotton, silk, jute and rubber must be imported. Now, of course, from the very beginning of her industrialization Britain was dependent to a considerable extent on foreign supplies. The point is that as population and industralization have increased the dependence has grown, and with this growth of dependence the economic life of Britain has been rendered less stable. It is an ever bigger pyramid on an ever smaller base, the equilibrium of which may be disturbed by two sorts of outside forces. Accidents of nature in distant parts of the world such as floods, droughts, blights and so forth may curtail the supplies of needed raw materials or restrict the purchasing power of needed markets to the disorganization of industrial Britain. Similar disorganization may be produced by the acts of men, such as the waging of wars which disturb markets and restrict the flow of raw materials, the erection of hostile tariffs, the development of industries which compete with those of Britain, and the deliberate monopolistic regulation by governments or capitalistic groups of supplies of raw materials which Britain must have.

One of the disturbing features of the present situation is the tendency for this second human species of outside disturbance to British industry to grow. Even in the 19th century the drift outside England was steadily away from the doctrines of Free Trade, and the Great War seems to have accentuated this

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tendency. It has multiplied states and frontiers and tariff systems. The new states, inspired with nationalist sentiment and still feeling insecure, strive by political means to stimulate the manufacture of their own raw materials and thus to become as independent as possible of the foreigner. In other cases customers of Britain during the war were forced to buy elsewhere with the result that the market she once enjoyed has now to be won back from the competitor. Other peoples who formerly bought from England were necessitated or encouraged by war conditions to manufacture for themselves, and national feeling operating through governmental action now protects the home industries thus created against British recovery of their market. Examples of the operation of these tendencies come readily enough to mind. Australia has tried to develop a woollen industry to handle the raw material which she produces. British India has passed an act for the protection of a home industry in steel. While the United States now manufactures much of its own cotton, and while spindles and looms have increased in Europe, India, China and Japan, Lancashire has been working short time. In 1924, Britain was buying more from other countries than in 1913, and she was selling less to them by about 20 percent. In the same period the production of the United States had increased by 20 percent and her export of manufactured goods by nearly 50 percent. These developments would seem to indicate that in the future the task of purchasing the needed food and raw materials by the products of industry will be more difficult for Britain than in the past.

So, too, with trade it will be more difficult for Britain to keep her old ascendancy. That ascendancy was based in a very considerable degree on her geographical position and her Free Trade policy making her a great *entrepôt* — a cheap and convenient market for the buying and selling and transhipment of goods in transit between Europe and the rest of the world. But of late years there has been more of a tendency for goods and passengers to go directly to the Continent or from the Continent to their foreign destination. More than that, the trade of Europe relative to the volume of world trade has been steadily declining. In the period from 1871 to 1880, the trade of Europe constituted about seven-tenths of that of the world; after 1880, about six-tenths; and in the period from 1913 to 1924 only five-tenths. If the trade of Europe is to form a steadily decreasing proportion of the world's

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trade, then it would seem to follow that Britain, whose strategic position for trade is largely relative to Europe, will in the future occupy a relatively less advantageous position.

So, too, in the matter of finance. Britain's world leadership in industry and commerce brought about vast accumulations of capital and made London the financial centre of the world. But as the trade and industry of other countries developed, capital accumulated elsewhere in large quantities, subsidiary financial centres grew up, and the shock of the Great War seemed for a time as though it were about to establish a primacy of one of these at London's expense. With heroic efforts Britain salvaged the pound and on the whole has retrieved the situation. Even yet the United States is for the moment the greatest exporter of capital in the world, but London has preserved her position as the international banking centre, as the discount market, the foreign exchange market, and the insurance market of the world. New York in the past has been predominantly concerned with the financing of enormous internal developments and lacks the specialized financial machinery and the skilled personnel and technique for international operations. But these things can be developed, and London must look to her laurels. In England progress in the accumulation of wealth was suspended during the war. Allowing for changes in the purchasing power of money it is estimated that the annual amount of wealth saved is from £150,000,000 to £200,000,000 below that saved in 1913. The enormous burden of direct taxation, moreover, hampers trade and takes capital from investment, and the fall of prices consequent upon deflation has slowed down industry and has greatly increased the real burden of the national debt. Even in the sphere of finance, then, there are factors which seem to make Britain's traditional preëminence more precarious.

In the above the adverse factors in Britain's position have been deliberately selected. The writer is well aware that there are assets which can be set off against them. In the matter of competition for the export trade, for example, Britain has the great advantage that her mines are close to the sea while American exports of iron, steel, coal, and engineering products are hampered by the relatively heavy cost of transportation from the mining and manufacturing districts to the coast. The German heavy industries, too, are tied to coal-fields much further inland than those of Britain, and therefore are handicapped in finding

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overseas markets, though their central position in Europe and the European canal systems give them an advantage in Central and Eastern Europe. Nor is the human factor to be neglected. Britain's free and stable government, the long-developed and well-tried genius of her people for seafaring, trade and industry, her superb financial technique and unrivalled financial integrity, the patriotism of her masses, and the public spirit which animates so many individuals of her middle and upper classes — these and other such things, together with the fact that she emerged victorious from the Great War and with her Empire intact and enlarged, all make for confidence in the future.

Nevertheless, if we try to strike a balance it is hard to resist the conclusion that on the whole Britain's position is as difficult as any which has confronted her in her long history. Her population owing to the decline of emigration was in 1921 2,000,000 more than in 1911, despite the losses of the Great War. A greater population means, if the standard of living is to be maintained, expansion of the industries, merchant marine and financial services by which food and raw materials are paid for. This in turn implies that adequate supplies of raw materials and adequate markets for British goods and services must be available abroad at profitable prices. But it is just in these respects, as we have seen, that the situation in the future appears through the operation of tariffs, monopoly and competition as though it would be more difficult than at any time in the past.

Even more gloomy is the prospect if we take into account the law of diminishing returns, which the Victorians too often forgot. They thought that there was no limit to the quantity of goods which could be produced at a profit. Many of our modern writers, returning to Malthus and Ricardo, remind us that though there is still much vacant agricultural land in the world it will only be brought into cultivation in response to the stimulant of a rise in prices. This means that for each new application of capital or labor applied to industry in an old country like Britain, a relatively smaller quantity of food-stuffs or raw materials can be purchased. Under these circumstances will not the point be steadily approached beyond which British industrialization will be excessive? Indeed, would not the phenomenon of the last six years during which the unemployed have never numbered under a million, together with the fact of a narrowing margin between imports and exports, visible and invisible, show

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that the point of saturation industrially has been reached, and that Britain now has a population as large as her own capacities and the conditions of the outside world will permit her to support? If this be true, while certain other powers such as the United States have greater capacity for expansion, must not Britain's wealth and power suffer a relative decline? And if Britain should suffer such a relative decline, does she not thereby become less capable of retaining control of the seas and maintaining her position as the centre of a world-wide empire whose communications are sea routes?

Such changing circumstances, such possibilities, force one to consider what policies, domestic, imperial and foreign, it would best serve Britain's interests to pursue. One such policy is indicated by Clive Day in his article on "War Shocks to European Commerce" in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July, 1927. "In foreign markets," he says, "in which Britain must face unaided the competition of established rivals like the United States and Japan (with the threat of German competition to come) and must overcome the resistance of newly founded home industries, the salvation of the British export trade appears to depend on a heightened efficiency of production which will win a market in spite of obstacles. Britain must specialize still further, abandoning the simpler processes to other peoples. . . . It is significant that the branch of the English cotton industry which has best maintained its position in these hard times has been that working on the long-stapled Egyptian cotton turning out a fine product and demanding superior skill."

To enable Britain thus to increase her efficiency of production and specialize still further there are certain prerequisites. Some *modus vivendi* must be found between capitalist and labor unions which will enable production to proceed with less friction than of late. The further expansion of facilities for technical education is also necessary and in this respect Britain has something to learn from both her chief rivals, Germany and the United States. From the latter, too, she can learn much in the matter of the utilization of more modern machine equipment. Both these competitors tend to excel her in the provision of educational facilities for the masses of the people. Until a great deal more than nine percent of the population possess the advantage of some secondary school education it is hopeless to look for Britain to hold her own. Industrial efficiency demands that the native

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intelligence of which the masses of the British people are not devoid should be tapped by popular educational facilities at least equal to those of her rivals. The hereditary principle which has so long dominated British social life and has in the economic sphere been a numbing influence should be discarded and the freest possible path should be opened up for talent.

A second and quite different line of action, but not one at all exclusive of the first, is that which has been advocated by the imperialistic school. The British Empire has roughly one-quarter of the population and one-fifth of the land area of the world. Its territory is distributed in every climate and contains an abundance of practically every kind of raw material. Let Britain then turn from a world of growing difficulties to her own Empire. By using her authority over the dependent parts of the Empire and by negotiation and agreement with the self-governing parts let her knit them together into an economic system in which highly industrialized Britain would find her natural complement in less developed regions which would supply the food and raw materials which she needs in exchange for her manufactured goods. Let her likewise concert with her Dominions a common policy for defense and foreign affairs and common machinery to make such policy effective. Such an Empire would be more self-sufficient even than the United States. It could coöperate cordially in the League of Nations. But it would, none the less, be great and strong enough to stand, if necessary, alone and impregnable, economically and politically.

Such a plan has not been without its attractiveness for men of fine intellect and ideals. But examination shows that perhaps insuperable obstacles lie in the path of the realization of many of its aspects. In the first place, the Empire is so scattered geographically, so differently endowed by nature, and so diverse racially, that its various parts are bound to develop divergent economic and political interests and policies.

Examples are easy to find. Take first the sphere of foreign policy. In the years before the Great War the Dominions were almost wholly content with their local autonomy and left foreign affairs in the hands of the Motherland. She paid the piper and should call the tune. But as a result of their exertions in the Great War and their own maturing national sentiment, the Dominions, led by Canada, have step by step won their way to a position at least of nominal equality with the Motherland in the League of

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Nations, in the Empire, and in the diplomatic world. Except for the Privy Council in the case of certain of the Dominions, the monarch himself remains the only formal link between Britain and her Dominions, and there is now the possibility of George V as King of Britain, of Canada and of Ireland following conflicting policies at Washington through his respective ambassadors. Why not? The intransigeance of certain elements which may get control of the Irish Government is well known. As for Canada, should serious trouble arise between the United States and Japan with Britain as the latter's ally, where would Canada's interest lie? Is not Mr. Meighen's opposition to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance sufficient answer? Britain is a European power and necessarily involved in the complicated game of European politics, but her Dominions being far distant wish only to be free from such entanglements, as witness Canada's attitude towards Chanak, Lausanne and Locarno. What common interests have India and Canada, or India and Australia, or India and South Africa, to draw them into a common foreign policy? If it came to the race struggle which some writers foresee, assuredly these parts of the Empire would tend to be drawn rather into opposite camps. Already there has been friction and there is ill-feeling on this score.

The same is true of a common policy of defense. The needs of the different parts are not the same. Britain, whether she had an empire or no, would need her sea power. The protection of her commerce, the safeguarding of her daily bread, would demand it. Canada, on the other hand, does not greatly need the British fleet or army. The United States in self-defense must protect Canada from attack by all other powers, while against her giant neighbor, should she choose to attack, Canada would be helpless. As for Australia and New Zealand, the only power that can really threaten them in their isolation would seem to be Japan, and could they not in such a case look almost equally to the United States as to Britain? The former would hardly consent without a struggle to such a formidable growth of her Japanese rival's power as the acquisition of Australia would make possible. As for India, South Africa, Canada, what interest have they in making any serious effort for each other's defense? Even under the threat of the German peril before the Great War the Dominions found it difficult to agree upon common measures of naval defense. With that pressure removed is the task an easier one?

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Again in economic matters the story is much the same. The economic interests involved have been too divergent. For nearly thirty years the question of some sort of tariff union for the Empire has been before the public and has been discussed at successive imperial conferences with little of consequence achieved. The Dominions have given certain preferences to the Motherland, and since the war she has responded with preferential treatment for certain products from her Empire overseas. But substantial progress has always broken down upon two obstacles. On the one hand, the British public has refused to assent to a preference on staple colonial products such as wool, cotton or wheat because it fears that thereby the cost of raw materials and food would be so increased as to make it impossible for Britain to compete in the markets of the world. The Dominions, on the other hand, though they have given a preference to British manufactured goods have always retained for their own manufacturing interests a substantial measure of protection. They do not propose to sacrifice home industries unduly to Britain. In this respect India seems to be following in the wake of the Dominions. Just in proportion as she progresses towards control of her own government so the movement grows for the protection of home industries, against Britain as against other states. In all likelihood the crown colonies as they attain self-government will adopt the same policy of economic self-development. Is there any calculable time within which it would seem likely that these divergent tendencies can be reconciled?

An examination of the character of British trade shows still further the nature of the difficulties.

	1913	1922	1923
British Imports from the Empire	24.9	31.6	29.7
British Exports to the Empire	37.2	37.5	36.3

In brief, something less than one-third of Britain's import trade and a little more than one-third of her export trade are with her own Empire. It is true that this imperial trade is of a more complementary character than her foreign trade, that is, the imports comprise a greater proportion of food and raw materials and the exports include a greater percentage of the manufactured goods than is the case with Britain's trade with foreign lands. None the less the fact remains that about two-thirds of Britain's

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total trade lies outside her Empire. The economics of Richard Cobden have sunk deep into the mentality of the British nation. On the principles of Free Trade they have built up an industrial, commercial and financial edifice which is world-wide in its foundations. May they not well ask themselves whether the imposition of restrictions on the two-thirds of their extra-imperial trade in favor of the one-third of their trade which is inter-imperial will not fatally disturb their economic equilibrium? What would be the effect on British industry? What would be the effect on the mercantile and financial ascendancy so largely built up on Britain's position as the greatest free market in the world? These are questions difficult or impossible to answer, but the fact remains that in 1923, as on all previous occasions when the British electorate found themselves confronted with these questions, they decided not to embark on an experiment the end of which they could so little foresee.

There is a further consideration which enters into this aspect of the question. Would not the knitting together of the British Empire into a tightly drawn economic and political unity excite the fear of other powers and bring about a hostile and possibly fatal coalition against Britain? Since the Great War Britain has established in the crown colonies differential duties in favor of herself which affect about 5 percent of the colonial trade. On this the United States Tariff Commission on Colonial Tariff Policies commented in 1922 as follows: "While the differential duties at present are so few, in so vast an empire and one that controls the major part of the world's supplies of so many articles, the reintroduction, on however limited a scale, of the old mercantilist principle of the reservation of colonial products to the Mother Country must cause serious concern to the rest of the world." It is true that the United States follows the same preferential system with most of her own possessions and therefore such a comment does not come from her with the virtue of consistency. But nations are not the slaves of consistency, and the comment shows the possible drift of developments. The economic plan of the imperialists is in essence a return to the old colonial system of the 18th century, and their opponents have not been slow to point out that that system culminated in a revolt of Britain's first colonial empire assisted by an interested and formidable coalition of outside powers. The precedent, it must be admitted, is not a happy one.

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Whether Britain will ever find an outlet from her difficulties along the lines of the old imperialist ideal is, then, a question that must give rise to grave doubts. But in connection with any program of imperialism it is necessary to bear certain fundamentals in mind. The British Empire is not dependent for its continuance upon any uniformity of economic policy. Had it been so it would long since have been dissolved into fragments. Though it was acquired by sea power backed by military force and economic strength, it is no longer so held. These were ties which in 1914 both India and the Dominions could have impeached had they wished. They did not so choose. The tie that held and holds them, then, is not naval, military or economic, but something on a quite different plane. It is something psychological. It is a devotion to common ideals of liberty and justice which find a growing embodiment in free institutions. These free ideals and institutions have been Britain's greatest bequest to her Empire. They form the very soul of it, and all sound imperial policy must be in harmony with them. Between such free and equal communities all progress in the direction of common political organization or unity of diplomatic and economic policy must necessarily be by consent of all the parts. Such progress, therefore, must be tentative and slow, so slow as to be extremely trying to the theorist. Yet any progress so attained is the surest form of progress.

By this method of negotiation, assent, and coöperation, there would seem to be at least one aspect of the imperialist policy which is susceptible of more rapid development than the others. If the Motherland is over-populated the Dominions are still comparatively empty, and many have pointed out the appropriate remedy of imperial migration. Various difficulties have hampered its application. For one thing, the so-called "dole system" in Britain has with many checked the impulse to migrate. The surplus population of Britain also is largely urban and industrial in character. What the Dominions require are agriculturists, and labor interests overseas have steadily opposed the immigration of British factory workers to compete with them in the labor market. But it would seem that these difficulties are not insuperable. Surely Britain and the Dominions are capable of evolving a scheme by which emigration would be stimulated and the emigrants be given a training for the new type of life and an assistance in the early years of it which would ensure the success

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of the great majority of them. Such a scheme would at one stroke help to solve the problems of both Dominions and Motherland. It would be the truest form of imperialism. Efforts indeed have been made along this line, but so far they have failed as a whole to achieve any striking success. Until our genius can solve a problem such as this surely the time is not ripe for us to attempt still more ambitious imperialistic schemes.

Still another aspect of Britain's problem is the determination of her proper policy towards the United States, the country which is now her most formidable political and economic rival. The writer has conversed with intelligent Americans who were apparently obsessed with the idea that Britain had for centuries compassed the ruin of her rivals by forming hostile coalitions against them. Thus she had disposed of Holland, France and Germany, and thus she would now set about to eliminate her latest rival, the United States. Therefore the latter must be eternally vigilant about her defenses, particularly at sea.

To any sane Britisher such a policy on Britain's part would be the sheerest folly, and for Americans to apprehend its adoption by Britain is nothing but a panicky obsession. Consider the circumstances. For Britain to provoke a naval rivalry by machinations against the United States would be suicidal for her, for there is no doubt that the United States has now developed to the point where her resources would permit her to outbuild Great Britain. More than that, to the north of the United States lies Canada. Her population is only 9,000,000 as compared with the 120,000,000 of her great neighbor. There are 3,000 miles of unfortified frontier and all the big Canadian centres of population lie within easy striking distance of the border. In case of war with the United States Canada's strategic position would be a hopeless one. She is practically a hostage in American hands. Can any one conceive a British statesman following such a witless policy as one of deliberately planned aggression against the United States? So far as I know no one has ever advocated or thought of such a course. On the contrary, there have been those who have proposed an Anglo-American alliance. This, however, is only to jump to the other extreme. It is an impracticable policy, for all the non-British and all the anti-British elements in the United States would be so opposed to it that no American government could carry it out. For Britain's part, it would be a very dubious policy for it would be apt to assume in the eyes of her

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colored subjects and the Japanese the aspect of a white alliance against the colored races, while European powers would regard it with an apprehension and hostility which might easily take the form of a counter-coalition. Neither of these eventualities would be to the advantage of Great Britain.

For her the sound policy would seem to lie in between these two extremes. It should be one that assumes that there never will be another war between the English-speaking nations. Britain should refuse to be drawn into machinations against or into naval or military competition with the United States, and should place her trust in the long mutual tradition of the amicable settlement of disputes, a tradition longer and stronger between Britain and the United States than between any other powers. No opportunity should be lost, consistent with national dignity and self-respect, to dispel the misunderstandings and animosities of the past and to create an atmosphere of friendliness and good will for the future. In this way the two countries can be drawn together most powerfully for the peace and welfare of the world.

One other aspect of our topic remains to be treated. There has been in existence since 1919 a new factor in world affairs in the shape of a League of Nations. The different states of the world have had to consider the question of their policy towards it. What should Britain's be?

At first glance it might appear that the League of Nations is an organization which must have a subversive effect on the British Empire. Nations and empires are usually cemented into unity by external pressure. Canada, in so far as she is a nation, has been created in no small degree by the pressure of the United States. The United States were largely created by the pressure of Britain's colonial system. Modern Japan is the product of the aggression of western powers. Examples need not be multiplied. May it not be conjectured, then, that just in so far as the League of Nations succeeds in changing international society from its ancient predatory state into a peaceful and law-observing one, the different parts of the British Empire will less than ever feel any need for each other and the Commonwealth will thus gradually dissolve into the larger body? Is the League of Nations a solvent for the British Empire? A little reflection will, I think, show that such a result by no means necessarily follows.

At the end of the Victorian age Britain was in such a powerful position that a policy of "splendid isolation" was still feasible.

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The German threat soon made it no longer so, and Britain was drawn into ententes and alliances. Today with her sea supremacy gone, her natural frontier — the Channel — no longer valid, with her dependence accentuated on raw materials and markets in all parts of the world, Britain can no longer follow such a policy. She cannot refrain as of old from previous commitments and keep her hands free to deal with each situation as it arises. She must take time by the forelock and enter into a regular system of commitments and relationships with other Powers. This Locarno has abundantly shown.

Fortunately, just at the moment when her growing dependence makes it necessary for Britain permanently to abandon her "splendid isolation" it has been made safer for her to do so by the fact that international relationships have been transferred, partly at least, to a new plane. In the old days the leading powers of the world were partly autocratic and partly democratic. This made for distrust and friction, and international arrangements tended too much to be hostile arrangements with one group against another on the old principle of the balance of power. As a result of the Great War, however, the democratically organized states have gained such a marked preponderance that it has become possible to an unprecedented degree for international relationships to develop upon the opposite principles of friendship, coöperation and the common good.

It is for these principles that the League of Nations stands. Its supreme interest is the maintenance of the peace of the world, for it is recognized that modern science has rendered war so all-destructive that only by its elimination can civilization itself be preserved. More than that, the League aims to promote the utmost international coöperation in such matters as health, labor conditions, communications, intellectual activities — the very things which are vital to the future progress of civilization.

Now in many ways the League of Nations is simply an embodiment of the principles for which the British Empire has stood and stands. What is the Empire but a society of nations linked together that each may the better make its distinctive contribution to the evolving civilization of the world? In the imperial conferences we forecasted the method of consultation and coöperation which the League of Nations was to adopt and to develop. Is not the *Pax Britannica* simply a peace enjoyed by one-quarter of the human race, the like of which the League

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wishes to extend to all the world? Is not the mandate system with supervision by the League simply a variant of that idea of trusteeship in the government of backward peoples of which the British Empire has long been the pioneer? The League's principle that mandated territories shall be given control of their own affairs when they are capable of assuming it is again only the application of the British principle of responsible government. As for the "open door" economically in mandated regions, that was long Britain's policy towards her crown colonies, and still is mainly so. And as to the "freedom of the seas" which nations seek through the League, did not Britain vindicate that principle against Spain and Portugal in the 16th century and has she not observed it scrupulously in the century and more of her unquestioned supremacy since Trafalgar?

If the League and the Empire embody many common principles and use many common methods they likewise have many common problems. The chief concern of the League is to preserve the peace of the world, but to whose interests is this more vital than to those of Britain? No state economically is so dependent as she on peace and order in the outside world, none has given so many hostages to fortune. The League seeks to lessen the burden of armaments. To Britain, strained by the Great War and subjected on many sides to an increasingly severe economic competition, this should be a welcome policy. Britain is dependent on foreign supplies of food and raw materials. But she is not alone in this. Japan, Italy, Germany, are dependent only in somewhat less degree — indeed in some respects they are more dependent, for they are "proletarian" nations lacking colonial empires such as Britain and France possess. The League of Nations seeks to make progress towards the solution of this international economic problem by economic conferences and in other ways, so that among the nations there may be established a live-and-let-live policy. Surely this is in line with Britain's long-cherished Cobdenite economic principles. The League seeks everywhere to facilitate means of transit and communication. No power stands to gain more by this than a world-wide Empire with a world-wide trade. Thinking men say that racial and nationalist antagonisms are two of the chief dangers to the future peace of the world, and both these problems the League must study and attempt to solve. With both these problems, too, the British Empire is concerned for they are reefs upon which it may well founder.

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Indeed, it follows from the way in which the British Empire interpenetrates the world that its problems are, on a somewhat smaller scale, just those world problems with which the League of Nations must contend. Any solution of them which the League may be able to achieve must redound to the advantage of the Empire, while in many ways the Empire may be able to reveal fruitful lines of action for the League to follow. Here, then, we have a relationship not fatal to one party but healthful to both. By sharing with her Dominions in the most active and whole-hearted participation in the League of Nations Britain will not extinguish her Empire but will further strengthen and vitalize its fibre and will assure for herself, her Dominions and dependencies a maximum of prosperity, stability and strength. Still more, by so doing she will attain in the world a moral prestige and leadership such as no mere preëminence in wealth and power like that of the Victorian Age could give.

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FRENCH IMMIGRATION PROBLEMS

By Charles Lambert

THE last French census, which closed on March 7, 1926, showed that in the five years since 1921 the population of France had gained in absolute figures by slightly more than a million and a half. In 1921 it had been 39,209,766; in 1926 it was 40,743,851; increase 1,534,085. However, closer examination gives a quite different meaning to the statistics. During these same years the number of "foreigners resident in France" increased by slightly less than a million (1921, 1,550,459; 1926, 2,498,230; increase, 947,771); while the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine accounts for another 1,795,000. Considering only the territories comprised within the old frontiers of France, we find that the native population of the country has actually diminished over the period of fifteen years since 1911 by slightly more than two million (2,021,775).

The rural districts especially have suffered. Eighty years ago (1846) three quarters of our population (75.6 percent) belonged to the peasantry. In 1926 that proportion had dropped to barely half (53.6 percent). Today it is less than half (48 percent). In certain sections the losses are especially apparent. Within twenty years the departments of Lot, Mayenne, and Gers have lost about one in five of their inhabitants. Today Gers has 120,000 acres of uncultivated land and 2,500 abandoned farms. Part of these losses are accounted for by marked tendencies toward urbanization. Comparing the census reports of 1926 with those of 1921, it is evident that small communes are steadily losing, while great centers are tending to gain.

While the population of France is at best stationary, with an inclination to decrease, her neighbors, and especially England and Italy, have recently shown steady average gains of about five hundred thousand souls per year. Here is a table comparing populations today with the figures of 1870:

Country	*1870*	*1927*
France	38,000,000	40,000,000
Germany	40,000,000	63,000,000
Great Britain	26,000,000	43,000,000
Italy	26,000,000	40,000,000
Russia	65,000,000	102,000,000
United States	39,000,000	120,000,000
Japan	32,000,000	60,000,000

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Thus in the fifty-seven years since 1870, France has increased her population by two millions (thanks to the return of Alsace-Lorraine), Germany by twenty-three millions, Great Britain by seventeen millions, Italy by fourteen millions. Going farther afield, the United States is stronger by eighty-one millions, Russia by thirty-seven millions, and Japan by twenty-eight millions.

That France should therefore be exercised over the question of population is certainly not surprising, the more so as a million and a half of her best men fell in the frightful carnage of the Great War.

While the native substance of France is thus seen to be gradually using itself up, another development, disquieting and at the same time reassuring, is coming to the fore. Foreigners in larger and larger numbers are settling on French soil. This is, after all, only the operation in France of that same principle of "population pressure" which has caused the astounding movement of emigrants to the United States in the last fifty years. In the last five years alone there has been an increase of nearly a million in the numbers of "foreigners resident in France;" nor does this figure include seasonal workers, tourists (of whom we have another million), or natives of our colonies (those in Africa especially), of whom some one hundred and twenty thousand find employment in French mines, factories and other industries.

Of the manifold causes of this foreign invasion we may consider two or three of the most important.

The first is the Great War. For four years and more French territory was the world's battle ground. Immense ruins piled up, villages were destroyed, great buildings were overthrown, fields were ravaged, roads were ruined. The country suffered all the consequences of a struggle engaging millions of combatants. The restoration of economic life to such regions was a gigantic task rendered all the more difficult by the fact that the numbers of our slain were almost equalled by the numbers of young men whom the war left with reduced social efficiency by reason of wounds or disease. The man-power of the nation was so depleted that in the work of reconstruction we were compelled to look abroad, and notably toward those countries which had suffered losses less serious than ours. Agreements for immigrant help were accordingly negotiated with Poland, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Belgium. Official commissions were sent to those countries to recruit labor. As a result, a considerable number of foreign

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workmen (estimated at 202,926 for the year 1923, and 236,365 for 1924) were installed permanently in France, adding this much strength in the task of rehabilitating devastated departments and speeding up production in our coal and iron mines, — in short, maintaining and expanding our national industry.

The second cause is the immigration policy of the United States. The laws passed on May 19, 1921, and May 26, 1924, put strict limitations on immigration from Europe. The number of foreigners to be admitted to the United States was fixed at two percent of the total previous immigration from the different countries as determined by the American census of 1890.

The more prolific nations of Europe, notably Italy, Poland, and Russia, at once found the flow of their immigrants to America seriously reduced. In the year 1920, a total of 430,000 individuals entered the United States, two-fifths of them Slavs or Italians. In the following year, 1921, the figure was 805,000, two-thirds of them Slavs or Italians. Compare these figures with the figures set by the restrictive measure of March 1924, which brought the Italians down to a quota of 3,845, the Poles to a quota of 5,982, the Russians to a quota of 2,248, and the total of all immigration to 164,667.

It was only natural, accordingly, that the flood of emigrants from Europe, on finding its principal outlet blocked, should turn to a country which, though of course unable to present the attraction of a wage scale comparable to the American, still could offer foreign labor excellent living conditions, appreciable social advantages, and, best of all, steady work. Hence the influx into France of the million resident foreigners registered by the census of 1924. And the rate of increase seems if anything to have grown during 1925.

Still a third cause may be noted. Since the war many European nations have undergone political convulsions which have driven across the frontiers large numbers of citizens unable to adapt themselves to new political conditions. From Soviet Russia, from Fascist Italy, from Hungary, from Spain, vast throngs have poured into France in order to escape persecution at home and to find personal security and freedom of thought under the flag of our Republic. To them must be added Jews fleeing Rumania and Poland before waves of anti-Semitism, and Armenians who have not welcomed a choice between the yoke of Turkey and the yoke of Soviet Russia.

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France, nevertheless, has not yet awakened to the importance of immigration, either as regards its dangers or as regards the benefits which may accrue from it; and the problems which arise in connection with it are referred for solution in a more or less haphazard way to departments of five different ministries. For example, questions of industrial and commercial employment, as well as of health and sanitation, come before the Ministry of Labor, while the recruiting and distribution of farm labor are supervised by the Ministry of Agriculture. The Foreign Ministry negotiates the treaties and agreements that bear on immigrants; but the Ministry of the Interior has control of policing and the Ministry of Justice control of naturalization. Certain classes of immigrants from the colonies depend on the Ministry of Colonies; others, notably natives of North Africa, on the Ministry of the Interior.

That such a loose organization should result in divergent policies and lead sometimes to lamentable consequences goes without saying. No serious supervision is exercised at the frontiers; and once the immigrant is safely within the country it is impossible to control his movements. At present, for instance, our immigrants tend to avoid the lands that lie uncultivated in half populated rural districts where they would have been welcome. They seek instead the great cities where there are already too many people, where the housing question is acute, and which in any case are daily attracting our native population from the fields. In many cases, far too many, French workers have been deprived of their positions by foreigners who have entered the country with contracts so favorable as to exempt them from all competition. Amendments to the Labor Code[1] made last year do indeed prevent such displacements of farm labor; but the reforms do not yet go far enough. The obligation of a foreign hand to remain in an agricultural occupation does not extend beyond one year.

The foreigners who migrate to France tend also to congregate together, and certain of our departments have become veritable centers of *irredentism*. Several villages in the Département du Nord are peopled entirely by Poles who have brought their wives, their children, their priests and their schoolmasters along with them. Immigrants from Poland make up 20 percent of the popu-

[1] Labor Code, Book II. Articles 64, 98, and 172. The amendments alluded to were voted on August 26, 1926.

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lation of Lens, 40 percent of the population of Courrieres, 68 percent of the population of Ostricourt. Thirty thousand Italians have settled in the south-west. The conquest of our frontier provinces by a process of infiltration is proceeding systematically. In the Riviera district nearly a third of the whole population is foreign, while the proportion reaches almost a half in Nice.[2]

The sick and infirm of all the world have free entry into France — our doors are wide open, everybody is welcome. But as though our natural hospitality were not sufficient, we have made reciprocal agreements for free medical assistance to immigrants with Italy, Poland, Belgium and Luxembourg, though those countries have only insignificant numbers of French immigrants. Paris has been described as the "world's hospital." There is some exaggeration in the phrase; but still the numbers of foreigners receiving gratuitous aid are impressive. In 1925, 19,500 foreigners received free assistance in the hospitals of Paris, seven or eight percent of the total number treated. The expense to the city of Paris was between eight and ten million francs.

It goes without saying that there also is a certain correlation between physical and moral decadence. The figures for arrests of foreigners made by our police show a steady increase. Of total arrests made by the Sureté Generale, a proportion of 10 percent were foreigners in 1921 and 1922; the figure became 12 percent in 1923, 14 percent in 1924, and 16 percent in 1925.[3]

The absence of a coherent policy toward immigration in France may be credited with some, at least, of these regrettable features of our population problem. And the question arises as to what such a policy ought be be.

It should, in my opinion, hold in view an adequate supply of hands for our industries and more especially for our farms by facilitating the entry into France of foreign workers, carefully chosen in advance, who are eager to leave their own country and are likely to be profitable additions to our own. What kind of men do we need? Above all peasants, to check the abandonment of our farmlands which is proceeding at a terrifying rate. By proper understandings with certain countries, based on reciprocal concessions, a steady current of farmers of robust stock should be kept moving toward our fields. A judicious choice must

[2] Alpes Maritimes, 140, 648 foreign residents out of a total population of 445,253; Nice, 91,712 out of a total of 201,872.

[3] These figures do not cover arrests made by municipal authorities.

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be made. We must not create race problems for ourselves by mixing people who will not and cannot coalesce. We are not hostile, in principle, to the assimilation of Asiatics and Africans, for whom we as a nation feel none of the harsh hostility that appears in the United States. Nevertheless we agree that such a mingling of races is undesirable. A policy for replenishing the French race should be based on the introduction of kindred blood. It is from Europe itself, and almost exclusively from Europe, that we should draw the peasants necessary for our countryside. Among the Latin peoples, Spaniards, Italians and Belgians are easily absorbed and constitute excellent materials; but these Latin stocks might well be balanced by Slavic and Nordic elements — Czechoslovaks, Poles, Russians, Scandinavians, Dutch, Swiss, prolific and sturdy races all, which could be distributed all through our territory with the best results.

Regarding the reconstitution of our peasantry as the prime objective, we should turn our attention especially to the children. The foreign child is marvelously responsive to contact with his French comrades. He acquires offhand at school capacities and qualities which his parents are unable to attain in a whole lifetime of effort. He loses his foreign accent and he often wins the highest grades in school work. It is as though the grafting of the new shoot on the aged trunk of France brought with it promise of new and splendid fruitage. We therefore should give preference to immigrants who are married and have large families.

French immigration policy should profit by the vast experience of the United States, where the four millions who peopled the country at the time of the Revolution have been converted by immigration into the 120,000,000 of today — a powerful, amalgamated mass, a new and vigorous race. We should admit to permanent residence among us only individuals whom successive examinations have shown to be without serious moral and physical defects. And this control should be exercised, not after the foreigner is within our doors, but before he is admitted. It is difficult to exclude or deport undesirables who may have come from great distances with large families and are unable to return to their places of origin. A first control should be applied therefore in the immigrants' home country, the French Consul according his visé only to individuals who conform to conditions prescribed impartially for all newcomers, if not by law, at least by ministerial regulation. The requirement of the passport and

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the visé on the passport should be continued permanently, if not for tourists, visitors and transients, at least for immigrants, who should never be admitted without them. A second examination should then take place when the immigrant arrives at our frontiers. There physicians permanently attached to Immigration Offices should see that the newcomer conforms to the regulations already applied to his case by the Consuls.

It seems evident that even before any attempt is made to evolve a complete legislation for governing immigration policy, we should have a unified and central department to deal with all matters pertaining to immigration — something, in a word, similar to the Immigration Bureau of the United States. M. Albert Thomas, Director of the International Labor Commission, has justly remarked that such a French bureau would have derived better results even from existing laws, but especially that it would have suggested and accelerated new legislation. It is certain that the important immigration law of 1924, establishing quotas for American immigrants, would not have worked so smoothly in the United States had not the Bureau of Immigration, established in 1913, had the benefit of many years of experience.

French immigration policy should have as its ultimate objective the permanent assimilation of the foreigner — in other words, his naturalization should be complete. Short-sighted as any other outlook would appear, quite opposite views have prevailed in recent years in the counsels of the French Government. A narrow-minded hostility toward everything foreign seems to have presided over the formulation of the different laws hitherto made for dealing with questions of nationality. Numberless difficulties were strewn in the path of the foreigner desirous of becoming a French citizen. Applications for naturalization were subject to long administrative delays. The formalities themselves were cumbersome, and on the whole so costly as to be beyond the reach of any but the most determined. An article of the Civil Code compelled the foreigner, in the first place, to furnish documentary proof of ten years of consecutive residence in the country. Then when an application had been granted, the children born of the immigrant's marriage abroad were still free to decline French citizenship on attaining their majority, and even those born in France could do the same. Every step in the complicated procedure was peppered with prohibitive taxes and fees.

To remove some of these regrettable conditions I introduced

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a bill in the Chamber of Deputies, on October 29, 1925, providing for the reduction of the residence requirement for naturalization from ten years to three, and for the extension of French nationality to the minor children of naturalized foreigners. Both these provisions were incorporated in the Nationality Bill which passed its final reading in the Chamber on July 14, 1927. It also provided that minor children shall acquire full rights to the new nationality of their parents, that the age at which an application for French citizenship may be filed be eighteen instead of twenty-one, and that the French woman who marries a foreigner — hitherto compelled to assume her husband's nationality — shall remain French unless she elects to repudiate that nationality at the time of her marriage. Even in this case she may later elect to reassume her native citizenship; and any children born to her on French soil are French citizens by that fact. It need not be said that this new law is of the first importance for the future of France. It is a long step toward realizing a broad policy of immigration indispensable to the growth of the nation.

It would be absurd to claim that these measures are the only ones to be applied in fighting the depopulation of our country. Social remedies — the subsidizing of large families, the fight on infant mortality, on bad housing conditions, on contagious diseases — must still occupy a chief place in our thoughts. But these remedies produce results very slowly, while the dangers are present here and now before our eyes. Our principal recourse must be to immigration, an immigration vigorously stimulated but at the same time controlled by careful selection, that we may welcome only individuals worthy of becoming Frenchmen.

We need hundreds of thousands of new hands for our fields and factories. In procuring these, and in dealing with them after they have arrived, we must abandon policies based on xenophobia and anti-foreign prejudice. To hold to these policies would be to deny the French nation its one chance of regeneration, without preventing the establishment on our soil of foreign colonies which a decade hence we might well be unable to control. On the other hand, to follow a broad policy of assimilation toward carefully selected immigrants is to give new vigor to the country, to halt the process of depopulation, to strengthen the development of our colonies, to increase the production of our shops and our fields, and to guarantee our national security in the family of European nations.

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THE ORIGIN OF THE MANDATES SYSTEM

By David Hunter Miller

AT the time the Anglo-Egyptian arrangement was made about the Sudan, Lord Salisbury, according to Lord Cromer, "joyfully agreed to the creation of a hybrid state of a nature eminently calculated to shock the susceptibilities of international jurists."

Some of the same sort of pleasure might be felt as to the mandates system.[1] It was novel in 1919; nothing of the same legal nature had ever been done before. Of course we may search around for analogies and find or try to find other things that are more or less like the mandates system; and a few of them, some protectorates, some spheres of influence, even the Sudan itself, are something like it, though rather less than more; but even the nearest of them are not very similar; and if they were, we might well recall the maxim that "nothing similar is the same."

I shall not attempt to trace the origin of the *idea* of mandates or of the term itself.[2] So far as it involved the principle that the control of uncivilized peoples ought to mean a trusteeship or wardship under which the interests of the natives themselves should be paramount, it had long been advocated by various writers; and "the interests of the populations" was the phrase used in the Fifth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points:

> A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

In any event, Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations is the starting point in theory of all legal argument about the mandates; it is the first international agreement about them; and, while it perhaps would be going too far to say that all other international agreements regarding mandates rest on this Article, they must at least be read in connection with it.

Perhaps it is not possible to turn one's mind back to the period

[1] Cf. Lansing's two pages of questions about sovereignty, which Wilson called "mere technicalities." Lansing: "The Peace Negotiations," pp. 151–153.

[2] See generally, "African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference," by G. L. Beer, Macmillan, 1923.

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after the Armistice and look at the situation then existing without being influenced by subsequent events; but there are at least some points that may be recalled. Territorial changes had already taken place in Europe on a considerable scale, not changes caused by the Peace Conference, but changes prior to the Peace Conference, some of which it would have taken force to undo. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had broken up in the latter part of October and the early part of November, 1918, before the German Armistice; the Governments at Vienna and Budapest were not only separate but bitterly hostile; Poland and Czechoslovakia were *de facto* in existence and functioning after a fashion; the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes, whether they were going to be one country or not, were certainly detached from their former connections; the only certainty about the situation around the Baltic was that it was uncertain. I need only mention the problem of Russia generally; and add that in that period it was quite doubtful whether there existed or would exist any Government in Germany capable of legally binding the country by any treaty of peace. Outside of Europe territorial changes were to take place in the former Ottoman Empire and in respect of the German colonies; and all of these were more or less under Allied military occupation.

Perhaps the first point that strikes one in thinking back to the early Peace Conference days is that the German colonies and Turkish territories were considered together. It is natural to suppose that this was because they were all regarded as "spoils of war," and to some extent this is true; but there were other and, I think, more pressing reasons; and nobody knew in January, 1919, whether there was going to be a global peace treaty with all the Central Powers or whether there was going to be, as it turned out, a treaty with Germany first; or even whether there was going to be some kind of document which was never properly envisaged but much discussed as a Preliminary Treaty of Peace.

Let me quote from some remarks of Mr. Lloyd George at the meeting of the Council of Ten[3] on January 30, 1919:

[3] The meetings of the representatives of the Great Powers during the Peace Conference of Paris were held in different forms. Sometimes the five Great Powers met as the Council of Ten, there being two representatives from each country; sometimes the five Foreign Ministers met and these meetings were usually referred to as the Council of Five. The meetings between the four heads of States, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau and Signor Orlando, were referred to as the Council of Four; this was the case even during the period when Orlando was absent. All these meetings — the Council of Ten, the Council of Five and the Council of Four — were called meetings of the Supreme Council.

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Mr. Lloyd George said that they could not accept the *status quo*. He wanted to put the British position again. The German Colonies did not matter very much, although the maintenance of troops in German East Africa was a very considerable burden. He could not say exactly how many troops they had in that theatre, but he knew it was a very considerable number. Coming to the Turkish Empire, he had handed some figures to the President of the United States and to M. Clemenceau, and he had also told M. Orlando that they had 1,084,000 men there. It was true that only between 250,000 and 300,000 were British troops, but they had to maintain the lot, and it was an enormous expense. The difficulty was to keep all these various tribes in some sort of peace with each other. If they kept them there until they had made peace with Turkey, and until the League of Nations had been constituted and had started business, and until it was able to dispose of this question, the expense would be something enormous, and they really could not face it, especially as they had not the slightest intention of being mandatories of a considerable number of territories they now occupied, such as Syria and parts of Armenia. He thought the same thing applied to Kurdestan and the Caucasus, although they had rich oil-wells. He did not think that they had the slightest intention of being mandatories even for the oil-wells of Baku, but somebody had to be there to protect the Armenians and to keep the tribes and sects in Lebanon from cutting each other's throats and attacking the French or Turks, or whoever else might be there. Therefore, he was afraid that they must insist (he was not using that word in a military sense but from the point of view of those who had to pay taxes in the United Kingdom, and to propose it to Parliament). He was afraid, however, that Parliament would want to know why they should keep 1,084,000 men there? Did they really mean to occupy the country? Why should they do so when they had no intention of having a permanent garrison there? This question specially affected them, and unless the Conference was prepared to relieve them of that responsibility, he would really have to press very hard for a definite appointment of the mandatories, which he should have thought was the most satisfactory way of dealing with it. Then they could clear out, and leave the mandatory to undertake the job.

Of course this was put by way of argument for an assignment of the mandated areas. But wholly apart from that, the practical situation in the military sense was one for very early discussion and decision.

It may be said that at the Peace Conference only minor conflicts of self interest existed among the Great Powers regarding the distribution of these territories. Such questions had largely been settled by the secret treaties among the French, the British, the Italians and the Japanese; but I do not attribute to those treaties any very great significance here. I now refer solely to those territories that were *finally* detached from Turkey and to the German colonies (including the Pacific islands). It is at least arguable that even without any treaties those four

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Powers would have agreed that South West Africa should go to South Africa, Mesopotamia to the British, and so on, a distribution politically logical and also in accord with the military situation. What the secret treaties did was to prevent the mandates system, particularly in respect of the "C" mandates, from going any farther toward League of Nations control of those areas.

From a selfish point of view, the United States had almost no interest in the problems presented. Every American would have regarded the acquisition of any territory in Africa in any form as a burden. Our interest in Turkey was sentimental only, and even so was limited substantially to Armenia. With the possible exception of Mosul, "the open door" in Turkey meant hardly more than a phrase. In the Pacific our situation was slightly different. Of course New Guinea meant nothing to the United States and we already had a part of Samoa. The only one of the small islands having any commercial value was Nauru, where the private rights, as distinct from the sovereignty, had been owned by the British since before 1914. That the remaining islands should not become naval bases and that we should have privileges for wireless communication in the Island of Yap were about all that, from the point of view of self-interest, America could ask.

The conflict that arose in the Conference was thus a conflict regarding a principle rather than a conflict between opposing national interests. The French, or at least the French Colonial Office, wanted to annex part of the Cameroons and Togo; and the three British Dominions interested wanted to annex respectively German South West Africa, New Guinea and German Samoa.

The British Government, meaning here the Government in London, was in a rather mixed and difficult position. The Colonial Office was destined, under one form or another, to have charge of German East Africa (except the region later assigned to Belgium) and of portions of Togo and the Cameroons; but not only the form of that control, but even the fact of it, was rather small dust in the British balance. Of course London wanted to keep peace in what I may call the Commonwealth family. Aside from that desire it cared very little about annexation as distinguished from mandates either in Africa or in the Pacific; indeed, while committed to the Japanese claim for islands north of the Equator, the British probably preferred the mandate system to annexation in either locality.

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Turkey was another matter; here Egypt, the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf, the Balfour declaration regarding Palestine, the rather vague commitments to the Arabs and the various agreements with the French and the Italians about Syria or Cilicia or Anatolia, all entered in as important factors.

Furthermore, there was a good deal of difference in public opinion in Great Britain on this general question. During the election campaign in December, 1918, for example, it had been bluntly asserted that Mesopotamia was a very rich country and would help to pay the cost of the war if the British took it over. It is doubtful whether any one still thinks so, after writing down in the red ink side of the ledger £100,000,000 or more spent in that region since 1919, even now that Mosul is to be credited to Iraq and even if there be included with the credit all the Mosul oil which is in newspaper headlines and which may possibly be underground and some day discovered. On the other hand there was a feeling, pretty strong even in 1919, against the extension of British colonial rule in any form whatever, anywhere. "The British Empire is big enough," is the way this sentiment was reflected among some of the most responsible British representatives at Paris.

Wilson had suggested on his voyage to Paris that

> the German colonies should be declared the common property of the League of Nations and administered by small nations. The resources of each colony should be available to all members of the League, and in this and other matters involving international relations or German colonies or resources or territorial arrangements, the world would be intolerable if only arrangement ensues; this is a peace conference in which arrangements cannot be made in the old style.

This was on December 10, 1918. So Wilson did not take his ideas from Smuts, so far as the German Colonies were concerned; the Wilson idea was there the opposite of Smuts' idea. Though Smuts in his paper, "A Practical Suggestion," dated December 16, advocated the mandatory system, it was not to be for the "barbarians of Africa," as he called them, but expressly the contrary; he proposed that the principle of mandates and not annexation be applied to Russia, Austria-Hungary and Turkey.

If we turn now to the drafts written by Wilson at Paris, we find that what he took from Smuts' paper was the *language*, but making it applicable to Turkey and the German colonies, and originally to Austria-Hungary also. A good deal of confusion

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prevails about these drafts.[4] There were in fact three, and in the first two of them is to be found the Smuts language, though Wilson's proposals were even more sweeping, as the following extract from his Second Paris Draft (January 20, 1919) shows:

> The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory State or agency shall in each case be explicitly defined by the Executive Council[5] in a Special Act or Charter which shall reserve to the League complete power of supervision, and which shall also reserve to the people of any such territory or governmental unit the right to appeal to the League for the redress or correction of any breach of the mandate by the Mandatory State or agency or for the substitution of some other State or agency, as Mandatory.

The idea of Wilson as to the inclusion of Austria-Hungary was expressed by him in a conversation with Orlando on January 30, from a note of which I extract the following:

> The President asked for Signor Orlando's views on the Covenant[6] which had been submitted to him the day before.
>
> Signor Orlando replied that he was in the main in entire agreement with President Wilson, but he had a few technical suggestions to make. He drew special attention to Article I of the supplementary agreements which, he thought, was open to misconstruction. If the Trentino and Trieste were to be handed over to a mandatory by the League of Nations, it would seriously compromise Italy's dignity.
>
> The President pointed out that this was far from his mind. In fact, he intended that this question should be settled before the creation of the League of Nations. In other words, the Trentino and Trieste had, as far as he was concerned, already been ceded to Italy. He said that the reason why he had drafted the paragraph in this form, was because Jugoslavia might be divided into one, two or three States. He was prepared to admit two Jugoslav States to the League of Nations but, if it were found advisable to separate them into three parts, he would prefer to place the more unformed and less developed of the new States under the mandatory of the League of Nations.
>
> Signor Orlando thanked the President warmly for this explanation but he nevertheless recommended that the language of Article I be altered.
>
> This, the President promised to do.

No one dissented at Paris from the proposal that Germany should lose her colonies, and all of them. This was Wilson's earlier view, as has been seen; and his First Paris Draft of the Covenant (January 10, 1919) formulated it. The matter was

[4] For example, in Mr. Ray Stannard Baker's book, "Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement," much of the comment on the second of these Drafts is applicable only to the third, which is not mentioned at all.

[5] In these Drafts the Council of the League was called "Executive Council."

[6] i.e. Wilson's Second Paris Draft.

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settled in a few words in the Council of Ten on January 24, recorded as follows:

All he (Mr. Lloyd George) would like to say on behalf of the British Empire as a whole was that he would be very much opposed to the return to Germany of any of these colonies. . . .

President Wilson said that he thought all were agreed to oppose the restoration of the German colonies.

M. Orlando, on behalf of Italy, and Baron Makino, on behalf of Japan, agreed.

(There was no dissentient and this principle was adopted. . . .)

It was General Smuts who fathered the resolution[7] which was offered by Lloyd George at the meeting on January 30 of the Council of Ten.

If we go back to the Smuts plan we find very naturally a considerable variance between the Smuts plan and the Smuts resolution. In proposing in his plan the idea of mandates, General Smuts had expressly excluded from its application "the barbarians" of Africa. Now, however, they were to be included; and so clause 8 of the resolution introduced for some[8] of these "barbarians" the mandates in their mildest and most milk and water form, that nearest to the annexation which Smuts desired, — what we now call "C" mandates, the territories which "can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory State as integral portions thereof." Indeed much of the Smuts resolution (aside from clause 8[9]) may be found in a British "Draft Convention regarding Mandates" which, as "Revised January 24, 1919," divided the mandated areas into "vested territories" and "assisted states;" that paper also contained a clause for a Mandates Commission, whose functions in the administration of Article 22 have been of the highest importance.

Previous to the meeting of the Council of Ten on January 30 the Smuts resolution had been discussed at a meeting of the British delegation on January 29. President Wilson saw the resolution on the morning of the day of the meeting of the British delegation; for my copy of the resolution had on it a marginal note from Colonel House to the President reading as follows:

L. G. and the colonials are meeting at 11.30 and this is a draft of a resolution that Smuts hopes to get passed. He wants to know whether it is satisfactory to you. It seems to me a fair compromise.

[7] For the text, see next page.

[8] Namely those of South West Africa. All other mandates in Africa are "B" mandates; but, as mentioned earlier, all the Pacific mandates are also "C" mandates.

[9] The vital clause, in the view of Smuts, W. M. Hughes and Massey.

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The resolution, as adopted, including the slight amendments made at the meeting of the Council of Ten, read as follows:

1. Having regard to the record of the German administration in the colonies formerly part of the German Empire, and to the menace which the possession by Germany of submarine bases in many parts of the world would necessarily constitute to the freedom and security of all nations, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that in no circumstances should any of the German colonies be restored to Germany.

2. For similar reasons, and more particularly because of the historic misgovernment by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Kurdestan, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. This is without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire.

3. The Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that advantage should be taken of the opportunity afforded by the necessity of disposing of these colonies and territories formerly belonging to Germany and Turkey which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, to apply to these territories the principle that the well being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League of Nations.

4. After careful study they are satisfied that the best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience of their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations.

5. The Allied and Associated Powers are of opinion that the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

6. They consider that certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a state of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power.

7. They further consider that other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory subject to conditions which will guarantee the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications of military and naval bases and of the military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League of Nations.

8. Finally they consider that there are territories, such as South West Africa and certain of the Islands in the South Pacific, which, owing to the

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sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the Mandatory State, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory State as integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate, the Mandatory State shall render to the League of Nations an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

A comparison of this resolution with the language of Article 22 of the Covenant shows that all of the resolution (other than its first two paragraphs) is carried into the Covenant, with almost no changes except those made necessary by the different characters of the two documents, and except also that the words "and who are willing to accept it" are inserted in its second paragraph; but otherwise the two papers are to this extent as alike as two such papers could well be.

In the Covenant Article, however, are two added paragraphs of importance. One provides for the framing of the mandates by the Council of the League, and the other for a permanent Mandates Commission, a body thus deriving its powers directly from the Covenant, and without which it is difficult to see how the system of mandates could have worked at all. These clauses came into the Covenant text at a later date, at the sixth meeting of the Commission on the League of Nations on February 8, 1919, when the resolution of January 30 was in substance proposed by Smuts as the text of the mandates article of the Covenant, with these additions.

When the question came before the Council of Ten on January 30, there was a noteworthy clash of views in the matter of the German colonies between Mr. Wilson on the one hand and Mr. W. M. Hughes of Australia and Mr. Massey of New Zealand on the other; and according to common report, the earlier discussions within the British delegation had been even more heated and violent, for the Dominion Premiers wanted annexation, and nothing less.

At the Council of Ten, Lloyd George offered the resolution, explaining that it was a compromise, "that Great Britain had deliberately decided to accept the principle of a mandatory, but that decision had not been wholly accepted by the Dominions." He said that so far as Turkey was concerned, the resolution dealt only with those regions "which had actually been conquered. Districts such as Smyrna, Adalia, the North of Anatolia were

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purposely excluded." Wilson, who had not agreed to the proposal in advance, pointed out that, while "the Great Powers had agreed that the League of Nations should form an integral part of the Peace Treaty," the scheme had not been drawn up, without which any mandates system was necessarily incomplete. This suggestion of the provisional character of the resolution and of the necessity of completing the League of Nations scheme, a statement which Lloyd George said "filled him with despair," led up to very vigorous speeches by Hughes and Massey, both of whom said that they desired annexation and not a Mandates system. Wilson finally asked the direct question whether Australia and New Zealand had presented an ultimatum to the Conference. Massey replied in the negative and, after some blustering, Hughes did also, although he had previously said that he would have to consult his Government. This clearing of the air was followed by a very moving and attractive speech by General Botha who opened by saying that he was "not a British subject of very long standing."

The result of the two meetings of the Ten was the acceptance of the resolution and, while it was a compromise, it must be regarded as a victory for Mr. Wilson, not complete but still substantial.

Even in the "C" mandates, as we now know them — in other words, German South West Africa, New Guinea, and other Pacific Islands — which by the Covenant may be "administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory," the principle of trusteeship is firmly established; this was clearly shown in connection with the uprising of the natives in the former area in 1923. And as to the other territories in Africa and those formerly in Turkey, the world took a very long step forward when Article 22 of the Covenant came into force.

There is one point regarding this Resolution of January 30 which may easily escape attention. The broad language of its first paragraph is to the effect that none of the German colonies should be restored to Germany. Similarly, the language of the third paragraph is equally broad in applying to "these territories," meaning all of them theretofore mentioned, the principle that the well being and development of their peoples "form a sacred trust of civilization," and so on. But when the Resolution goes on to classify the various peoples in the sixth, seventh and eighth paragraphs, it speaks first of "certain communities

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formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire" ("A" mandates); then "other peoples especially those of Central Africa" ("B" mandates); and finally "territories such as South West Africa and certain of the Islands in the South Pacific ("C" mandates). Thus the islands in the North Pacific, while doubtless included in some of the general language, are not specifically mentioned at all. These were the islands held by Japan, and no others. The "South Pacific" meant the Pacific south of the Equator; and Samoa is south of the Equator, and so is Nauru.

Mr. Wilson was thinking of these islands held by Japan and had taken notice of the fact that they were not specifically mentioned in the Resolution. My Diary records a conversation with him at the Quai d'Orsay, from which I quote:

> After the meeting (on January 30) the President came up to me and talked for fifteen or twenty minutes. He said that he spoke of the ultimatum so as to clear up the situation; that Australia and New Zealand with 6,000,000 people between them could not hold up a conference in which, including China, some twelve hundred million people were represented.
>
> He then spoke of the resolution as not going as far as he had hoped, to which I replied that it was in my opinion a great achievement and pointed out how far it went in respect of Turkish territories and in Central Africa. To this the President assented, saying that he had not thought of it as going quite that far.
>
> He then spoke of the limitation in the resolution to the islands in the South Pacific and asked me to consider this question in respect of the islands in the North Pacific which Japan held. He said that these islands lie athwart the path from Hawaii to the Philippines and that they were nearer to Hawaii than the Pacific coast was, and they could be fortified and made naval bases by Japan; that indeed they were of little use for anything else and that we had no naval base except at Guam.

The discussion at these meetings of the Council of Ten on January 30 was not directly on the question of the *distribution* of the mandates; this matter was passed on by the Supreme Council some months later, on May 7, except as to Turkish territories; but no one can read the debates on January 30 without observing that, in part, such a distribution had already received the tacit assent of everyone. Indeed the claims of the British Dominions had been presented at length to the Council of Ten on January 24. So it was assumed that German South West Africa was to be under the control of the Union of South Africa, New Guinea under the control of Australia, and German Samoa under the control of New Zealand; and despite the statement of Lloyd George that "the resolution did not deal with the distribution of mandates at all," it was also admitted in the conversations about the black

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armies in Africa that France was to have certain African mandates, and these of course would be none other than in Togo and the Cameroons.

The distribution of the mandates was thus obviously in everybody's mind. Lloyd George, for example, said (as above quoted) that the British had not the slightest idea of being the mandatory for Armenia or Syria or Kurdistan, a not unfair implication from this being that the British would look with favor on a mandate for Mesopotamia; and just after the passage of the resolution of January 30 the Belgians were heard by the Council of Ten regarding their claims to a portion of East Africa, claims which were subsequently realized, although not completely settled till 1923. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the French contention regarding recruiting of troops in their mandated territories in Africa was accepted at the afternoon meeting of the Council of Ten of January 30. The language of Clemenceau could hardly have been more explicit; in the original unrevised text of the minutes the rather long discussion ended thus:

> Mr. Lloyd George said that there was nothing in the clause under review to prevent that. The words used there were "for other than police purposes and the defense of territory." He really thought that those words would cover the case of France. There was nothing in the document which would prevent their doing exactly the same thing as they had done before. What it did prevent was the kind of thing the Germans were likely to do, namely, organize great black armies in Africa, which they could use for the purpose of clearing everybody else out of that country. That was their proclaimed policy, and if that was encouraged amongst the other nations even though they might not have wars in Europe, they would have the sort of thing that happened in the 17th and 18th century in India when France and Great Britain were at war in India, whilst being fairly good friends in Europe. Then they were always raising great native armies against each other. That must now be stopped. There was nothing in this document which prevented France doing what she did before. The defense of the territory was provided for.
>
> M. Clemenceau said that if he could raise troops, that was all he wanted.
>
> Mr. Lloyd George replied that he had exactly the same power as previously. It only prevented any country drilling the natives and raising great armies.
>
> M. Clemenceau said that he did not want to do that. All that he wished was that the matter should be made quite plain, and he did not want anybody to come and tell him afterwards that he had broken away from the agreement. If this clause meant that he had a right of raising troops in case of general war, he was satisfied.
>
> Mr. Lloyd George said that so long as M. Clemenceau did not train big nigger armies, for the purposes of aggression, that was all the clause was intended to guard against.

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M. Clemenceau said that he did not want to do that. He therefore understood that Mr. Lloyd George's interpretation was adopted.

President Wilson said that Mr. Lloyd George's interpretation was consistent with the phraseology.

M. Clemenceau said that he was quite satisfied.

The language of the Resolution itself (as resulting from an amendment of Sir Robert Borden) was not perhaps perfectly clear. It speaks of "defense of territory" which might mean simply the mandated territory; but the French view that this meant home territory as well was accepted. My own pencil note of the discussion, written during the meeting, read as follows:

Clemenceau and Pichon speak against the clause preventing voluntary recruiting in colonies — they want this right in mandatories as well as present colonies. This right is admitted by L. G. and W. W.

But the language of the Resolution was not changed; it remained "defense of territory," and so it is in Article 22 of the Covenant. Later on an attempt was made by the French to change this language of the Covenant by adding to it "and of the territory of the mother country." That attempt did not succeed owing to the opposition of President Wilson.

The result of all this is a rather curious one. The six "B" mandates, all for African territory, are not all alike. Four of them, those over British Togo, British Cameroons, Tanganyika (British) and Belgian East Africa do not contain the following clause, which is found in the French mandates for their portions of Togo and the Cameroons:

It is understood, however, that the troops thus raised may, in the event of general war, be utilised to repel an attack or for defense of the territory outside that subject to the mandate.

However, the development of the mandate system under Article 22 of the Covenant is beyond the scope of this article. Its history forms already a very interesting chapter in present-day international affairs. The non-ratification of the Treaty of Versailles by the United States was followed by unnecessarily long negotiations as to our relations with the mandated territories; but what I may call the mandate status is now completely recognized. The rights of its *cestuis que trust* have become fixed rights, which very likely will, from time to time, be increased, as events in Syria and Mesopotamia and elsewhere have indicated; but certainly they will never be diminished.

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THE PHILOSOPHIC BASIS OF FASCISM

By Giovanni Gentile

FOR the Italian nation the World War was the solution of a deep spiritual crisis. They willed and fought it long before they felt and evaluated it. But they willed, fought, felt and evaluated it in a certain spirit which Italy's generals and statesmen exploited, but which also worked on them, conditioning their policies and their action. The spirit in question was not altogether clear and self-consistent. That it lacked unanimity was particularly apparent just before and again just after the war when feelings were not subject to war discipline. It was as though the Italian character were crossed by two different currents which divided it into two irreconcilable sections. One need think only of the days of Italian neutrality and of the debates that raged between Interventionists and Neutralists. The ease with which the most inconsistent ideas were pressed into service by both parties showed that the issue was not between two opposing political opinions, two conflicting concepts of history, but actually between two different temperaments, two different souls.

For one kind of person the important point was to fight the war, either on the side of Germany or against Germany: but in either event to fight the war, without regard to specific advantages — to fight the war in order that at last the Italian nation, created rather by favoring conditions than by the will of its people to be a nation, might receive its test in blood, such a test as only war can bring by uniting all citizens in a single thought, a single passion, a single hope, emphasizing to each individual that all have something in common, something transcending private interests.

This was the very thing that frightened the other kind of person, the prudent man, the realist, who had a clear view of the mortal risks a young, inexperienced, badly prepared nation would be running in such a war, and who also saw — a most significant point — that, all things considered, a bargaining neutrality would surely win the country tangible rewards, as great as victorious participation itself.

The point at issue was just that: the Italian Neutralists stood for material advantages, advantages tangible, ponderable, palpable; the Interventionists stood for moral advantages, intangible,

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impalpable, imponderable — imponderable at least on the scales used by their antagonists. On the eve of the war these two Italian characters stood facing each other, scowling and irreconcilable — the one on the aggressive, asserting itself ever more forcefully through the various organs of public opinion; the other on the defensive, offering resistance through the Parliament which in those days still seemed to be the basic repository of State sovereignty. Civil conflict seemed inevitable in Italy, and civil war was in fact averted only because the King took advantage of one of his prerogatives and declared war against the Central Powers.

This act of the King was the first decisive step toward the solution of the crisis.

II

The crisis had ancient origins. Its roots sank deep into the inner spirit of the Italian people.

What were the creative forces of the *Risorgimento?* The "Italian people," to which some historians are now tending to attribute an important if not a decisive rôle in our struggle for national unity and independence, was hardly on the scene at all. The active agency was always an idea become a person — it was one or several determined wills which were fixed on determined goals. There can be no question that the birth of modern Italy was the work of the few. And it could not be otherwise. It is always the few who represent the self-consciousness and the will of an epoch and determine what its history shall be; for it is they who see the forces at their disposal and through those forces actuate the one truly active and productive force — their own will.

That will we find in the song of the poets and the ideas of the political writers, who know how to use a language harmonious with a universal sentiment or with a sentiment capable of becoming universal. In the case of Italy, in all our bards, philosophers and leaders, from Alfieri to Foscolo, from Leopardi to Manzoni, from Mazzini to Gioberti, we are able to pick up the threads of a new fabric, which is a new kind of thought, a new kind of soul, a new kind of Italy. This new Italy differed from the old Italy in something that was very simple but yet was of the greatest importance: this new Italy took life seriously, while the old one did not. People in every age had dreamed of an Italy and talked of an Italy. The notion of Italy had been sung in all kinds of music, propounded in all kinds of philosophy. But it was always

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an Italy that existed in the brain of some scholar whose learning was more or less divorced from reality. Now reality demands that convictions be taken seriously, that ideas become actions. Accordingly it was necessary that this Italy, which was an affair of brains only, become also an affair of hearts, become, that is, something serious, something alive. This, and no other, was the meaning of Mazzini's great slogan: "Thought and Action." It was the essence of the great revolution which he preached and which he accomplished by instilling his doctrine into the hearts of others. Not many others — a small minority! But they were numerous enough and powerful enough to raise the question where it could be answered — in Italian public opinion (taken in conjunction with the political situation prevailing in the rest of Europe). They were able to establish the doctrine that life is not a game, but a mission; that, therefore, the individual has a law and a purpose in obedience to which and in fulfillment of which he alone attains his true value; that, accordingly, he must make sacrifices, now of personal comfort, now of private interest, now of life itself.

No revolution ever possessed more markedly than did the Italian *Risorgimento* this characteristic of ideality, of thought preceding action. Our revolt was not concerned with the material needs of life, nor did it spring from elementary and widely diffused sentiments breaking out in popular uprisings and mass disturbances. The movements of 1847 and 1848 were demonstrations, as we would say today, of "intellectuals;" they were efforts toward a goal on the part of a minority of patriots who were standard bearers of an ideal and were driving governments and peoples toward its attainment. Idealism — understood as faith in the advent of an ideal reality, as a manner of conceiving life not as fixed within the limits of existing fact, but as incessant progress and transformation toward the level of a higher law which controls men with the very force of the idea — was the sum and substance of Mazzini's teaching; and it supplied the most conspicuous characteristic of our great Italian revolution. In this sense all the patriots who worked for the foundation of the new kingdom were Mazzinians — Gioberti, Cavour, Victor Emmanuel, Garibaldi. To be sure, our writers of the first rank, such as Manzoni and Rosmini, had no historical connection with Mazzini; but they had the same general tendency as Mazzini. Working along diverging lines, they all came together on the

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essential point: that true life is not the life which is, but also the life which ought to be. It was a conviction essentially religious in character, essentially anti-materialistic.

III

This religious and idealistic manner of looking at life, so characteristic of the *Risorgimento*, prevails even beyond the heroic age of the revolution and the establishment of the Kingdom. It survives down through Ricasoli, Lanza, Sella and Minghetti, down, that is, to the occupation of Rome and the systemization of our national finances. The parliamentary overturn of 1876, indeed, marks not the end, but rather an interruption, on the road that Italy had been following since the beginning of the century. The outlook then changed, and not by the capriciousness or weakness of men, but by a necessity of history which it would be idiotic in our day to deplore. At that time the fall of the Right, which had ruled continuously between 1861 and 1876, seemed to most people the real conquest of freedom.

To be sure the Right cannot be accused of too great scruple in respecting the liberties guaranteed by our Constitution; but the real truth was that the Right conceived liberty in a sense directly opposite to the notions of the Left. The Left moved from the individual to the State: the Right moved from the State to the individual. The men of the Left thought of "the people" as merely the agglomerate of the citizens composing it. They therefore made the individual the center and the point of departure of all the rights and prerogatives which a régime of freedom was bound to respect.

The men of the Right, on the contrary, were firmly set in the notion that no freedom can be conceived except within the State, that freedom can have no important content apart from a solid régime of law indisputably sovereign over the activities and the interests of individuals. For the Right there could be no individual freedom not reconcilable with the authority of the State. In their eyes the general interest was always paramount over private interests. The law, therefore, should have absolute efficacy and embrace the whole life of the people.

This conception of the Right was evidently sound; but it involved great dangers when applied without regard to the motives which provoked it. Unless we are careful, too much law leads to stasis and therefore to the annihilation of the life which

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it is the State's function to regulate but which the State cannot suppress. The State may easily become a form indifferent to its content — something extraneous to the substance it would regulate. If the law comes upon the individual from without, if the individual is not absorbed in the life of the State, the individual feels the law and the State as limitations on his activity, as chains which will eventually strangle him unless he can break them down.

This was just the feeling of the men of '76. The country needed a breath of air. Its moral, economic, and social forces demanded the right to develop without interference from a law which took no account of them. This was the historical reason for the overturn of that year; and with the transference of power from Right to Left begins the period of growth and development in our nation: economic growth in industry, commerce, railroads, agriculture; intellectual growth in science, education. The nation had received its form from above. It had now to struggle to its new level, giving to a State which already had its constitution, its administrative and political organization, its army and its finance, a living content of forces springing from individual initiative prompted by interests which the *Risorgimento*, absorbed in its great ideals, had either neglected or altogether disregarded.

The accomplishment of this constitutes the credit side of the balance sheet of King Humbert I. It was the error of King Humbert's greatest minister, Francesco Crispi, not to have understood his age. Crispi strove vigorously to restore the authority and the prestige of the State as against an individualism gone rampant, to reassert religious ideals as against triumphant materialism. He fell, therefore, before the assaults of so-called democracy.

Crispi was wrong. That was not the moment for re-hoisting the time-honored banner of idealism. At that time there could be no talk of wars, of national dignity, of competition with the Great Powers; no talk of setting limits to personal liberties in the interests of the abstract entity called "State." The word "God," which Crispi sometimes used, was singularly out of place. It was a question rather of bringing the popular classes to prosperity, self-consciousness, participation in political life. Campaigns against illiteracy, all kinds of social legislation, the elimination of the clergy from the public schools, which must be secular and anti-clerical! During this period Freemasonry became solidly

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established in the bureaucracy, the army, the judiciary. The central power of the State was weakened and made subservient to the fleeting variations of popular will as reflected in a suffrage absolved from all control from above. The growth of big industry favored the rise of a socialism of Marxian stamp as a new kind of moral and political education for our proletariat. The conception of humanity was not indeed lost from view: but such moral restraints as were placed on the free individual were all based on the feeling that each man must instinctively seek his own well-being and defend it. This was the very conception which Mazzini had fought in socialism, though he rightly saw that it was not peculiar to socialism alone, but belonged to any political theory, whether liberal, democratic, or anti-socialistic, which urges men toward the exaction of rights rather than to the fulfillment of duties.

From 1876 till the Great War, accordingly, we had an Italy that was materialistic and anti-Mazzinian, though an Italy far superior to the Italy of and before Mazzini's time. All our culture, whether in the natural or the moral sciences, in letters or in the arts, was dominated by a crude positivism, which conceived of the reality in which we live as something given, something ready-made, and which therefore limits and conditions human activity quite apart from so-called arbitrary and illusory demands of morality. Everybody wanted "facts," "positive facts." Everybody laughed at "metaphysical dreams," at impalpable realities. The truth was there before the eyes of men. They had only to open their eyes to see it. The Beautiful itself could only be the mirror of the Truth present before us in Nature. Patriotism, like all the other virtues based on a religious attitude of mind, and which can be mentioned only when people have the courage to talk in earnest, became a rhetorical theme on which it was rather bad taste to touch.

This period, which anyone born during the last half of the past century can well remember, might be called the demo-socialistic phase of the modern Italian State. It was the period which elaborated the characteristically democratic attitude of mind on a basis of personal freedom, and which resulted in the establishment of socialism as the primary and controlling force in the State. It was a period of growth and of prosperity during which the moral forces developed during the *Risorgimento* were crowded into the background or off the stage.

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IV

But toward the end of the Nineteenth Century and in the first years of the Twentieth a vigorous spirit of reaction began to manifest itself in the young men of Italy against the preceding generation's ideas in politics, literature, science and philosophy. It was as though they were weary of the prosaic bourgeois life which they had inherited from their fathers and were eager to return to the lofty moral enthusiasms of their grandfathers. Rosmini and Gioberti had been long forgotten. They were now exhumed, read, discussed. As for Mazzini, an edition of his writings was financed by the State itself. Vico, the great Vico, a formidable preacher of idealistic philosophy and a great anti-Cartesian and anti-rationalist, became the object of a new cult.

Positivism began forthwith to be attacked by neo-idealism. Materialistic approaches to the study of literature and art were refuted and discredited. Within the Church itself modernism came to rouse the Italian clergy to the need of a deeper and more modern culture. Even socialism was brought under the philosophical probe and criticized like other doctrines for its weaknesses and errors; and when, in France, George Sorel went beyond the fallacies of the materialistic theories of the Marxist social-democracy to his theory of syndicalism, our young Italian socialists turned to him. In Sorel's ideas they saw two things: first, the end of a hypocritical "collaborationism" which betrayed both proletariat and nation; and second, faith in a moral and ideal reality for which it was the individual's duty to sacrifice himself, and to defend which, even violence was justified. The anti-parliamentarian spirit and the moral spirit of syndicalism brought Italian socialists back within the Mazzinian orbit.

Of great importance, too, was nationalism, a new movement then just coming to the fore. Our Italian nationalism was less literary and more political in character than the similar movement in France, because with us it was attached to the old historic Right which had a long political tradition. The new nationalism differed from the old Right in the stress it laid on the idea of "nation;" but it was at one with the Right in regarding the State as the necessary premise to the individual rights and values. It was the special achievement of nationalism to rekindle faith in the nation in Italian hearts, to arouse the country against parliamentary socialism, and to lead an open attack on Freemasonry,

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before which the Italian bourgeoisie was terrifiedly prostrating itself. Syndicalists, nationalists, idealists succeeded, between them, in bringing the great majority of Italian youth back to the spirit of Mazzini.

Official, legal, parliamentary Italy, the Italy that was anti-Mazzinian and anti-idealistic, stood against all this, finding its leader in a man of unfailing political intuition, and master as well of the political mechanism of the country, a man sceptical of all high-sounding words, impatient of complicated concepts, ironical, cold, hard-headed, practical — what Mazzini would have called a "shrewd materialist." In the persons, indeed, of Mazzini and Giolitti, we may find a picture of the two aspects of pre-war Italy, of that irreconcilable duality which paralyzed the vitality of the country and which the Great War was to solve.

v

The effect of the war seemed at first to be quite in an opposite sense — to mark the beginning of a general *débâcle* of the Italian State and of the moral forces that must underlie any State. If entrance into the war had been a triumph of ideal Italy over materialistic Italy, the advent of peace seemed to give ample justification to the Neutralists who had represented the latter. After the Armistice our Allies turned their backs upon us. Our victory assumed all the aspects of a defeat. A defeatist psychology, as they say, took possession of the Italian people and expressed itself in hatred of the war, of those responsible for the war, even of our army which had won our war. An anarchical spirit of dissolution rose against all authority. The ganglia of our economic life seemed struck with mortal disease. Labor ran riot in strike after strike. The very bureaucracy seemed to align itself against the State. The measure of our spiritual dispersion was the return to power of Giolitti — the execrated Neutralist — who for five years had been held up as the exponent of an Italy which had died with the war.

But, curiously enough, it was under Giolitti that things suddenly changed in aspect, that against the Giolittian State a new State arose. Our soldiers, our genuine soldiers, men who had willed our war and fought it in full consciousness of what they were doing, had the good fortune to find as their leader a man who could express in words things that were in all their hearts and who could make those words audible above the tumult.

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Mussolini had left Italian socialism in 1915 in order to be a more faithful interpreter of "the Italian People" (the name he chose for his new paper). He was one of those who saw the necessity of our war, one of those mainly responsible for our entering the war. Already as a socialist he had fought Freemasonry; and, drawing his inspiration from Sorel's syndicalism, he had assailed the parliamentary corruption of Reformist Socialism with the idealistic postulates of revolution and violence. Then, later, on leaving the party and in defending the cause of intervention, he had come to oppose the illusory fancies of proletarian internationalism with an assertion of the infrangible integrity, not only moral but economic as well, of the national organism, affirming therefore the sanctity of country for the working classes as for other classes. Mussolini was a Mazzinian of that pure-blooded breed which Mazzini seemed somehow always to find in the province of Romagna. First by instinct, later by reflection, Mussolini had come to despise the futility of the socialists who kept preaching a revolution which they had neither the power nor the will to bring to pass even under the most favorable circumstances. More keenly than anyone else he had come to feel the necessity of a State which would be a State, of a law which would be respected as law, of an authority capable of exacting obedience but at the same time able to give indisputable evidence of its worthiness so to act. It seemed incredible to Mussolini that a country capable of fighting and winning such a war as Italy had fought and won should be thrown into disorder and held at the mercy of a handful of faithless politicians.

When Mussolini founded his Fasci in Milan in March, 1919, the movement toward dissolution and negation that featured the post-war period in Italy had virtually ceased. The Fasci made their appeal to Italians who, in spite of the disappointments of the peace, continued to believe in the war, and who, in order to validate the victory which was the proof of the war's value, were bent on recovering for Italy that control over her own destinies which could come only through a restoration of discipline and a reorganization of social and political forces. From the first, the Fascist Party was not one of believers but of action. What it needed was not a platform of principles, but an idea which would indicate a goal and a road by which the goal could be reached.

The four years between 1919 and 1923 inclusive were charac-

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terized by the development of the Fascist revolution through the action of "the squads." The Fascist "squads" were really the force of a State not yet born but on the way to being. In its first period, Fascist "squadrism" transgressed the law of the old régime because it was determined to suppress that régime as incompatible with the national State to which Fascism was aspiring. The March on Rome was not the beginning, it was the end of that phase of the revolution; because, with Mussolini's advent to power, Fascism entered the sphere of legality. After October 28, 1922, Fascism was no longer at war with the State; it *was* the State, looking about for the organization which would realize Fascism as a concept of State. Fascism already had control of all the instruments necessary for the upbuilding of a new State. The Italy of Giolitti had been superceded, at least so far as militant politics were concerned. Between Giolitti's Italy and the new Italy there flowed, as an imaginative orator once said in the Chamber, "a torrent of blood" that would prevent any return to the past. The century-old crisis had been solved. The war at last had begun to bear fruit for Italy.

VI

Now to understand the distinctive essence of Fascism, nothing is more instructive than a comparison of it with the point of view of Mazzini to which I have so often referred.

Mazzini did have a political conception, but his politic was a sort of integral politic, which cannot be so sharply distinguished from morals, religion, and ideas of life as a whole, as to be considered apart from these other fundamental interests of the human spirit. If one tries to separate what is purely political from his religious beliefs, his ethical consciousness and his metaphysical concepts, it becomes impossible to understand the vast influence which his credo and his propaganda exerted. Unless we assume the unity of the whole man, we arrive not at the clarification but at the destruction of those ideas of his which proved so powerful.

In the definition of Fascism, the first point to grasp is the comprehensive, or as Fascists say, the "totalitarian" scope of its doctrine, which concerns itself not only with political organization and political tendency, but with the whole will and thought and feeling of the nation.

There is a second and equally important point. Fascism is not a

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philosophy. Much less is it a religion. It is not even a political theory which may be stated in a series of formulæ. The significance of Fascism is not to be grasped in the special theses which it from time to time assumes. When on occasion it has announced a program, a goal, a concept to be realized in action, Fascism has not hesitated to abandon them when in practice these were found to be inadequate or inconsistent with the principle of Fascism. Fascism has never been willing to compromise its future. Mussolini has boasted that he is a *tempista*, that his real pride is in "good timing." He makes decisions and acts on them at the precise moment when all the conditions and considerations which make them feasible and opportune are properly matured. This is a way of saying that Fascism returns to the most rigorous meaning of Mazzini's "Thought and Action," whereby the two terms are so perfectly coincident that no thought has value which is not already expressed in action. The real "views" of the *Duce* are those which he formulates and executes at one and the same time.

Is Fascism therefore "anti-intellectual," as has been so often charged? It is eminently anti-intellectual, eminently Mazzinian, that is, if by intellectualism we mean the divorce of thought from action, of knowledge from life, of brain from heart, of theory from practice. Fascism is hostile to all Utopian systems which are destined never to face the test of reality. It is hostile to all science and all philosophy which remain matters of mere fancy or intelligence. It is not that Fascism denies value to culture, to the higher intellectual pursuits by which thought is invigorated as a source of action. Fascist anti-intellectualism holds in scorn a product peculiarly typical of the educated classes in Italy: the *leterato* — the man who plays with knowledge and with thought without any sense of responsibility for the practical world. It is hostile not so much to culture as to bad culture, the culture which does not educate, which does not make men, but rather creates pedants and aesthetes, egotists in a word, men morally and politically indifferent. It has no use, for instance, for the man who is "above the conflict" when his country or its important interests are at stake.

By virtue of its repugnance for "intellectualism," Fascism prefers not to waste time constructing abstract theories about itself. But when we say that it is not a system or a doctrine we must not conclude that it is a blind praxis or a purely instinctive

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method. If by system or philosophy we mean a living thought, a principle of universal character daily revealing its inner fertility and significance, then Fascism is a perfect system, with a solidly established foundation and with a rigorous logic in its development; and all who feel the truth and the vitality of the principle work day by day for its development, now doing, now undoing, now going forward, now retracing their steps, according as the things they do prove to be in harmony with the principle or to deviate from it.

And we come finally to a third point.

The Fascist system is not a political system, but it has its center of gravity in politics. Fascism came into being to meet serious problems of politics in post-war Italy. And it presents itself as a political method. But in confronting and solving political problems it is carried by its very nature, that is to say by its method, to consider moral, religious, and philosophical questions and to unfold and demonstrate the comprehensive totalitarian character peculiar to it. It is only after we have grasped the political character of the Fascist principle that we are able adequately to appreciate the deeper concept of life which underlies that principle and from which the principle springs. The political doctrine of Fascism is not the whole of Fascism. It is rather its more prominent aspect and in general its most interesting one.

VII

The politic of Fascism revolves wholly about the concept of the national State; and accordingly it has points of contact with nationalist doctrines, along with distinctions from the latter which it is important to bear in mind.

Both Fascism and nationalism regard the State as the foundation of all rights and the source of all values in the individuals composing it. For the one as for the other the State is not a consequence — it is a principle. But in the case of nationalism, the relation which individualistic liberalism, and for that matter socialism also, assumed between individual and State is inverted. Since the State is a principle, the individual becomes a consequence — he is something which finds an antecedent in the State: the State limits him and determines his manner of existence, restricting his freedom, binding him to a piece of ground whereon he was born, whereon he must live and will die. In the case of

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Fascism, State and individual are one and the same things, or rather, they are inseparable terms of a necessary synthesis.

Nationalism, in fact, founds the State on the concept of nation, the nation being an entity which transcends the will and the life of the individual because it is conceived as objectively existing apart from the consciousness of individuals, existing even if the individual does nothing to bring it into being. For the nationalist, the nation exists not by virtue of the citizen's will, but as datum, a fact, of nature.

For Fascism, on the contrary, the State is a wholly spiritual creation. It is a national State, because, from the Fascist point of view, the nation itself is a creation of the mind and is not a material presupposition, is not a datum of nature. The nation, says the Fascist, is never really made; neither, therefore, can the State attain an absolute form, since it is merely the nation in the latter's concrete, political manifestation. For the Fascist, the State is always *in fieri*. It is in our hands, wholly; whence our very serious responsibility towards it.

But this State of the Fascists which is created by the consciousness and the will of the citizen, and is not a force descending on the citizen from above or from without, cannot have toward the mass of the population the relationship which was presumed by nationalism.

Nationalism identified State with Nation, and made of the nation an entity preëxisting, which needed not to be created but merely to be recognized or known. The nationalists, therefore, required a ruling class of an intellectual character, which was conscious of the nation and could understand, appreciate and exalt it. The authority of the State, furthermore, was not a product but a presupposition. It could not depend on the people — rather the people depended on the State and on the State's authority as the source of the life which they lived and apart from which they could not live. The nationalistic State was, therefore, an aristocratic State, enforcing itself upon the masses through the power conferred upon it by its origins.

The Fascist State, on the contrary, is a people's state, and, as such, the democratic State *par excellence*. The relationship between State and citizen (not this or that citizen, but all citizens) is accordingly so intimate that the State exists only as, and in so far as, the citizen causes it to exist. Its formation therefore is the formation of a consciousness of it in individuals, in the masses.

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Hence the need of the Party, and of all the instruments of propaganda and education which Fascism uses to make the thought and will of the *Duce* the thought and will of the masses. Hence the enormous task which Fascism sets itself in trying to bring the whole mass of the people, beginning with the little children, inside the fold of the Party.

On the popular character of the Fascist State likewise depends its greatest social and constitutional reform — the foundation of the Corporations of Syndicates. In this reform Fascism took over from syndicalism the notion of the moral and educational function of the syndicate. But the Corporations of Syndicates were necessary in order to reduce the syndicates to State discipline and make them an expression of the State's organism from within. The Corporation of Syndicates are a device through which the Fascist State goes looking for the individual in order to create itself through the individual's will. But the individual it seeks is not the abstract political individual whom the old liberalism took for granted. He is the only individual who can ever be found, the individual who exists as a specialized productive force, and who, by the fact of his specialization, is brought to unite with other individuals of his same category and comes to belong with them to the one great economic unit which is none other than the nation.

This great reform is already well under way. Toward it nationalism, syndicalism, and even liberalism itself, were already tending in the past. For even liberalism was beginning to criticize the older forms of political representation, seeking some system of organic representation which would correspond to the structural reality of the State.

The Fascist conception of liberty merits passing notice. The *Duce* of Fascism once chose to discuss the theme of "Force or Consent?;" and he concluded that the two terms are inseparable, that the one implies the other and cannot exist apart from the other; that, in other words, the authority of the State and the freedom of the citizen constitute a continuous circle wherein authority presupposes liberty and liberty authority. For freedom can exist only within the State, and the State means authority. But the State is not an entity hovering in the air over the heads of its citizens. It is one with the personality of the citizen. Fascism, indeed, envisages the contrast not as between liberty and authority, but as between a true, a concrete liberty which exists, and an abstract, illusory liberty which cannot exist.

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Liberalism broke the circle above referred to, setting the individual against the State and liberty against authority. What the liberal desired was liberty as against the State, a liberty which was a limitation of the State; though the liberal had to resign himself, as the lesser of the evils, to a State which was a limitation on liberty. The absurdities inherent in the liberal concept of freedom were apparent to liberals themselves early in the Nineteenth Century. It is no merit of Fascism to have again indicated them. Fascism has its own solution of the paradox of liberty and authority. The authority of the State is absolute. It does not compromise, it does not bargain, it does not surrender any portion of its field to other moral or religious principles which may interfere with the individual conscience. But on the other hand, the State becomes a reality only in the consciousness of its individuals. And the Fascist corporative State supplies a representative system more sincere and more in touch with realities than any other previously devised and is therefore freer than the old liberal State.

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THE WEST AND CANADIAN WHEAT GROWERS

By F. D. Farrell

AS a part of their service in feeding humanity the farmers of the world produce each year about 3,500,000,000 bushels of wheat. It is grown on all the continents. Every day in the year, somewhere in the world, it is being harvested. In no fewer than sixty countries the crop is sufficiently important to be reported statistically. The United States produces more wheat than any other country, but even its large crop is less than 30 percent of the world's production. In each of the wheat producing countries production fluctuates rather widely from year to year. But fluctuations in the different countries tend to offset one another, and though there is some annual variation in the total quantity produced in the world the prevailing storage and marketing practices result in a fairly constant annual flow of wheat into the world's markets.

Most of the international trade in wheat is supplied by four countries. Among these four Canada stands first and the United States second. The United States Department of Commerce reports[1] that the overseas movement of wheat and flour, expressed as net exports, during the four crop years ending with 1925–26, was supplied in the following percentages:

Canada	39
United States	23
Argentina	18
Australia	11
Other Countries	9
	100

Canada and the United States, then, furnish more than 60 percent of the overseas movement of wheat. Evidently the relationships existing between the wheat industries of the two countries is of much public interest.

It is in the western part of each country that the wheat industry is of greatest importance, both absolutely and relatively. The major types of wheat grown in these two regions — west of the

[1] Theodore D. Hammatt, "Factors in Wheat Marketing," 14 pp., United States Department of Commerce, Washington, 1927.

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Mississippi in the United States and west of Winnipeg in Canada — are sufficiently alike to interest similar markets, but the West of the United States has more complex problems than the Canadian West has in the disposal of its wheat. The wheat growers of each region are subjected to the interplay of similar economic forces but the forces are affected by certain conditions that are not the same in the two countries. These differing conditions include such things as tariff duties, transportation facilities and costs, soil conditions, agricultural practice, type of population and weather conditions.

The wheat industry of Canada is concentrated chiefly in the three Prairie Provinces—Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta—which account for fully 90 percent of the wheat acreage of the Dominion. Westward and northwestward from Winnipeg the vast empire of wheat extends for nearly a thousand miles. The visitor from the United States is greatly impressed with the immensity of the country and the dominance of wheat. Of course these provinces produce other commodities besides wheat. Livestock is of some importance in all three, but especially in Alberta. Flax and other crops are important in some districts. But as compared with the landscape of the wheat regions of the United States we see in these three provinces few cattle or sheep, few silos, which are so common in the United States and which indicate the feeding of cattle and sheep, and few fields of Indian corn, a common indicator of the presence of hogs. On the other hand, the grain elevators that form the skylines of most of the towns are an unforgettable feature.

The wheat industry has developed in the three Prairie Provinces with remarkable rapidity. Since 1900 the total area of land in wheat has increased from 2,000,000 acres to about 22,000,000 acres. In the ten years, 1914 to 1923, the production of wheat increased from 141,000,000 bushels to 452,000,000 bushels. Nor is there any indication that acreage and production have reached their maximum. The three provinces are said to contain 170,000,000 acres of arable land, of which less than 50,000,000 acres has been placed in cultivation. It has been estimated that there are more than 20,000,000 acres of unused fertile land within fifteen miles of existing railroads. The land is comparatively cheap, prices ranging from less than $20 to about $35 an acre. This land, millions of acres of it, is favorable, in topography and soil fertility, to wheat production. It may be doubted whether the land

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now unused will be found as productive as that which has been selected and placed under cultivation. Much of the unused land may be subject to a greater frost hazard, or for other reasons it may be less desirable. But there can be no doubt that, with advantageous price relationships, the wheat industry of the three Prairie Provinces could be materially expanded.

This situation is of practical significance to the wheat grower in the Western United States. His land has been in cultivation for a longer time than has the land of the farmer in the Prairie Provinces. His fields, being older and usually no better farmed than those in Western Canada, are less rich in native fertility and rather more badly infested with weeds. His economic relationships are more complex. The wheat industry of the Prairie Provinces is more concentrated and its output is more uniform than that south of the border. The Prairie Provinces produce essentially one type of wheat, known on the market as hard spring wheat. The greater complexity of the wheat industry in the United States is suggested by the following table which shows the annual production, in round numbers in bushels, of the major types of wheat in the two countries:

Type of Wheat	*Annual Production*	*Principal Places of Production*
CANADA		
Hard spring	400,000,000	Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta
UNITED STATES		
Hard spring	250,000,000	Montana, the Dakotas, Minnesota
Hard red winter	260,000,000	Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Eastern Colorado, Northern Texas
Soft red winter	250,000,000	From Missouri to Pennsylvania
Durum ("Macaroni")	45,000,000	The Dakotas
The White wheats	45,000,000	Pacific Coast States

The diversity of output and the wide distribution of our wheat industry create some complex problems, especially in marketing, that the Canadians do not have to face. The wheat grower of our own West, whether he produces hard winter wheat in Kansas or hard spring wheat in Minnesota, must compete with the three Prairie Provinces in marketing his product. His problems are further complicated by the fact that in other sections of the United States other farmers are growing and marketing entirely different types of wheat. In Canada, where the population is relatively sparse, wheat is produced chiefly for export. In the more populous United States most of the wheat produced is consumed at home. Canada exports about 75 percent of her wheat and the United States about 20 percent of hers. These differences

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have produced in each country a different complex of transportation, manufacturing, and marketing activities.

The Canadian wheat grower is more of a specialist than our wheat grower is. In our West the wheat industry is more specialized than in most other parts of the United States, but it still is not so highly specialized as in the Canadian West. The Canadian has both the advantages and the disadvantages of high specialization. Since he emphasizes the wheat industry and the production of a single type of wheat, the Canadian farmer gives his full attention to the problems of that particular specialty. In many ways this promotes efficiency. But it has its disadvantages. The Canadian wheat grower, to a greater extent than the American, has all his eggs in one basket. He must assume greater hazards than need to be assumed by most wheat growers in the United States. In Western Canada when wheat production is low or when prices are unsatisfactory the farmer has a bad year. In the United States, on the other hand — except for relatively small areas which are approximately as new, agriculturally, as Western Canada — the wheat grower is also an important producer of other commodities. Kansas, the leading wheat state in the Union, also ranks third among the states in beef cattle and twelfth in dairy cattle. Nebraska, another important wheat producing state, ranks near the top as a producer of corn. Minnesota, a large producer of hard spring wheat, is one of the leading dairy states. Again, the season in Canada is short and likely in any year to end with an early frost, while in the United States, and particularly in the Middle-Southwest, the growing season is comparatively long. In Kansas and adjacent states it is not at all uncommon when the winter wheat crop fails, in a year that proves to be favorable for corn, for many farmers to plant corn on land where winter wheat has failed and to reap larger profits than they would have had if the wheat crop had succeeded. This sort of thing seldom occurs in Western Canada because by the time spring-seeded wheat has failed there the growing season is well along and frost is too near for the seeding of other crops. The longer growing season and the greater age, agriculturally, of our farming regions have tended to produce in this country a more diversified, and, in some ways, less hazardous type of agriculture than that which dominates the Canadian West.

The farmers of the Prairie Provinces have some advantages over our western wheat growers in the cost of transportation.

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Transportation costs in that country are lower, whether the movement is from the farm to central terminals, from the farm to Buffalo (where an increasing quantity of Canadian wheat is milled, either in bond for export as flour or for consumption in the United States), or from the farm to overseas points. The water rates, while varying from time to time in both countries, average essentially the same in the two, but the land rates are distinctly lower in Canada. In a recent report the Food Research Institute states[2] that, "over comparable distances, the Canadian roads haul a hundred pounds 41 miles for 1 cent, the American roads only 23 miles for 1 cent." Whether the rates charged by the railroad companies in the United States are justifiable, in view of railroad operating costs and quality of service, is a large question in itself and its discussion will not be attempted here.

The United States imposes an import duty of 42 cents a bushel on wheat. This duty applies to Canadian wheat imported into the United States for domestic consumption but not to that imported in bond to be milled for export. The tariff on wheat is by no means fully effective. With rare exceptions, it does not raise the price of wheat in the United States above the price of comparable grades in Canada by the amount of the duty. Its degree of effectiveness depends upon the grades of wheat concerned and upon the size of the wheat crop in each of the two countries. When the combined production of hard spring and hard winter wheat in the United States is small and the Canadian crop is very large, as in the crop year of 1923–24, prices at Winnipeg fall below prices at Minneapolis and Kansas City. Even in the year mentioned the price differential only a part of the time equaled the amount of the duty, which was 30 cents a bushel until March 7, 1924, when it was increased to 42 cents. Similar conditions as to production produced similar effects two years later, in the crop year 1925–26, with the price differential going slightly higher but still not equaling the amount of the higher duty. Between these two crop years, that is, in 1924–25, the Canadian crop was very small, the crop of hard spring wheat in the United States was moderately large and the crop of hard winter wheat in this country was quite large, and prices actually were higher at Winnipeg than at Minneapolis and Kansas City most of the time. While the duty on wheat is only partially effective and that

[2] "Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute," Vol. III, No. 1, Stanford University, California, November, 1926.

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only on superior grades of wheat, it is doubtful whether the western wheat grower would welcome a repeal of the wheat tariff, especially if such action were considered without reference to other items in the tariff schedules. The present import duty is of some benefit to the producer of high quality hard wheat, winter or spring, when Canada has a large production of wheat of comparable quality. It is to be observed, however, that upon the whole the benefits as expressed in price differentials have been rather disappointing to the western wheat grower.

One of the most interesting recent developments involving the West and the Canadian wheat grower is the organization of the so-called wheat pools. In this respect the West has much to learn from Canada. In the latter country there are three great pools, one each in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Each of these pools assembles the wheat of its members for the purpose of feeding the commodity into the market in an orderly manner, presumably in accordance with market demands, throughout the entire year, and for the purpose of cheapening the cost and improving the service of wheat marketing. The wheat is marketed by a central sales agency that represents all three pools. The first pool was operated in Alberta in 1923–24. In that year there were about 25,000 members and the pool handled 34,000,000 bushels from 2,500,000 acres. Three years later the three provincial pools had a total membership of 136,000 and handled about 200,000,000 bushels of wheat, or about half the total crop. In the United States there are now nine pools. Their operations involved 16,800,000 bushels in 1925–26 and 17,500,000 bushels in 1926–27.

The stated objectives of the pools — lower marketing costs, more orderly marketing so as to avoid market gluts and shortages with consequent wide fluctuations in prices, and a more accurate reflection of quality differences in the prices paid to producers — are all desirable. The pooling plan has not been tried long enough to prove conclusively whether they are practically attainable. Some of the effects of pooling are indirect and difficult to evaluate. For example, it is claimed by pool supporters with some reason that the existence of the pools has caused some of the regular commercial agencies to pay better prices than they would have paid if the pools had not been in operation. Some Canadians imply, if they do not actually state, that the Canadian pools have helped at times to put Winnipeg prices above prices at Minneapolis.

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The pooling plan itself is essentially sound. Its purpose is to market the farmers' wheat without any attempt to make the processes of marketing profitable in themselves. One of its most important features is that it seeks to obtain for individual farmers prices that fairly reflect differences in the quality of their wheat. The commercial grain trade, with some conspicuous individual exceptions, has largely failed to do this, and its failure has injured the producers of high quality wheat and the wheat industry itself. The grain trade is not wholly to blame. Indifference and short-sighted individualism among farmers contribute heavily to the difficulties that confront a grain dealer who tries to buy wheat on the basis of quality. The farmers who produce inferior wheat tend to patronize the dealer who pays a flat price. To establish the practice of buying on quality requires a degree of coöperation between grain dealers, on the one hand, and between farmers and the grain trade, on the other, that has not yet been attained. When the wheat producers in a given district are paid a flat price regardless of important quality differences, the farmer who grows a high quality product is penalized for his excellence and the producer of inferior wheat is rewarded for his inefficiency. This tends definitely to retard sound agricultural development. If the wheat pools did nothing else but remedy this one widespread evil they would render a great public service.

The difficulties of establishing successful pools are greater in the United States than in Canada, with its more uniform product, a population that is economically more homogeneous, less deeply intrenched opposing agricultural factions, a more concentrated wheat industry, and, perhaps, a greater need, all things considered, for an improved marketing system. But the Canadians are furnishing an example of intelligent group action that unquestionably is stimulating interest among our own wheat growers.

The rapid growth of coöperative marketing among farmers in the past twenty-five years is an interesting phenomenon. It runs counter to the general development toward specialization in agriculture. During the nineteenth century the American farmer became less self-sufficient and more of a specialist than he ever had been before. He concentrated his attention on fewer enterprises and depended increasingly upon other people. As his business became more specialized and commercialized, his dependence upon others came to involve the marketing of his products as well as the making of his clothing, butter, and cheese, the repairing of

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his harness and machinery, the shoeing of his horses, and the sharpening of his plowshares. Apparently he has been less satisfied with the service of commercial marketing agencies than with that of the agencies to which he has shifted other responsibilities and tasks. At any rate, there is a definite swinging back in the matter of marketing. The United States Department of Agriculture reports that in the year 1925 at least two million farmers in the United States were members of coöperative associations and that these organizations did a business of $2,400,000,000. In 1915 the membership had been 651,000 with a business of $635,800,000. The development of wheat pools is simply a part of the movement toward more extensive agricultural coöperation.

Canada has gone further than the United States in enacting legislation for the benefit of wheat growers. This probably is because the abuses in grain marketing were greater in Canada than in the United States. The Canada Grain Act of 1912 is one of the major acts of legislation to give protection to wheat growers. Briefly, its objective is to provide close governmental oversight and supervision of transactions involving the elevator interests, the transportation companies, and the grain growers, with a view to seeing that the farmers get a square deal. Some supplementary legislation has been enacted since 1912. The government does not attempt to buy or sell grain or to regulate prices. It has, however, acquired elevators at Vancouver and at a few important interior points, chiefly for the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of its supervisory activities. Somewhat comparable, but less far-reaching, legislation has been enacted in the United States, including the Grain Futures Act and the acts providing for federal supervision of certain features of the grain business at the principal markets. In each country there is legislation, both federal and state, providing for scientific research and education, for combating insect pests and plant diseases that affect the wheat crop, and for collecting and disseminating statistical information regarding supply and demand factors that influence wheat movements and prices.

Opinions differ, especially in the United States, as to how far it is practicable to go in legislation to benefit the wheat grower. The farm organizations themselves have not agreed upon a legislative program, and it is difficult to determine the state of public opinion on the subject. There are several reasons why this is so. Many wheat growers are doing well under present con-

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ditions and are inclined to be apathetic. The people in this group say little or nothing about legislation, while some of those who are dissatisfied say much and those who appear to wish to capitalize dissatisfaction say even more. Many people — editors, farmers, politicians, publicists — who disbelieve in proposed legislative remedies hesitate to oppose them for fear of being regarded as unfriendly to the farmer. It is probable that the consensus of informed opinion among farmers is at least skeptical regarding the practical feasibility of direct governmental participation in wheat marketing. Many farmers are convinced that the present marketing system fails to reward adequately the individual producer of high quality wheat and that it involves too wide a spread between the price that the producer receives and the price that the consumer pays. Many hold that transportation costs are higher than they should be, especially in the Middle-Southwest. Some believe that these conditions can be dealt with successfully by legislation. Others advocate large-scale agricultural coöperation. Still others hold that a *laissez faire* policy will be more satisfactory in the end. It is probable that all three policies will have a part in the developments of the next quarter-century.

The more one studies how agriculture responds to changes in economic conditions and to contributions of agricultural and mechanical science in the form of new crops, new methods, and new machines, the less inclined one is to attempt a long-range forecast of the future relative positions of our West and the Canadian provinces in the wheat industry. The two regions are competitors, directly or indirectly, in the wheat markets of the world. Moreover, each region is in competition with Argentina, Australia, and other wheat producing countries. Each of the two has certain advantages and certain disadvantages, natural or artificial. Each must strive for its place in the sun. There appears to be little, if any, expectation in either region that the wheat growers of the two will unite in any comprehensive manner to solve the general problems that face the industry as a whole. At the time of the international conference of wheat pool officials at Kansas City in May, 1927, the newspapers hinted that a gigantic international wheat pool might be formed. But the speeches made at the conference did not support the hint. Some of the speakers directly contradicted it. The sentiment seemed rather to be that wheat growers in all countries, and especially in wheat exporting countries, have a common cause in the sense that they all need

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better marketing service than they are getting from commercial agencies, that pooling offers improved service, and that each country should apply the principles of pooling to its own marketing problems in accordance with its own conditions. It is coming to be believed in the United States that the wheat growers in each region that produces a characteristic type of wheat should operate a regional pool. This is the present direction of development. The principal obstacles are those of human nature. They are exceedingly difficult but they should not be insurmountable if sufficient capable leadership comes forward, as in time it commonly does if a need is sufficiently acute.

It is a platitude to say that the wheat growers on both sides of the international boundary already have achieved a comparatively high degree of efficiency in production, if efficiency be measured in terms of average output per man engaged in the industry. The increase of individual productive efficiency in agriculture generally is one of the features of American history since the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1850, the average area of farm land cultivated per man engaged in agriculture in the United States was 12 acres. In 1920 it was 34 acres. A large share of the increase is accounted for by the principal wheat growing states where the use of large-scale machinery is the rule. In 1920 the figure for Kansas was 96 acres and that for Nebraska was 103 acres. To make each acre produce more through the practice of improved agronomic methods, and so reduce unit costs, and to develop a better type of organization of the entire business of the individual farm so as to get more efficient use of land, labor, and machinery, are tasks the achievement of which will increase the western wheat grower's ability to survive the inevitable competition. Simultaneously improvements must be made in marketing methods and in the quality of the product.

Relations between the wheat growers of our own West and those of the Prairie Provinces appear to be entirely friendly. But each region has its own fish to fry. As contacts become closer there probably will be increasing agreement as to how to handle the distributive problems of the wheat industry, but equally probably what each region regards as intelligent self-interest will determine the direction of development. In the long run, the larger rewards will go to the people who excel in the application of agricultural, commercial, and political intelligence.

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HOLLAND AND BELGIUM IN THE GERMAN WAR PLAN

By T. H. Thomas

GENERALOBERST HELMUTH VON MOLTKE: ERINNERUNGEN, BRIEFE, DOKUMENTE. EDITED BY COUNTESS VON MOLTKE. Stuttgart: Der Kommende Tag, 1922.
OVER ROERMUND. BY CAPTAIN VAN VOORST TOT VOORST. The Hague: de Swart & Zoon, 1923.
DEFENSE DE LIEGE, NAMUR ET ANVERS EN 1914. BY COLONEL ROBERT NORMAND. Paris: L. Fournier, 1923.
DU HAUT DE LA TOUR DE BABEL. BY LT. GENERAL DE SELLIERS DE MORANVILLE. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1925.

COUNT VON WALDERSEE, who became Chief of the German General Staff in 1888, records that in the course of that year he was asked by Bismarck,

"whether it would be desirable for us to march through Belgium, committing thereby a breach of neutrality. I explained that my advice would be against doing this, whereas it seemed very much to be desired that France should operate through Belgium. The best thing for us, I maintained, would be that we were at war with France and Russia simultaneously. With Austria and Italy as allies the chances would be very good for us, whereas in a war with France alone Russia might be in a position to dictate to us the terms of peace."

Bismarck's reply to this politico-military speculation is not recorded, but Waldersee at least had good grounds for his confidence in regard to Belgium. His predecessor, the elder Moltke, had examined this hypothesis of a French advance through northern Belgium, and found in it no cause for concern. Such a move would bring up short in any case against the lower Rhine, and he arranged a maneuver to meet it — taking it in the flank by a counter-attack northward through Luxemburg. Reassured in this quarter, Moltke had reversed his earlier war plan, and arranged in case of war against France and Russia together to take the offensive against the latter. In the course of this same conversation with Bismarck the prospects of this plan were touched on, and Waldersee notes: "We agreed that in the event of war we must take the offensive into Poland, but not beyond Poland."

Even this limited objective of "into Poland" was found unsatisfactory by Schlieffen, who succeeded Waldersee as Chief of

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Staff a few years later. During the "roadless seasons" of spring and autumn the mud of Poland would make it impossible to undertake an offensive, and if war chanced to come under one of these unfavorable constellations, the rapid campaign Moltke had counted on would be out of the question. There remained always the danger that Russia might execute the classic retirement far into her own territory, and destroy all possibility of a prompt decision on the eastern front. Last of all, Schlieffen had no confidence in Austrian statesmen or soldiers, and was more and more reluctant to rely on any plans depending on their coöperation. These and various other dangers and uncertainties led Schlieffen presently to abandon the campaign in the east; and in 1894 he turned back to the western front for his military decision. But whereas Moltke had left a strong force to guard his defensive frontier, Schlieffen put all his eggs into one basket: nearly his whole army was to concentrate against France, and the eastern front would stand or fall on the result of the western battle. The Austrians he left to shift for themselves. He gave their army no part in his western campaign; he refused to confide the details of his plans to the Austrian staff; and from this time until 1909 the military relations between the two allies seem to have been correct but distant.

The French fortified frontier, which had caused Moltke to turn east fifteen years earlier, was still a formidable obstacle to a rapid military decision. But by passing to the north or south of it Schlieffen saw that he could not only turn the French flank but above all force the issue to the prompt and decisive battle which was essential. "To pass by Switzerland," General von Kuhl explains, "was forbidden both by the difficult terrain and by the Swiss Army." On the side of Belgium no such obstacle offered; and across Luxemburg and southern Belgium Schlieffen borrowed a right of way for his enveloping operation. "We were forced to it by necessity," observes von Kuhl with a due sense of historical anticipation. It was a necessity at least for the maneuver of envelopment which was the basis of Schlieffen's conception, — and for this same reason the violation of Belgian territory continued a fundamental condition of all German plans of campaign in the west from this time forward.

Between 1894 and 1900 the enveloping operation (crossing the Meuse north of Verdun) was combined with a thrust through the French front further south; by these twin offensives Schlieffen

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expected to gather in the main mass of the French army, — achieving on a gigantic scale a classic Cannae. Re-working constantly his plan, he shifted the balance of force more and more to the northern wing and borrowed an ever wider stretch of Belgian territory for his purpose. *Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coute:* — having once stepped over the line, there was all Belgium at his disposal for elbow room. The attack in Lorraine gradually dwindled to a minor rôle; and the Cannae project gave place to a single enveloping operation.

This evolution was presently brought to a head by an unexpected development. The Russo-Japanese war and the paralyzing of Russian military power that followed, suddenly freed Germany from the traditional anxiety over the "Russian millions," — and for some time to come there would be not only no danger but no possibility of a war against Germany on the two fronts. The three Army Corps earmarked heretofore for the defense of East Prussia were shifted westward, and the whole army was to be concentrated against France. Moreover there was now no need to turn back east in a hurry, and no necessity for taking any risk in the west for the sake of an immediate and a complete victory over the French. With this fundamental change in the underlying military problem, the compelling motive of the violation of Belgian territory had vanished. The recent development of the Entente Cordiale which brought England now to the side of France offered a very definite additional reason against it.

But Schlieffen was of the Continental terra-firma school which so aroused Tirpitz' fury: the British army was a trifle, and the British fleet would not at any rate interfere with his carefully planned maneuver. In these years of bending every effort toward the one aim of annihilation by envelopment, Schlieffen and the generation of Staff officers he formed had fallen — Pygmalion like — into a helpless passion for their professional handiwork. With Russia out of the way, the move through Belgium, originally worked out as the solution of a military dilemma, now became an irresistible temptation — an opportunity for an unparalleled *tour-de-force* of pure strategy. Instead of returning to the lawful Franco-German frontier, Schlieffen pressed to the extreme point in the other direction and reached out across not only Belgium but Holland.

Late in 1905 he produced the professional masterpiece of his famous "final plan," in which he threw practically the whole

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strength of the German army into the enveloping operation. With only one weak army left to screen the Lorraine frontier, no less than seven of his eight armies were to assemble between Metz and the Dutch frontier, and rapidly push forward their advance to a line reaching from Verdun clear to Dunkirk. This 200 mile marching wing was then to wheel down irresistibly across northern France, roll up the flank of the French Army, and drive it back in rout even to the Swiss frontier. This moving of a whole battle line to one flank suggests a theory of envelopment afflicted with elephantiasis; but Ludendorff notes that after detailed study the operation inspired Schlieffen with perfect confidence: "The forces devoted to it had been made so powerful that victory could be assured them, *a priori*."

This final plan was disclosed to the outside world after 1918 as the formula which would have won the war at the outset except that the younger Moltke failed to follow it. By thus off-loading the blame upon him, the plan was made to serve as a hypothetical consolation to the German public and as a professional alibi for the General Staff. It is noteworthy that all these spokesmen of the Staff, (von Kuhl, Foerster, Ludendorff and others) have seen fit to withhold the text of the actual document, — and also to leave out from their accounts any allusion to the crossing of Holland.[1] For a corresponding reason, Moltke took pains to put it in — when he sat down to write his apologia. In this long confession of helplessness there emerged one strong point to his credit:

> "The concentration (*Aufmarsch*) planned by my predecessor was worked out in such a way that the right flank of the German Army would extend beyond Roermond . . . and march through southern Holland. We would thus have to violate not only Belgian but also Dutch territory. . . I was and still am of the opinion that the campaign in the west would have gone to wreck if we had not kept clear of Holland."

To this extent at least Moltke's famous watering down of the plan saved his country from a most certain factor of disaster; and in his vigorous justification of his course in re-casting his line of march westward, he makes clear Schlieffen's motives for reaching into Holland.

The essential point was to swing forward this overwhelming

[1] Some rumor of the Holland project having gained currency, Ludendorff, in 1921, issued a categorical denial of it, in a letter to a German military journal. The next year Countess von Moltke published in her volume of memoirs the two papers written by her husband in 1914 and 1915 in which he set forth the thing in detail.

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right wing quickly, and an advance across northern Belgium would have to meet a dangerous obstacle at the outset. All the main roads leading directly into this area from Germany were gathered into a narrow bottle neck at Liége; and all the network of railways on the German side of the frontier converged into the one main line from Aix la Chapelle westward. It would be a



SCHLIEFFEN'S PLAN OF ADVANCE ACROSS THE MAASTRICHT APPENDIX

Showing the approximate concentration area of the northern group of German armies, and railway routes leading west into Belgium. The single track line running s. w. above Namur would have supplied forces there while the main line Aix-Liége-Namur was blocked by the siege operations. Railway crossings over the Meuse at Venloo and Gennap would have aided Schlieffen's lines of communications had Holland acquiesced in the violation of her territory.

problem in any case to crowd so great a mass of troops through this narrow corridor; and roads, railway and bridges were covered by the fire of the Liége fortifications. If the Belgians resisted, the fortress would have to be reduced by the slow and methodical operations of siege-warfare, and this itself could not be begun

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until large German forces were mobilized and brought up into position — a matter requiring almost a fortnight. Before this the Belgians would have time to mobilize in turn and organize the defence of the fortress; and before the gateway was broken open, the French would have time to shift their forces to the northern flank and take up a position across the Belgian plain where Schlieffen's superior numbers would not have room to maneuver.

To avoid this impasse and accommodate this traffic during the rush hour, Schlieffen turned to the various river crossings in the Maastricht Appendix, just to the north — in Dutch territory, but unguarded by fortresses. With tempting directness the railway bridges at Maastricht and Roermond connected up the main railways coming down from northern Germany with lines straight to Brussels and Antwerp. These routes lay directly west of the Ruhr, the source of the army's munition supply; they would provide admirable lines of communication while the main line at Liége was blocked or damaged; and later on would ease the heavy burden that line would have to carry. The elder Moltke long ago had taken note of these unusual facilities, and in 1859 had employed this route in a plan of campaign against France. Present circumstances made the seizure of the Maastricht Appendix a "military necessity" essential to the maneuver of super-envelopment; and by this brusque international railway merger, after the first rush Schlieffen could route his troop trains straight through to Brussels, Antwerp and all points westward — without breaking the journey.

At the end of 1905 Schlieffen retired, bequeathing to his successor, the younger Moltke, this inheritance of victory assured *a priori*. A Staff officer of the Netherlands army, Captain van Voorst, explains that for a certain period Moltke continued the plan in force; and in 1906 maps were issued to the formations of the First Army giving the routes to be followed across Holland. But the new railway sidings and other preparations on the German side of the border could not pass unnoticed, and the Hollanders drew the necessary conclusions. Very formally they announced their intention of defending their territory against all comers; their army was increased and reorganized so that it could take the field effectively in open warfare; the railway bridges over the Meuse were provided with "great double steel doors, with loopholes for files and machine guns;" while mine-chambers were prepared in the piers of the Meuse bridges. *Cet animal est très*

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méchant; quand on l'attaque, il se défend; and in Captain van Voorst's view, the indications of this trait on the part of his countrymen caused Moltke to change his plans — about the year 1909. We know, too, that by then the recovery of the Russian army forced Moltke to return to the normal prospect of a war on two fronts, and assign the eastern Army Corps to their former mission of guarding East Prussia. With the Russians again to deal with, there would be the more danger in picking this extra quarrel in the west.

Moltke's own account passes over this first phase and goes at once into his reasons for sparing Holland.

"Count Schlieffen was of the view that Holland would confine herself to a protest, and for the rest would allow the violation of her territory to proceed unhindered. I had the most serious doubts as to this conception: I did not believe that Holland would put up quietly with this act of violence, and on the contrary thought that a hostile Holland would divert such strong forces from our right wing that the combat strength necessary for the offensive in the west must be lost. The preliminary advance through Belgium, in my view, could be carried through only on the presumption of a strictly neutral Holland. . .

I had taken into account the difficulties that must arise even without setting foot on Dutch soil. . . One needs only to consider what our situation would have been, had we had to deal with a hostile Holland whose coasts stood open to an English landing: — what the undertaking against Antwerp would have become with the Scheldt no longer neutral: — how many troops would have been required to cover this rear flank so close to our lines of communication westward. If, on the other hand, we spared Holland, England, after declaring war on us for the alleged sake of protecting small neutral nations, could not possibly violate the neutrality of Holland on her own part. . .

Furthermore, it was clear to me that Holland must be kept open under all circumstances as an air-pipe for our economic life."

Between the economic air-pipe, the British fleet, the Dutch army, and Russia, Moltke decided to forego the Appendix operation. The idea of England acquiring a Continental bridgehead continued a serious anxiety; the Dutch warnings were very plain; and Moltke suffered from an uneasy conscience in the whole matter:

"Immediately upon the ordering of mobilization in 1914 I made clear to the envoy of the Netherlands in Berlin, that I would solemnly pledge myself to guarantee a strict respect of Dutch neutrality on the part of Germany. I think the event proved me right."

More so even than Moltke knew. Five days before this solemn pledge, on July 26, the demolition charges were in place and ready

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under the bridges at Maastricht and Roermond; and special detachments were already on guard there. The Dutch called on no one for help; but by the 3rd of August, notes Captain van Voorst, "the army had been brought up to the full war-strength of 203,000 men and the foremost divisions of the field army were in readiness" — well toward the frontier. Had Belgium taken up her defence no less in earnest during these years preceding the war, she could have destroyed the military temptation of forcing the Liége gateway.

It was to this alternative that Moltke turned, after abandoning the short-cut through Holland. He explains that by this renunciation the scope of the enveloping movement was notably restricted; and henceforth, pretty clearly, there was no hope of reaching out the flank clear to Dunkirk and making a clean sweep around the Channel coast. Even so, he notes, there remained "unheard-of technical difficulties" in getting the right wing forward. Gathering as before in the Crefeld area, the whole body of the northernmost army would now have to defile through Aix: which meant passing 250,000 men with all their trains and baggage through what von Kluck defines as "a narrow defile formed by a town only 2,000 yards in width." Further south, the roads led not westward but straight north into Liége, so that the army next in line had also to form in narrow column and pick its way over the crossings in or near the city. In all, some 500,000 men would have to be got through a passage about 15 miles wide, chiefly within the perimeter of the Liége fortifications; and Moltke records that "year-long theoretical studies" and staff rides were devoted to working out this problem of troop movements and road capacities.

There remained the obstacle of the fortifications. Under Moltke's plan it became all the more serious, in that all the supplies of the 500,000 would first have to be hurried forward over these roads in trucks; and afterward the railway through Liége must serve as the main line of communications for the whole right wing — at least three armies. The way would have to be cleared by the time they were ready to march forward; and Moltke agreed with Schlieffen that no such schedule could be achieved by siege operations. Even the ten days necessary for assembling the armies would give warning and allow the Belgians to prepare a thorough destruction of roads, railways and bridges. In this dilemma, Moltke conceived the daring expedient of rushing the

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place without warning, by a *coup de main* delivered with a small force at the very outset. This strategical *apéritif* would precede the beginning of the campaign proper, and solve all the complications at Liége even without waiting for mobilization. It was a highly unorthodox conception for dealing with a modern fortress, but as he observes:

"The very fact that Liége was a modern fortress, and hence without a continuous inner *enceinte*, made feasible my plan of thrusting through the inter-



MOLTKE'S PASSAGE THROUGH THE LIÉGE CORRIDOR

Showing main railway lines of communication actually used during the opening phase of the campaign in 1914. Dotted lines indicate concentration areas of the armies of von Kluck and von Bülow, and the routes they were forced to follow to cross the Meuse. The line of August 16th indicates points reached by the heads of von Kluck's columns on the day the last of the Liége forts surrendered. Dusseldorf was von Kluck's base during this first period.

vals between the outer forts, into the city within. . . *Bei dem von mir beabsichtigen Handstreich kam alles auf Schnelligkeit des Handels an.*"

The inquests published since the war by Colonel Normand and the Belgian Chief of Staff make clear that this decision was not an act of recklessness, but rather a tribute to Moltke's professional acumen. A close scrutiny revealed at Liége only the foundations

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of a modern fortress: having built the forts, years before, the Belgian Government had left its task uncompleted. The twelve forts, around a perimeter of 50 kilometers, had no direct telephone communication between each other; no arsenal of munitions; no narrow-gauge railway; no post of command in a secure place with underground telephone lines to the forts. Buildings crowded in so that the forts had no clear field of fire; their design left them at the mercy of artillery fire within the perimeter; and there was nothing to prevent enemy batteries from marching in. No defences barred the way between the forts, and across these intervals the forts had poor observation and ineffective flanking fire.

"A bold enemy, moving at night or in one of the fogs so frequent along the Meuse, could push through into the city without firing a shot."

More than once, in maneuvers, the Belgian infantry had succeeded, even in daytime; and from this experience the Belgian Command had decided not to try to defend the intervals in earnest, and had left the establishment of fortress troops wholly insufficient for the purpose.

It was of course unnecessary for Moltke to wait until the publication of Colonel Normand's book in 1923 to discern such salient features of the military landscape. Forthwith he decided to grasp so obvious an opportunity, and arranged to march in along these sheltered roads under the cover of darkness. The working out of these arrangements was shared by Ludendorff, who had then been serving for some years past as a junior officer at General Staff headquarters; he had worked for a year directly under Schlieffen; and in 1908 Moltke appointed him Chief of the Operations Section. Once again, as Moltke explains, a careful series of Staff studies was undertaken:

"I had the most accurate reconnaissances made of the environs of Liége, and searched out all the roads on which columns could push forward without coming under observation from the forts. Five such roads were found. Officers for leading the columns forward by night were made thoroughly familiar with the ground and carefully trained in their task. For this, in spite of the general prejudice against such a thing, I assigned five brigades to march forward, still on their peace footing."

The German frontier was fifteen or twenty miles away, and it was necessary to get up "before field-works could be thrown up across the intervals between the forts." Brigades stationed near-by in peace time were accordingly designated, and held

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ready to move without waiting to receive their war-time complement. (In 1914, August 2nd was made the first day of mobilization, and early next morning these "peace-brigades" had crossed the frontier.) Moltke could feel confident that every detail was thoroughly prepared, and counted even on forestalling the destruction of the Liége railway. He nourished to the last some faint hope that the Belgians might decide to yield and let him pass, but his plan involved no speculation on this point, one way or another: they were to be given the chance, but the advance on Liége was to proceed as arranged, irrespective of their decision. There remained nevertheless an underlying mood of risk and anxiety, and Moltke concludes with a plaintive reflection:

"It was perfectly clear to me that if the affair miscarried, the whole military world would throw in my face the reproach that I had attempted an impossibility; — and that by this hazardous enterprise of an infantry attack against a modern fortress I had revealed my complete incapacity. . .

In this undertaking, I staked all upon a single card. . . *Ich habe mit diesem Unternehmen alles auf eine Karte gesetzt.* . ."

The single card, moreover, would have to be played without warning: success at Liége would require rapidity of diplomatic no less than political action. In fact, for all its undoubted military advantages the whole plan of assembling an unexpectedly strong right wing far outside of the French flank involved far-reaching diplomatic complications. If, after mobilizing, these northern armies were to stand marking time pending an actual outbreak of war, their strength could promptly be reported across the frontier and the French could alter their deployment of forces accordingly. There would remain even so a momentary breathing space, since in all countries it would require some ten days for the armies to mobilize, carry out the train movements to the frontier, and complete their organization. During this interval, even an extreme crisis might conceivably be turned back from war to peace: — there was at least nothing in the technical military arrangements to prevent it. Mobilization must involve counter-mobilization as a measure of safety, but in itself did not elsewhere compel war. The German plan of operations comprised no *attaque brusquée* against Russia and none along the Franco-German frontier; and, as it happened, neither the French, Russian nor Austrian plans involved or even made possible a serious "hostile act" during this ten day period.

The *coup de main* at Liége must sweep away even this slender

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margin of safety. In a prolonged crisis, the Belgians might take certain legitimate military precautions: and only a little barbed wire and a few machine guns in the proper place could wreck all hopes of the march by night on which so much depended. The thing in fact required a flying start and at a certain point the mechanism might become automatically self starting. Even in an accidental crisis a situation might arise when, under peril of certain military failure at Liége, it would become fatal to delay ordering mobilization.

Thus it was that upon every other frontier the Continental powers — Germany included — could resort to mobilization as an extreme military precaution or as a means of diplomatic pressure: could if necessary take up arms and then mark time along the border without ruining the campaigns planned. But in this one northwestern sector there could be no breathing space: a mere ordering of mobilization must here be followed by an immediate act of war. However uncertain or reluctant the Imperial Government or even the General Staff might be when the time came, at a certain point of tension they must lose all freedom of action, all control over the situation; and the delicately adjusted military mechanism once set in motion must go through to the bitter end its appointed series of revolutions.

Some years later Moltke doubled his stakes by casting aside the alternative plans hitherto kept on file for a war against Russia only. Henceforth, whatever crisis might arise, whatever the international alignment facing the Empire, there was available but a single military solution. Even if Petersburg and Moscow suddenly became the military objectives, the road thither led inexorably via Liége and Paris. (It fell to Moltke, in the stormy scene of August 1st at the Palace to drum the fact into the head of the frightened Kaiser.) To cap the climax, Moltke as "responsible military adviser" reiterated to his Government the conviction that the crossing of Belgium would certainly force England into war. To avoid this was a main object of Bethmann Hollweg's policy.

Knowing all this, Bethmann for six years on end maintained the plan in force by his passive but none the less official acquiescence. "In the case of a less unique personality as Chancellor" (to quote Tirpitz' phrase), the issue could have been put squarely up to the Emperor. Bethmann did nothing of the sort, but proceeded ludicrously with his efforts to lead England into an

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alliance: i.e. to make her a partner in a military enterprise for gaining a German foothold along the Channel. And with the hair-trigger apparatus at Liége always awaiting any chance misstep on his part, he sallied calmly forth, in 1914, into the venture of the "death-blow to Serbia."

With corresponding adroitness, in his effort to bargain for British neutrality Bethmann disclosed to Goschen, on July 29th, the intention of invading Belgium. By one brilliant stroke, he precipitated the British decision against him and let the cat out of the bag in regard to his one military secret: henceforth surprise at Liége could hardly be hoped for. Only the Belgians themselves saved Moltke's plan. As late as midnight of July 31st, General Leman received an order by the Government "forbidding him to construct field-works in the intervals between the forts, *en raison des susceptibilités allemandes;*" and the Belgian concentration was not even ordered until after Moltke's five Peace-Brigades had set forth across the frontier on their mission. At Berlin such assistance was not to be anticipated: for days on end the tension and turmoil there had been extreme, and Moltke was already a nerve-shattered leader when on August 5th he sat waiting within his office the news of the one card on which he had staked his fortunes. He records what followed:

"On the evening of that day the report came in, that the impression was the undertaking had not succeeded: at least our troops had not pushed through into the city. I had to report the news to the Kaiser. He said to me, 'I thought so. This going against Belgium has brought down on my neck war with England. — *Das habe ich mir gleich gedacht. Mir hat dies Vorgehen gegen Belgien den Krieg mit England auf den Hals gebracht.*'"

His Majesty had at last formed an accurate appreciation. But during twenty years — from 1894 to 1914 — he had had time to think the matter over.

At the very moment, that evening on August 5th, the report was true. In spite of training and careful preparations, all five of the assaulting columns halted before the fire of Belgian outposts, and four of them did not renew the effort. But with the fifth was Ludendorff, as liaison officer and long-time expert in the Liége operation. No man knew better than he how much depended upon the venture: quite on his own he pushed to the head of his column, set it in motion, and led it through — inside the line of the fortifications. They were alone and isolated from the world without; but the essential thing had been accomplished: the

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Belgian field troops vanished from the scene, and daylight revealed the great railway bridge over the Meuse still standing, intact and uninjured. There had been much miscellaneous dynamiting, but the easiest, most obvious, and most essential of all the war measures to be taken by Belgium had passed neglected in the shuffle. Over this bridge, according to plan, passed the supplies for the advancing armies; the railway connections behind their march proved "favorable beyond expectation," and during the Marne the trains pushed forward as far as Noyon. They were to get no further, but Moltke's single card had succeeded; the Belgian Chief of Staff endorses the German contention:

"By the day set for the general advance, the 18th of August, the plans of the German Supreme Command were realized exactly, without the slightest loss of time, in spite of the valiant but fruitless resistance of the Liége forts."

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THE "HOLY MOUNTAIN"

By William Miller

MOUNT ATHOS, the easternmost of the three prongs of the peninsula of Chalkidiké, has been for centuries the "Holy Mountain" of the Orthodox Church. Pious, or at least penitent, Byzantine, Trapezuntine, Serbian and Russian Emperors and dignitaries founded twenty monasteries there in the dark centuries; more than one monarch sought refuge there from the intrigues of courts, and, to make the solitude safer, it has always been a rule that no female — except the inevitable female flea, which invades most Eastern monasteries — should set foot upon Mount Athos. One woman alone is known to have visited the "Holy Mountain" — the wife of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the "Great Elchi," at the time when that famous British diplomatist was omnipotent at Constantinople. When the Turks conquered the Balkan peninsula they allowed the monks of Mount Athos, which Xerxes had tried to sever by a canal from the mainland, to enjoy practical autonomy under the nominal sway of a *Kaimakam*, or Governor. The monasteries were represented in a federal council, which met at Karges, the monastic capital, and managed the common affairs of their community. Such was Mount Athos when scholarly travellers like Robert Curzon, Bowen, Tozer, Riley, Lampros and Hasluck visited it to study its institutions or catalogue its libraries.

The Balkan and European wars, by eliminating Turkey from Macedonia, surrounded Mount Athos with Greek territory. But the treaty of Bucharest in 1913 passed over its juridical position in prudent silence. An annex to the treaty of Sèvres of 1920 constituted the twenty monasteries of Mount Athos into a theocratic republic under the suzerainty of Greece, which undertook to respect the rights of all those ancient foundations, including the Serbian monastery of Chilindar, founded at the end of the twelfth century by the authors of the Nemanja dynasty, and the Bulgarian and Russian establishments. During the European conflict the monks of these monasteries, which were in convenient strategic positions, had been suspected of turning their refectories into arsenals for the benefit of this or that belligerent, and a new form of research work was undertaken there by emissaries of the Allies. Greek monks are naturally

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politicians; the writer, who has visited many Greek monasteries, has always found the Abbot more interested in the latest political crisis in Athens or the imaginary schemes of the Great Powers in the Levant than in questions of theology or the history of his own religious house.

Accordingly, the task assumed by the Greek Government seven years ago was not easy; for all Greek monks do not hold the same views upon Greek internal politics, while the Greek and Bulgarian "fathers" could scarcely be expected to agree about external policy, and the Serbian inmates of Chilindar naturally looked to Belgrade rather than Athens for inspiration in the things of this world, which will creep into the most secluded cells. Nevertheless, the task has been satisfactorily performed; a holy calm has reigned over the "Holy Mountain." Greece wisely showed conciliation towards Jugoslavia, when it was asked that the monastery of Chilindar's *metóchia*, or farm-lands, situated in Chalkidiké outside the boundaries of Mount Athos, should not be liable to expropriation for the benefit of the refugees from Asia Minor. Russia, which had striven to assert claims over the Russian monks at San Stefano in 1878, in London in 1913 and in a memorandum to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs in May, 1914, ceased to take interest in them when the Bolsheviks came into power. The proposals of the Tsar's Minister that the Russian monks should keep their nationality, hoist the Russian flag over their buildings, and enjoy the protection of Russia through a Russian official, have been quietly dropped. The spectacle of the Bolsheviks protecting the Orthodox religion would, indeed, have furnished a modern Juvenal with a parallel to the classical example of "the Gracchi complaining of sedition." Warned by the lessons of the Crimean War, the Greek Government could not have accepted propositions which would have given the Tsars an excuse for interference in the affairs of Mount Athos, just as they used to claim the right to intervene on behalf of the Orthodox Christians of Turkey. The Christian states of the Near East have learned by bitter experience the dangers of even well-intentioned intervention by the Great Powers.

The unsettled conditions of Greek politics postponed for six years the elaboration of a charter for Mount Athos, just as they have adjourned the definite allocation of the ecclesiastical sees in "New" Greece to either the Œcumenical Patriarch or the Archbishop of Athens. But on September 10, 1926, a decree on

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the legal position of the "Holy Mountain" was issued, and followed last June by two further decrees regulating the relations between the Greek and the Monastic Republics. While, politically, Mount Athos was declared to form a part of the Hellenic State, its administrative autonomy was recognized, and, spiritually, it was made a direct appendage, *stavropégion* (as the ecclesiastical lawyers say), of the Œcumenical Patriarchate. Thus, on the "Holy Mountain" the Œcumenical Patriarch has obtained jurisdiction — which he had lost since the creation of independent Bulgarian, Serbian, Rumanian and Albanian Orthodox Churches — over Orthodox monks of non-Greek birth. But this new charter expressly lays down the principle that all monks who seek refuge from the world on Mount Athos *ipso facto* become Greek nationals, and that on the "Holy Mountain," as in heaven, there are no race distinctions: all are, at least juridically, one family.

It has, indeed, been further suggested by some — although the suggestion has not found much support in Greece — that Mount Athos might advantageously become the seat of the Œcumenical Patriarch instead of the Phanar at Constantinople. The destruction of the Greek dioceses in Asia Minor as the result of the exchange of populations, the reduction of the Greek element in Constantinople itself, and the very restricted area, even if the sees of Western Thrace and Macedonia be definitely retained by the Patriarchate, of its jurisdiction in Europe, have greatly diminished the importance of the Patriarch, who, even in Greek lands, is now only "Œcumenical" in name — *magni nominis umbra*. Moreover, the summary expulsion of the Patriarch Constantine VI by the Turks four years ago, and their idea of forming a new Orthodox Church for Turkey alone under Papa Ephthym, made a considerable impression upon the Greeks. They saw clearly that the Patriarchate was at the mercy of the Turks, as Mohammed II had always intended it should be and had therefore allowed it to remain in Constantinople. History, prestige and faint hopes of the future alone militate in favor of the Phanar as the Patriarch's residence. The statesmen who in 1833 created the autocephalous church of Greece saw the danger of a Patriarchate situated in an enemy's country.

The new administrative system contains some interesting features. The Greek *Harmostes*, as he is styled by the classical title, bestowed in modern times on the British Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands and Governor of Cyprus, is a lay

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official, subordinate to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, not to the Minister of the Interior like the other prefects, whom he resembles in rank and salary. He has under him a force of gendarmes, in case the holy fathers — *tantaene animis caelestribus irae* — come to fisticuffs, as has happened in Jerusalem and other "Holy Places." But he can make no change in the number or relations of the twenty monasteries, into which no schismatic may creep. Their property is declared inalienable, and all property on Mount Athos is exempted from taxation, including the earnings of artisans, but excluding the profits of those traders who supply the ascetic monks with their very few necessaries of existence. This is a very liberal measure, when it is remembered that the trend of opinion in Greece is against the preservation of monasteries and in favor of devoting monastic property to a fund for increasing the meagre stipends of the parish priests. For, with the exception of Mount Athos and a few show monasteries of great historic interest, such as Megaspelaion, Meteora, Hagia Lavoa and Néa Moné in Chios, public opinion regards such institutions as an anachronism and an excuse for idleness rather than opportunities for pious contemplation or learned research. Under the new dispensation the monasteries retain their *Synaxis*, or Federal Assembly with its executive government of four, each of whom keeps one-quarter of the corporate seal. The entire charter must have the ratification of both the Patriarch and the Greek Parliament. Thus the monks of Mount Athos, like the inhabitants of Monaco, enjoy that rarest of all privileges of modern communities — exemption from taxation.

The above-mentioned arrangements should last as long as the political situation in Macedonia remains unchanged. Greek Macedonia, since the exchange of populations, is inhabited by an overwhelmingly Greek population — 88.8 percent of the whole, including the Jews of Saloniki. As long as Greece retains Saloniki and Dedeagatch, with the coast-line between them, the charter of Mount Athos should stand the test of practical application. In these days a theocratic republic is a rarity, which possesses unique interest for the student of constitutions. We may compare it with the treatment of the Vatican by Italy in the Law of Guarantees in 1871, which the late Luigi Luzzatti considered to be a masterpiece of Italian statesmanship. History may similarly point to the new charter of Mount Athos as a wise act of the young Greek Republic.

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THE RECENT RUSSIAN CENSUS

A GENERAL census of the population of Russia, the second in the history of the country and the first under the Soviet régime, was carried out in the last half of December, 1926, except in certain remote regions in Siberia and Central Asia, for which a longer period was required. The only previous general census was that of 1897.[1] The recent census was conducted on a very elaborate scale; 150,000 enumerators were employed, and it is estimated that 4,500 people will be engaged for the next two and one half years in tabulating the returns. The total cost is placed at about 14,000,000 roubles ($7,000,000),[2] and it is expected that the results, when completed, will fill 53 volumes of about 500 pages each.

The individual census questionnaire comprised fifteen questions regarding name, sex, age, race, language, birthplace, marital status, literacy, physical condition, soundness of mind, unemployment, occupation, source of income, etc. It is worthy of note that no inquiry was made as to religious affiliation. In working out the instructions for the enumerators, considerable discussion took place in connection with the fourth question on the individual census sheet, as to whether data shall be collected respecting nationality or racial affiliation. It was finally decided to view the matter from an ethnographic rather than from a political-cultural standpoint. Accordingly, inquiry was to be made as to "narodnost" (people) — which is defined as "a group of persons unified and differentiated from other such groups by certain common biological characteristics and by a common language," whereas nationality ("natsionalnost") is considered as "narodnost plus culture plus state organization."[3] On the Ukrainian cards, however, the word "nationality" was placed before "narodnost," and in the Transcaucasus the three words: "Tribe, narodnost, nationality" appear on the census sheets. It was also decided that the answer to this question was to be based entirely on the statement of the particular individual. Enumerators were instructed to record the "narodnost" to which the individual stated he belonged. In the Ukraine, White Russia, and the western provinces of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, there were special instructions to the effect that if a person stated that he was a Russian, he was to be further asked to which of the three peoples — Great Russian, Ukrainian, or White Russian — he considered himself to belong. Another question which caused considerable difficulty was that of native language. This was finally defined in the enumerators' instructions to be, not the mother tongue, but the language "which the individual knows best of all or usually speaks." In answer to criticisms on these points, the Chief of the Statistical Administration declared that "our whole census was based upon self-determination of nationality. . . . Therefore we strove to have each person freely decide his own nationality and language."[4]

[1] In 1920 the Soviet régime took a partial census, which did not include a considerable part of the Ukraine, Transcaucasus, and Turkestan.

[2] Report of Ossinsky, 3rd session of Union Central Executive Committee, Feb. 17, 1927, *Izvestia*, February 18, 1927.

[3] *Izvestia*, December 9, 1926. [4] *Izvestia*, February 18, 1927.

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In order to obtain data with regard to family life in the cities, a special family questionnaire was elaborated which required particulars as to number in family, number living together on common budget, number of rooms or size of space occupied, kitchen conveniences, etc. Soviet leaders assert that the extremely large number of family questionnaire cards which were required in the census indicate the disintegration of the family under the influence of present conditions in Russia. In many cities, for instance, the number of family cards used exceeded 50 percent of the population.[5]

According to the latest figures which have been made public,[6] the total population of the Soviet Union at the present time is 146,200,000 people, distributed as follows:

R. S. F. S. R.	100,500,000
Ukraine	28,900,000
White Russia	4,900,000
Transcaucasus	5,800,000
Turcmanistan	1,000,000
Uzbekistan	5,100,000
TOTAL	146,200,000

If this total is compared with previous population figures for the same territory, it will be observed that the enormous losses caused by the World War, the civil war, and the famine, have already been compensated by the extraordinary vitality of the population. Whereas the population of the present territory of the Soviet Union increased from 104,100,000 in 1897 to 135,600,000 on January 1, 1914, it declined to 131,500,000 in 1920 which represents an absolute loss of 4,100,000 as compared with 1914. This figure does not represent the total loss suffered by the Russian people from foreign and civil war, since it does not take into account the natural increase of the population which would have taken place during the six years in question under normal conditions. The recent census returns indicate that not only the loss from war (4,100,000), but also the loss from the famine in 1921–1922, have been compensated, and that in addition there has been an absolute increase of 10,600,000 in the total population as compared with 1914. It is to be noted in this connection that the rate of economic rehabilitation in Russia has been less rapid. As Ossinsky, the Chief of the Statistical Administration, pointed out in January, 1927, "the demographic restoration process in recent years has made more rapid progress than the process of economic rehabilitation."

While the increase of population since 1920 has exceeded every expectation, the acceleration of the rate of increase as compared with the period from 1897 to 1914 is a fact of not less importance. In the period from 1897 to 1914 the annual rate of increase was 1.7 percent; in the last six years it would seem to have approximated 2.5 percent. This elemental phenomenon is of fundamental importance for Soviet economic life.

A comparison of the census figures of 1897 with those of 1927 for the various parts of Russian territory shows that the Far Eastern region has increased 164 percent in the 30 years, Siberia 140 percent, and North Caucasus 48 percent, the percentage of increase for the whole country being 38.5 percent. The smallest increase has taken place in Dagestan and the Central Asiatic regions.

[5] *Weekly Soviet Justice*, No. 4, January 31, 1927, page 81. [6] *Izvestia*, July 21, 1927.

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The town population is placed at 26,000,000. This figure represents a much faster growth of the urban population than Soviet statisticians had foreseen. An urban census was taken in the beginning of 1923. According to the recent census, the population of the cities of which a census was taken in 1923 has increased by almost 5,000,000 people, or 24 percent, in the course of three and three quarter years. This constitutes for the urban population an average annual growth of 6 percent, which is double the pre-war rate of growth, and also double the estimated rate of growth used by the State Plan Commission in its calculations, as reported by Ossinsky at the third session of the Union Central Executive Committee. It should be noted in this connection that the annual growth of population for the whole Union in the same period has been not more than 2.5 percent. It is estimated that, of the 5,000,000 increase in the town population, not more than 1,500,000 can be attributed to natural growth. Consequently, the remainder, about 3,500,000, represents immigration from the villages. The rapidity of growth has been especially noticeable in cities of more than 100,000 population. In 1897 there were only 14 cities of this category with a total population of 4,249,000; in 1923 there were 21 such cities with a population of 6,337,000; and according to *Izvestia* for January 30, 1927, at the present time there are 30 with a population of 9,251,000, some of which were not in existence in 1897. The population of Moscow has increased 34.6 percent since 1923 and that of Leningrad 51.2 percent. The figures for the ten largest cities of Russia are as follows:

	1926	*1923*
Moscow	2,019,453	1,542,874
Leningrad	1,616,118	1,071,103
Kiev	493,873	422,975
Baku	446,832	335,700
Odessa	411,416	314,840
Kharkov	409,505	307,801
Tashkent	320,865	262,011
Rostov	304,812	231,422
Tiflis	282,918	233,958
Saratov	211,756	181,459

It is worthy of note that the effect of the famine of 1921 appears clearly in the census returns for the famine areas. Thus, in the province of Samara the population is 18 percent smaller than it was in 1920, in the republic of the Volga Germans the decrease is 17 percent, in the province of Orenburg 16 percent, in the Tatar Republic 14 percent, and in the Bashkir Republic 12 percent. The most rapid growth of population during the past six years has taken place in the Ukraine, where the population has increased by 12 percent as compared with only 6.3 percent in the R.S.F.S.R. This is explained by the Soviet statisticians as being due to the immigration into the industrial region of the Don Basin and to the lesser influence of the famine in the Ukraine. The largest increase in the R.S.F.S.R. is recorded in the central industrial region, which is ascribed to the influx from the villages. In general, the returns indicate a movement of population on the one hand into the industrial regions and on the other into the grain producing regions.

R. F. K.

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

COTTON PRODUCTION AREA OF THE WORLD

With charts showing the amounts of cotton produced and consumed, 1925–26.

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WORLD COTTON CROPS

By John A. Todd

THE issue of *Foreign Affairs* for December, 1923, contained an article by the writer on the "World's Crisis in Cotton." Since then the world's cotton supplies have passed through great changes. The apparently desperate situation described in that article was completely transformed by the unexpected recovery of the American crop through the practical disappearance of the weevil for three seasons in succession, 1924, 1925 and 1926. Many people jumped to the conclusion that this disappearance was permanent. The comparative failure of the American crop in 1927, however, due to the reappearance of the weevil, has brought us back very nearly to the position of 1923 and has revived the whole question of alternative cotton supplies from other parts of the world.

The map of the world's cotton areas printed on the opposite page is therefore of great interest. Perhaps the best commentary on it is to give an up-to-date version of the table of the world's crops which appeared in the writer's original article. In this case, however, it will be more convenient to arrange the table in geographical order. No information is yet available for 1927, except early estimates of the American and Egyptian crops. Both of these are subject to substantial revision before the close of the season, but in the meantime they show a substantial decline from the 1926 figures, which is at least partly attributable to the revised acreage resulting from the low prices of 1926.

COTTON CROPS, 1914–1927

(In thousands of bales of 500 lbs. approx.)

	1914	*1920*	*1921*	*1922*	*1923*	*1924*	*1925*	*1926*	*1927*
AMERICA									
U. S. A.	16,135	13,440	7,954	9,762	10,140	13,628	16,104	17,977	12,692
Mexico	112	220	169	186	168	288	198	396	
W. Indies (British)	5	4	3	4	3	3	5	5	
W. Indies (non-British)	13	13	22	17	17	18	18	20	
Brazil	406	424	483	519	544	630	596	447	
Peru	123	164	183	185	196	193	187	200	
Other S. American	14	56	62	65	144	165	227	225	
AFRICA									
Egypt	1,298	1,206	972	1,243	1,306	1,455	1,593	1,719	1,272
Sudan	8	24	19	23	38	36	97	105	
Uganda	29	65	39	70	103	157	145	104	
Kenya	.....	.....	.....	1	1	2	2	1	
Tanganyika	.....	7	7	6	10	15	17	20	
Nyasaland	6	4	4	3	6	7	4	3	
Rhodesia	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	4	5	1	
South Africa	.....	2	2	5	7	14	16	16	
Nigeria	12	24	12	14	20	32	40	15	
Africa (non-British)	3	13	18	25	48	68	76	80	
ASIA									
Japan and Korea	68	127	128	205	197	183	190	200	
China	2,363	1,667	1,263	1,884	1,747	1,880	1,827	1,667	
East Indies, etc.	71	67	36	26	22	23	24	25	
India (mostly 400 lb. bales)	5,209	3,600	4,485	5,073	5,161	6,088	6,250	4,973	
Persia	131	73	68	75	91	93	105	100	
Russia	1,164	121	57	50	212	471	733	850	
Asia Minor	148	116	52	64	116	144	243	250	
Iraq	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	2	2	3	
Malta, Cyprus	5	2	2	1	2	3	3	3	
Australasia	.....	1	2	8	9	11	6	4	
GRAND TOTAL	27,323	21,440	16,042	19,514	20,310	25,613	28,713	29,409	

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THE NEXT CHAPTER: THE WAR AGAINST THE MOON. By ANDRÉ MAUROIS. London: Kegan Paul, 1927, 2/6.

An effective take-off on the belligerent instincts of man. A book which will repay reading.

THE OUTLAWRY OF WAR. By CHARLES C. MORRISON. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Colby, 1927, 330 pp. $3.00.

The editor of the *Christian Century* advances a somewhat naïve plan for the ending of international conflicts.

NATIONAL FRONTIERS IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW. By COLONNELLO VITTORIO ADAMI. New York: Oxford University Press, 1927, 127 pp. $3.50.

A splendid technical study of the vexed question of frontiers in all its aspects.

ANNUAIRE DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS, 1920–1927. EDITED BY GEORGES OTTLIK. Geneva: Payot, 1927, 1005 pp.

An indispensable handbook for those interested in the work of the League. The editor reviews the making of the covenant, the organization of the League, its activities, the work of the Mandates Commission, the regulations governing minorities, etc.

DAS DEUTSCHE SCHRIFTUM ÜBER DEN VOELKERBUND, 1917–1927. By FRITZ JUNTKE and HANS SVEISTRUP. Berlin: Struppe and Winckler, 1927, 71 pp. M. 15.

An important and valuable contribution to the bibliography of the League. The authors include not only books, but periodical essays and even newspaper articles. Their book is an exhaustive survey of the German literature on the subject.

A LITTLE BOOK OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1920–1927. By B. BRADFIELD. New York: Stechert, 1927, 112 pp. 50c.

A little survey for the general public, unusually well done.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNE CRISE DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. By Georges Scelle. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1927, 256 pp. Fr. 10.

An excellent critical study of the difficult period from March to September 1926, with the reform of the League council and the admission of Germany.

DIE MITGLIEDSCHAFT IM VOELKERBUND. By Wilhelm Strub. Basel: Helbing and Lichterhahn, 1927, 108 pp. M. 2.50.

An examination of the principles governing the admission of new League members.

LES MANDATS INTERNATIONAUX. By D. F. W. Van Rees. Paris: Rousseau, 1927, 145 pp. Fr. 23.

One of the most important books on the question of the organization and control of mandates, by the Vice President of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League.

DAS RECHT DER MINDERHEITEN. By Herbert Kraus. Berlin: Stilke, 1927, 36 pp. M. 10.

A collection of the essential documents bearing on the problem of minorities.

POLITICAL MYTHS AND ECONOMIC REALITIES. By Francis Delaisi. New York: Viking, 1927, 463 pp. $4.00.

The translation of a work by a French economist, which should be widely read by those interested in foreign affairs. The author sets out to demolish the "myth" of nationalism by putting it in its proper setting and showing that it has outlived its usefulness. The modern world is based primarily on economic foundations, and the result of the spread of industrialism has been to make all parts of the world interdependent. Under the circumstances the "polytheism of sovereignties" has become a dangerous anomaly and no satisfactory solution of such problems as war can be expected until a readjustment of the world order has taken place. The argument in itself is not new, but it is cogently and logically presented.

AN ECONOMIST'S PROTEST. By Edwin Cannan. London: King, 1927, 458 pp. 16/.

A reprint of articles by an English economist in the years from 1914 to 1926. Like Delaisi the writer takes a strong stand against "nationalist" economics, and proves his point by an able exposition of such war and postwar problems as currency, taxation, wages, prices, etc. On the whole the essays have a permanent value and, taken together, make one of the most telling critiques of the existing system.

International Relations of the United States

A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS. By Louis M. Sears. New York: Crowell, 1927, 648 pp. $3.50.

A good general survey of the international relations of the United States, conventional in presentation, but readable, straightforward and generally up-to-date.

THE BUILDERS OF AMERICA. By Ellsworth Huntington and Leon F. Whitney. New York: Morrow, 1927, 382 pp. $3.50.

An interesting and timely contribution, investigating the problems arising from the birth-rates of various nationalities comprising the American population.

MEN OF DESTINY. By Walter Lippmann. New York: Macmillan, 1927, 244 pp. $2.50.

A collection of essays by the well-known writer and editor. Those dealing with the outlawry of war, the Kellogg Doctrine and imperialism are stimulating contributions to the discussion of present-day international problems.

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ROOSEVELT AND THE CARIBBEAN. By Howard C. Hill. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1927.

An important addition to the literature on American foreign policy. The author, basing his account in part upon unpublished material, makes out a rather strong indictment of Roosevelt's policy.

ALIAS UNCLE SHYLOCK. By Herbert W. Fisher. New York: Boni 1927, 214 pp. $2.50.

An exceedingly keen and penetrating review of the origins of the war, reminding one of Fabre-Luce's "La Victoire."

THE STROKE OF THE MOMENT. Edited by Oswald Chew. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1927, 551 pp.

A reprint of articles by numerous writers tending to show that it would be either unjust or unprofitable to insist on the payment of the foreign debts.

AMERICAN LOANS TO GERMANY. By Robert R. Kuczynski. New York: Macmillan, 1927, 378 pp. $3.00.

A recent addition to the series of excellent monographs published under the auspices of the Institute of Economics. The author, a well-known German economist, examines the nature and terms of the loans made to Germany in the last few years and discusses the uses to which they have been put. The importance of the question for American investors need not be pressed, and this volume is a work of reference of great value, though it does not attempt to enter into the question of the advisability of continuing large-scale investments abroad.

AMERICA THE GOLDEN. By Ramsay Muir. London: Williams and Norgate, 1927, 151 pp. 2/.

One of a number of recent books recounting impressions gained in America by Europeans. There is nothing original about the volume and the emphasis on American business methods, the wide distribution of ownership in industrials, etc., is quite conventional.

Europe

VOELKERRECHT IM WELTKRIEG. By Eugen Fischer, Berthold Widmann, et alt. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1927, four volumes, M. 110.

Series III of the investigations of the Committee of the Reichstag, one of the most important collections of source material on the history of the war. The committee took testimony on all questions of violations of international law and now publishes all the very extensive evidence, the only problem of major importance that is omitted being that of the violation of Belgian neutrality, which is reserved for a later date. The decisions of the experts may be questioned on some points and did, in fact, lead to majority and minority reports, but apart from all this the value of the source material presented cannot be over-emphasized.

LES ANNÉES FATALES. By Serge Sazonov. Paris: Payot, 1927, 352 pp. Fr. 25.

The reminiscences of the former Russian foreign minister, an outstanding contribution to the story of the origins of the war.

PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUE IN THE WORLD WAR. By Harold D. Lasswell. London: Kegan Paul, 1927, 243 pp. 10/6.

An examination of the methods of systematic propaganda, so important in the conduct of modern war.

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VERSAILLES. By Karl F. Nowak. Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1927, 345 pp. M. 12.

The brilliant writer of the "Collapse of the Central Powers" reviews the making of the treaty and the circumstances which influenced the course of events.

PAROLES DE PAIX. By Aristide Briand. Paris: Figuière, 1927, Fr. 6.75.

Selections from the speeches of Briand tending to show that the key to his policy has always been peace.

VEREINIGTE STAATEN EUROPAS. By Aristoteles Poulimenos. Berlin: Stolberg, 1927, 110 pp. M. 4.

The latest addition to the growing body of literature on a United States of Europe.

THE BREAKDOWN OF SOCIALISM. By Arthur Shadwell. Boston: Little Brown, 1927, 272 pp. $3.00.

Perhaps the best general survey of the working of socialist governments in Europe, written by a competent authority after extended visits to Russia, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Czechoslovakia and Denmark.

HISTOIRE DE LA NATION FRANÇAISE. Edited by Gabriel Hanotaux. Volume X. Histoire Économique et Financière. By Germain Martin. Paris: Plon, 1927, 644 pp.

A substantial and scholarly survey of the whole economic history of France. The best general treatment available.

DYKTATOR. By Stanislaw Wędkiewicz. Kraków: Krakowska Spólka Wydawnicza, 1927, 143 pp.

A penetrating survey by a prominent Polish editor of the present tendencies in French politics and literature and forecasting the advent of some type of dictatorship. A really outstanding work.

LA RÉPUBLIQUE RÉALISTE. By Jean Montigny. Paris: Renaissance, 1927, Fr. 12.

The author, a French deputy of the Radical School, continues his book "Depuis le 11 Mai," chronicling the chief developments of recent French politics.

L'ÉTRANGER EN FRANCE. By Georges Monteux and Charles Biboud. Paris: Hachette, 1927, Fr. 5.

A book that should be read by all tourists. The authors, both prominent French lawyers, examine in detail the rights and duties of all strangers sojourning in France.

LA FRANCE ET LES ÉTRANGERS. By Charles Lambert. Paris: Delahaye, 1927, Fr. 7.

A book of fundamental importance. The writer, a deputy, discusses the vital problems of depopulation, immigration, naturalization, etc.

BEVOELKERUNGSPROBLEME FRANKREICHS. By Hans Harmsen. Berlin: Vowinckel, 1927, 221 pp. M. 8.

On the whole the best general treatment of the French population problem, examining the decline of the birth rate, the measures taken to correct it, foreign immigration and its effects, and the larger evolution of the French population.

LA GUERRA E IL SISTEMA TRIBUTARIO ITALIANO. By Luigi Einaudi. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927, 505 pp.

An exhaustive treatise in the Carnegie series, going a long way towards showing the extraordinary difficulties under which the Italian Government labored but also explaining the fundamental mistakes that led to the economic breakdown later.

IL COMMANDANTE. By Vittorio Margonari. Milan: Pirola, 1926, 309 pp. L. 60.

Reminiscences of D'Annunzio's Fiume adventure, by one of his enthusiastic followers.

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WESEN UND WERDEN DES FASCISTISCHEN STAATES. By Erwin von Beukerath. Berlin: Springer, 1927, 155 pp. M. 5.70.

A stimulating philosophical disquisition. The author sees the fascist state as the realization of the authoritarian state aimed at in the eighteenth century and foresees attempts to establish similar systems elsewhere in Europe as the economic and political tension grows.

IL MEDITERRANEO DALL'UNITÀ DI ROMA ALL'UNITÀ D'ITALIA. By Pietro Silva. Milan: Mondadori, 1927, 447 pp. L. 40.

A serious work on the history of the Mediterranean problem, the viewpoint being outspokenly nationalist.

LE VATICAN ET LA PAIX. By Ernest Judet. Paris: Delpeuch, 1927, 314 pp. Fr. 15.

An unusually timely and important work. The author, who has long been in touch with Vatican circles, attempts to show, by elaborate documentation, that the Popes, from Leo XIII to Pius XI, have followed undeviatingly and uncompromisingly a policy of peace.

ESPRIT UND GEIST. By Eduard Wechsler. Bielefeld: Velhagen and Klasing, 1927, 604 pp. M. 28.

An interesting attempt to show the fundamental cultural unity of French and German by a survey of their development and institutions.

DER MARNE FELDZUG 1914. By Crownprince Wilhelm. Berlin: Dob-Verlag, 1927, 100 pp. M. 2.

An able but hardly impartial commentary on the German official history of the war.

DER DEUTSCHE LANDKRIEG. By Wilhelm von Dommes, Karl Hosse, et alt. Leipzig: Finking, 1927, three volumes, M. 22.50 each.

A large-scale history of the war, written by experts and well supplied with charts.

DER SEEKRIEG. By Eberhard Heydel, Otto Groos, et alt. Leipzig: Finking, 1927, 688 pp. M. 22.50.

Another volume in the same series, including the war for the colonies, the war on the Turkish front, gas warfare and the war in the air.

DIE ORGANISATIONEN DER KRIEGFÜHRUNG. By Ernst von Wrisberg, Hans Fost, et alt. Leipzig: Finking, 1927, three volumes, M. 22.50 each.

In the same series. An important contribution to the study of supply, organization of education for the armies, etc.

THE DAWES PLAN AND THE NEW ECONOMICS. By George P. Auld. New York: Doubleday Page, 1927, 317 pp. $2.50.

This book, written by the former Accountant-General of the Reparations Commission, immediately takes rank as one of the really noteworthy contributions to the literature of reparations. The point of view is one diametrically opposed to that taken by Keynes and his school, and the book is quite as impressive as "The Economic Consequences of the Peace" for grasp of the subject matter and close reasoning. With the problem of the final success or failure of the Dawes plan looming up in the immediate future one should not neglect to read this lucid account of the making of the plan, its actual functioning to date and the outlook for the future, enriched, as it is, by the personal experience of the author.

ZUR TRANSFERIERUNG DER DEUTSCHEN REPARATIONSLEISTUNGEN. By Heinrich Martens. Berlin: Hoffmann, 1927, 132 pp. M. 4.

A timely discussion of the all-important subject of transfer of payments, by a competent writer.

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LA RENAISSANCE DU CREDIT EN ALLEMAGNE. By Georges Dernis. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1927, 140 pp. Fr. 10.

A well-documented, scholarly examination of the reëstablishment of credit in Germany, the general purpose being to discredit the idea of revaluation.

DIE VOELKERRECHTLICHE STELLUNG DANZIGS. By Karl L. Schroeder. Breslau: Kern, 1927, 96 pp. M. 5.

Another study of the vexed problem of the status of Danzig in international law.

FRANCIS JOSEPH. By Eugene Bagger. New York: Putnams, 1927, 572 pp. $5.00.

This is a careful and conscientious study of the Emperor and his reign and, as an addition to the very slight literature in English on the history of modern Austria, is to be welcomed and commended. The account is perfectly impartial and far removed from the line of popular biographies so current at the present time. The author throughout has depended, not so much on unpublished material, as on the sound and substantial monographic literature. He goes too far in claiming that his book is the first biography of Francis Joseph and one is rather surprised to find no reference to such fundamental works as those of Srbik on Metternich and Redlich on the constitutional development of the empire since 1848, but it is perhaps not too much to say that the book is as good a one as any American could hope to write on this subject.

LE PROBLÈME DU FÉDÉRALISME EN AUTRICHE-HONGRIE. By Sigismund Gargas. Paris: Giard, 1927, 44 pp. Fr. 5.

An interesting essay on the much-discussed question of the constitutional organization of the old monarchy.

L'UNGHERIA. By Giorgio M. Sangiorgi. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1927, 227 pp. L. 16.50.

A good brief survey of the course of events in Hungary from the time of the Karolyi régime to the establishment of the Horthy regency.

DIE NATÜRLICHEN UND NATIONALEN GRUNDLAGEN DES TSCHECHO-SLOWAKISCHEN STAATES. By Gerhard Kutzscher. Leipzig: Noske, 1927, 134 pp. M. 5.

A systematic treatment of the geographic and national lines and influences.

POLSKA NA PRZELOMIE DZIEJÓW. By Marjan Seyda. Posnań: Wojciecha, 1927, 663 pp.

The Polish question during the World War, written by one of the most active Polish leaders. Though one-sided and prejudiced, the book has great value as a source.

DIE BALTISCHEN STAATEN LITAUEN, LETTLAND UND ESTLAND UND IHR VERFASSUNGSRECHT. By Hirsch Rolnik. Leipzig: Noske, 1927, 148 pp. M. 6.

A good general survey of the constitutions of the Baltic states, by a Lithuanian.

DAS ZARISTISCHE RUSSLAND IM WELTKRIEGE. Edited by Alfred von Wegerer. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1927, 337 pp. M. 20.

An excellent edition of the Russian documents dealing with the entrance of Turkey, Bulgaria, Italy and Rumania into the war.

LA CHUTE DU RÉGIME TSARISTE. Edited by J. Polonsky. Paris: Payot, 1927, 592 pp. Fr. 32.

The report of the commission appointed by the provisional government in 1917, and containing valuable testimony by many of the ministers and officials of the old régime.

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THE CATASTROPHE. By Alexander F. Kerensky. New York: Appleton, 1927, 377 pp. $3.00.

This account by the Russian revolutionary leader is on the whole rather thin and disappointing, but nevertheless takes its place as an important document for the study of the Russian overturn.

NEW GOVERNMENTS OF EASTERN EUROPE. By Malbone W. Graham, Jr. New York: Holt, 1927, 835 pp. $5.00.

A text, supplementing the author's book on the governments of Central Europe and presenting all the essential material and information in convenient form regarding Russia, Poland and the Baltic States.

RUSSLAND JENSEITS DER GRENZEN. By Hans von Rimscha. Jena: Frommann, 1927, 238 pp. M. 6.

A unique book, giving the history of the Russian *emigration* from 1921–1926.

DER GROSS-BALKAN. By Italo Zingarelli. Vienna: Amalthea, 1927, 395 pp. M. 7.

Journalistic travelogues on Rumania, Greece, Jugoslavia, Hungary and Austria.

DIE AGRARREFORM IN JUGOSLAWIEN. By Josef Matl. Berlin: Sack, 1927, 137 pp. M. 6.

A valuable pioneer work by a professor at Graz. The book has an interesting historical introduction, a full account of the agrarian legislation, a summary of native criticism.

TRENTE ANS À LA COUR DE BULGARIE. By Mme. Sulanne Petroff. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1927, 284 pp. Fr. 15.

An interesting account of the inside history of the Bulgarian court, covering the years from 1887 to 1918.

LE CONFLIT GRECO-BULGARE D'OCTOBRE 1925. By Georges V. Sarailieff. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1927, Fr. 20.

A systematic treatment of the dispute and of the work of the League in settling it.

LA GRÈCE. Anonymous. Paris: La Vie Technique, 1927, 150 pp. Fr. 15.

A general survey of conditions, published under the auspices of the Greek Foreign Office.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR, 1898–1914. Edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley. London: H. M. S. O. 1927, Vols. I and II, 355 and 430 pp. (New York: British Library of Information. $3.00 per vol.)

These first two volumes of the great publication of the British pre-war correspondence cover the period from 1898 to 1904. Needless to say, there is a wealth of information which has not been available hitherto, though in some respects the student of pre-war diplomacy is bound to be disappointed. There is, for example, hardly a reference to the negotiations for an alliance with Germany prior to 1901, and the reports published almost all lack the brilliance and general grasp so characteristic of a good many of the documents in the German collection. The outstanding problems here dealt with are those of the Far East, beginning with the occupation of Kiao-Chow and Port Arthur, running through the Boxer troubles and the Yangste Agreement of 1900 and following the course of events through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the negotiations preceding the Russo-Japanese War. Much light is thrown upon the exceedingly complicated international relations of the period, and this alone would make the collection indispensable. The other major problem dealt with is that of the Franco-English Entente of

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1904, the documents showing that the initiative was taken by the French throughout. The information presented may be said to equal in importance, or even to exceed, all the data we have had up to the present time, and will serve to dispel many current illusions as to the ultimate aims of British policy. It should be remarked that the editing is admirable throughout, and that no effort has been spared to refer the reader to supplementary material.

KING EDWARD VII. A BIOGRAPHY. By Sir Sydney Lee. Volume II. New York: Macmillan, 1927, 745 pp. $8.50.

The second and concluding volume of the standard biography, written at the request of George V and based in large part upon personal papers of the monarch. Whether the reader likes the book or not will depend largely upon his political sympathies, but there is no disputing the fact that this volume is one of the most important contributions to the history of the pre-war period. It appears, to be sure, that King Edward's influence upon affairs, both domestic and foreign, has been grossly exaggerated by some writers, but Sir Sydney's work shows how great was the interest which the King took in matters of state, how inexhaustible was his energy and how wise his general acquaintance with problems and personalities.

FIELD MARSHALL SIR HENRY WILSON. By Major-General Sir Charles E. Callwell. New York: Scribner, 1927, two volumes, $10.00.

A work based to a large extent upon the diaries of the general, and hardly less important than the biography of Edward VII. In an age when militarism is generally discredited and loose talk of an idealistic nature is all too prevalent it is rather instructive to study the life of an out-and-out military man of great ability and determination, and useful to be reminded of the realistic outlook on things political. Wilson had no use whatsoever for the sentimental approach, and this unusually frank and honest account of his life and career is a valuable cross-section of recent world history.

LORD NORTHCLIFFE: A STUDY. By R. Macnair Wilson. London: Benn, 1927, 304 pp. 15/.

Written by a friend and admirer, this biography of the great journalist can hardly be regarded as a just appraisal of his real influence or importance, though it adds many interesting facts to our knowledge.

WINSTON CHURCHILL. By "Ephesian." London: Mills, 1927, 272 pp. 10/6.

A clever and telling critique of the man and his policy as revealed in his writings.

BRITISH WAR FINANCE. By Henry F. Grady. New York: Columbia University Press, 1927, 316 pp. $5.00.

A careful scholarly treatment, based upon all available material.

STATECRAFT. By William Sanderson. London: Methuen, 1927, 146 pp. 7/6.

A provocative discussion of English politics, which the author looks upon as an expression of the race.

LIBERAL POINTS OF VIEW. Edited by H. L. Nathan and H. H. Williams. London: Benn, 1927, 328 pp. 7/6.

A series of addresses by a number of prominent Liberals, including Gilbert Murray, J. A. Spender, J. M. Keynes, R. Mins and others. The subjects are by no means all political, but cover problems such as Production, Free Trade, Unemployment and Foreign Policy. On the whole, an excellent survey of present day Liberal outlook.

LIFE, JOURNALISM AND POLITICS. By J. A. Spender. London: Cassell, 1927, 253, 232 pp. 42/.

The reminiscences of the well-known liberal and former editor of the *Westminster Gazette*. The presentation is charming and the viewpoint interesting, while there are a number of important contributions to the recent domestic and foreign history of the Empire.

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RECOLLECTIONS OF THE IRISH WAR. By Darrell Figgis. London: Benn, 1927, 309 pp. 16/.

A fascinating though strange account of experiences in the stormy period from 1914 to 1922.

THE GROWTH OF CANADIAN NATIONAL FEELING. By W. Stewart Wallace. Toronto: Macmillan, 1927, 85 pp.

A well-written essay, tracing the effect of the constitutional development on the growth of a national consciousness.

LES CANADIENS FRANÇAIS ET LE CONFÉDÉRATION CANADIENNE. By Albert Lévesque. Montreal: Action Française, 1927, 145 pp.

An evaluation of the influence and activity of the French element since the confederation.

INDIA TOMORROW. By Khub Dekhta Age. New York: Oxford University Press, 1927, 3/6.

A stimulating examination of the problems which have arisen from the introduction of dyarchy.

THE GARDEN OF ADONIS. By Al. Carthill. London: Blackwoods, 1927, 15/.

A capable and arresting survey. The author, well-known for his "The Lost Dominion," here continues his pessimistic prognostications.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE RELATIONS OF INDIAN STATES WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. By K. M. Panikkar. London: Hopkinson, 1927, 201 pp. 10/6.

An able and forceful study, the author concentrating on an examination of the relations of the leading states.

THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA. By Edgar H. Brookes. Pretoria: Van Shaik, 1927, 99 pp.

A popular presentation of current problems, written by a liberal professor.

THE CAPE COLOUR QUESTION. By W. M. Macmillan. London: Faber, 1927, 320 pp. 21/.

An important and provocative historical work, recounting the Hottentot problem with the aid of the Philip papers and drawing an interesting parallel to the present color question.

AN AFRICA FOR AFRICANS. By Arthur S. Cripps. New York: Longmans, 1927, 217 pp. $3.60.

A plea for extreme segregation and autonomy for the blacks.

THE COLONIZATION OF NEW ZEALAND. By J. S. Marais. New York: Oxford University Press, 1927, 369 pp. $5.00.

An exhaustive scholarly treatise.

The Near East

THE NEAR EAST YEARBOOK. By H. T. Montague Bell. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1927, 943 pp. $7.50.

An American edition of an English handbook, with the texts of recent treaties and a *Who's Who* appended, the value of which can hardly be exaggerated.

LETTERS. By Gertrude Bell. London: Benn, 1927, two volumes, 42/.

The correspondence of a remarkable woman and one of the most arresting figures in the recent history of the Near East.

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LE RÉVEIL D'UNE RACE. By René Marchand. Paris: Nouvelle Société d'Éditions, 1927, Fr. 12.

The well-known French radical returns, duly impressed, from a visit to the land of Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

MODERN PALESTINE. By A. S. Waldstein. New York: Bloch, 1927, 229 pp. $2.00.

A general review of present conditions and problems.

THE JEWISH QUESTION AND ZIONISM. By P. Horowitz. London: Benn, 1927, 127 pp. 2/6.

An interesting review of the Zionist position.

EGYPT. By George Young. New York: Scribner, 1927, $5.00.

Valuable as one of the few available reviews of the history of modern Egypt since the time of Napoleon and Mehemet Ali. The viewpoint is that of the Laborite and the treatment of English policy is exceedingly harsh throughout. Perhaps the most provocative part is the discussion of present-day Anglo-Egyptian relations.

Africa

I SPEAK OF AFRICA. By William Plomer. London: Hogarth, 1927, 260 pp. 7/6.

An able essay, forcefully presenting the urgency of current issues.

ALBUM DE LA GUERRE DU RIF. By Henry Clerisse. Paris: Desgrandchamps, 1927, Fr. 145.

Richly illustrated and supplemented with the text of important documents.

L'AFRIQUE EQUATORIALE FRANÇAISE. Anonymous. Paris: La Vie Technique, 1927, 120 pp. Fr. 15.

A general survey, published under the auspices of the colonial government.

The Far East

L'ANTAGONISMO ANGLO-RUSSO IN ASIA. By Giambattista Mazzolini. Pavia: Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, 1927, 72 pp.

A much needed historical review of Anglo-Russian relations in Asia from 1907 to 1927, unfortunately somewhat sketchy.

CHINA. By Friedrich Otte. Gotha: Perthes, 1927, 111 pp. M. 16.

The author, for many years a customs official in China, gives an excellent brief survey of the finances, trade, industry, banking and general resources.

THE RED THEOLOGY IN THE FAR EAST. By Charles H. Coates. London: Thynne and Jarvis, 1927, 202 pp. 2/6.

The title adequately characterizes the work.

SHANGHAI. ITS MUNICIPALITY AND THE CHINESE. By A. M. Kotenev. New York: Stechert, 1927, 565 pp. $8.50.

An exhaustive treatise on the peculiar status of Shanghai and the problems arising therefrom.

AN ASIAN ARCADY. By Reginald Le May. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1927, 274 pp. $6.00.

A beautiful and instructive historical, topographical and ethnological survey of Siam, by the Acting Adviser of the Siamese Government.

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Latin America

LATIN AMERICA: MEN AND MARKETS. By Clayton S. Cooper. Boston: Ginn, 1927, 475 pp. $3.00.

A general descriptive and reference work, stressing the economic side.

READINGS IN HISPANIC-AMERICAN HISTORY. By N. Andrew N. Cleven. Boston: Ginn, 1927, 791 pp. $3.60.

A much-needed selection of representative documents and readings, conveniently arranged.

ZWISCHEN LA PLATA UND HUDSON. By Walter Hagemann. Berlin: Germania, 1927, 270 pp. M. 3.50.

Good on the political conditions of Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Mexico.

THE MEXICAN QUESTION. By William E. Walling. New York: Robins, 1927, 205 pp. $2.00.

A review of Mexican-American relations during the administrations of Obregon and Calles.

MODERN MEXICO AND ITS PROBLEMS. By J. W. Brown. London: Labor Publishing Company, 1927, 128 pp. 4/6.

A clear formulation of the radical standpoint.

MÉJICO ANTE EL MUNDO. By Plutarco E. Calles. Barcelona: Cervantes, 1927, 252 pp. Pes. 3.

The Mexican President reviews the situation in a very interesting and able book.

HISTORIA DE LOS LIMITOS DEL PERU. By Juan Angulo Puente Arnao. Lima: Imprenta de la Intendencia General de Guerra, 1927.

The Tacna-Arica problem from the Peruvian angle.

LE PARAGUAY. By Cecilio Baez. Paris: Alcan, 1927, 124 pp. Fr. 20.

A descriptive work of merit, by the rector of the National University, former minister to France and Great Britain.

Miscellaneous

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PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OFFICIALLY PRINTED

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE NEWS RELEASES

The Department of State, Division of Current Information, issues to the press copies of documents made public from time to time. Present releases are listed below. Application for authentic mimeographed copies should be made to the Division of Current Information, Department of State, Washington, D. C. They are to be distinguished from publications of the Department, which issue from the Government Printing Office and are usually on sale at the Office of the Superintendent of Documents, who will furnish price lists on request.

ARMAMENT — Text of British proposals at the Geneva Conference, S. D. 261, July 28.

Joint declaration of American, British and Japanese delegations at the Geneva Conference, S. D. 262, Aug. 4.

Address of Hugh S. Gibson at Geneva Conference, S. D. 263, Aug. 4.

Statement by Secretary of State in regard to failure of Geneva Conference, S. D. 264, Aug. 4.

CANADA — Requirements to be met by American non-Government aircraft entering Canada, S. D. 265, Aug. 8.

CHINA — Legation in Peking advises that situation does not appear to warrant change in policy as to protection of American citizens, S. D. 266, Aug. 18.

ETHIOPIA — Remarks to the President by Dr. C. Martin of Ethiopia, S. D. 267, Sept. 17.

FOREIGN SERVICE — Letter from Secretary of State to Stephen G. Porter, concerning administration by Department of State of Foreign Service personnel, S. D. 268, Aug. 5.

Plans adopted by the Foreign Service Buildings Commission, S. D. 269, Oct. 18.

FRANCE — Notes exchanged concerning questions to be considered by the International Telegraph Conference at Paris, 1925, and by the International Radiotelegraph Conference to be held in Washington, S. D. 270, Sept. 28.

Aide-mémoires presented to the French Foreign Office, in regard to tariff question by French Foreign Office, Sept. 14 and Sept. 30, S. D. 273 and 272, Oct. 3.

GREAT BRITAIN—Notes exchanged between American Ambassador in London and British Foreign Office regarding releases of property seized under the American and British Trading with the Enemy Acts, S. D. 274, Aug. 13.

Exchange of checks between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador in settlement of awards rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal, S. D. 275, Oct. 1.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS — U. S. Government accepts invitation to participate in Third General Conference on Communications and Transit, S. D. 276, Aug. 22.

Invitation to take part in an international conference on import and export restrictions and prohibitions, to be held on Oct. 17, and acceptance thereof, S. D. 277, Sept. 19.

MEXICO — Convention extending life of General Claims Commission between the U. S. and Mexico, and list of claims, S. D. 278, Aug. 16.

NICARAGUA — Letter from Secretary of State to president of the American Federation of Labor in regard to Nicaraguan conditions, S. D. 279, July 18.

Telegram from the American legation concerning Nicaraguan constabulary, S. D. 280, Aug. 6.

Statement handed to General Chamorro at the Department in regard to his candidacy for president, S. D. 281, Oct. 22.

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